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5830
Ser N01L/022
3 Apr 23

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on RDML Bradley D. Dunham, USN, ltr 5830 of 28 Jan 23

From: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
To: File

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO COMMAND CLIMATE AND SAILOR QUALITY OF LIFE ONBOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) INCLUSIVE OF SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES THAT IMPACT CARRIERS UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE OR CONSTRUCTION IN NEWPORT NEWS

1. In April of 2022, the tragic deaths, by suicide, of three Sailors attached to USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) launched a series of investigations, to include required line of duty determinations and a narrowly focused investigation to determine the proximate causes of the suicides, and whether any correlations existed between the three victims. The findings of the GW Suicide Investigation determined that there was no causal connection or correlation between the three victims. In the fall of 2022, the Navy concluded the GW Suicide Investigation and shared that report with Congress. The report was personally shared with the three families involved and made public in December 2022. During the course of the GW Suicide Investigation, it became clear that a broader investigation was necessary to address concerns for the Quality of Service impacts our Sailors face during extended maintenance and construction periods in all public and private shipyards. Therefore a third, comprehensive Quality of Service (QoS = Quality of Life + Quality of Work) investigation and assessment was convened. At the end of January 2023, the Navy completed this expansive and comprehensive review of the issues and programs that affect our Sailors' QoS in the shipyard environment.

2. This endorsement finalizes the QoS Investigation and provides succinct and actionable recommendations aimed at implementing a number of immediate and long-term changes to improve the QoS for our Sailors. Several deadline extensions were granted to the investigating officer due to the large volume of material that needed to be thoroughly reviewed. However, the most important factor for me was ensuring my team had the time necessary to complete a thorough, all-encompassing investigation and to ensure all facets of the problem and impacts were collected, evaluated, weighed, and presented to me for consideration.

3. I thoroughly reviewed the subject investigation and the previous endorsements. I approve the findings and opinions as previously endorsed. I have reduced and combined many of the previous recommendations to ensure that the impacts of these recommendations are succinct, well understood, and clearly focused on making the greatest impact to the QoS challenges faced in the shipyard environment.

4. Preliminary Statement:

a. While the Navy is a resilient force, we are not immune from the same challenges in maintaining individual physical and mental health that affect the nation that we serve. The Navy is working daily, and aggressively, to ensure support and resources are available to Sailors in the shipyards, at sea, and at home.

b. This investigation was conducted to assess the QoS concerns associated with crews assigned to units conducting extended maintenance and construction periods in public and private shipyards. The investigation incorporated multi-disciplinary subject matter experts from numerous stakeholders to identify program areas that require increased attention, support, or resources. Although this investigation specifically focused on assessing the QoS concerns of crews undergoing the Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) process, the assessment and resulting recommendations have general and scalable application across the Navy for crews assigned to any vessel undergoing prolonged, depot maintenance, or new construction availabilities. I believe that the RCOH process as well as other prolonged availabilities need fundamental changes to improve the QoS for our most valuable assets, our Sailors.

c. Over the past year, the Navy has been working diligently to immediately identify and solve problems as they become apparent throughout the investigative process. This is directly aligned with the Navy's "Get Real, Get Better" (GRGB) campaign. Through GRGB, the Navy intends to instill a culture that empowers our people to find and fix problems at the lowest levels, and to raise issues to leadership when they need additional assistance. "Get Real" is about having the courage to self-assess, and to build teams that embrace honest, hard, transparent looks at our performance to understand our actual strengths and shortcomings. We must be our own toughest critics. This mindset does, and will continue to, help move the Navy forward to overcome the numerous challenges we face — especially, the mental health challenges confronting our nation. It is with this mindset that the Navy has been doggedly working to improve Sailor QoS in the shipyard and on all our Navy ships and installations. The Navy has already taken immediate action to identify collaborative solutions with Huntington Ingalls Industries and the City of Newport News to improve QoS for our Sailors at this shipyard. However, certain long-term solutions will require congressional funding and/or authorization.

d. The infrastructure to support Sailor QoS in the area surrounding Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipyard (HII-NNS) is insufficient to support the crews of multiple aircraft carriers and submarines in overhaul and new construction in the shipyard. There remains inadequate parking, transportation, access to food and nutritional options, training space, physical fitness facilities, and housing options available to support the number of Sailors assigned to ships and submarines in the shipyard. This directly contributed to poor Sailor QoS and morale. New and improved permanent infrastructure and facilities are needed at or in close proximity to HII-NNS to ensure our Sailors work in an environment that meets industrial standards and live in adequate accommodations separated from the same industrial environment.

e. An integral part of the solution requires Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to review the contracting process to incentivize quality on-time completion of new construction and overhaul of ships and submarines across all public and private shipyards. Without on-time incentives, current delivery delays will continue, which places more Sailors in the shipyard environments than current facilities and manning can support, compounding the already backed-up and oversubscribed shipyards. This is a risk too large to continue unchecked.

f. I concur that policies, procedures, and resources must be adjusted to increase shipyard Sailors' pay, health, and wellbeing. Personnel issues ranging from ship's force manning during RCOH, to Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) and Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) entitlements for Sailors assigned to ships in prolonged, depot availabilities, to increasing access to adequate food, rest, fitness, parking, mental health and chaplain resources need heighted attention. However, I also believe there is a need to expand the application of some of these efforts across the Fleet. Namely, when not underway, no Sailor should be required to live on a ship or barge, with the exception of the duty section.

g. While I hold myself accountable to improve QoS for our Sailors, in the spirit of GRGB, I acknowledge that many of these recommendations require authorities and funding that are held above or outside of USFFC. Accordingly, we will forward this endorsement to the cognizant organizations for their consideration in helping the Navy address these difficult issues.

h. The command and control lines of authority of units in depot availabilities require immediate action. Units in Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) level depot availabilities should fall under the administrative control of the service authority associated with the Fleet Commander in which the shipyard is geographically located and not assigned to a Combatant Commander during the shipyard period. Units in the shipyard should be under formal C2 service authority versus memoranda of agreement or understanding.

5. Findings:

a. I concur with all findings, as modified by Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) and Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic (CNAL).

6. Opinions:

a. I concur with all opinions, as modified by CNAF and CNAL.

7. Recommendations:

a. I do not concur with the recommendations as written in the investigation or as modified by CNAF and CNAL. To ensure this investigation has succinct and actionable recommendations, I have consolidated or replaced all the original and previously endorsed recommendations with the following recommendations:

Personnel.

(1) OPNAV N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center study to identify RCOH "essential" manning. The study should establish minimum acceptable RCOH crew size by rating, for each of the different phases of the RCOH: 12 months prior to the ship entering RCOH, overhaul of the ship, testing and establishing material conditions to meet standards for redelivery of the ship to the fleet, and to safely take the ship back to sea.

(2) OPNAV N1 develop a program providing first-term Sailors assigned to ships in a maintenance facility for longer than one (1) year the opportunity to cross-deck to operational units.

(3) OPNAV N1 develop a split-tour program that ensures first-term Sailors are not assigned to aircraft carriers in RCOH for longer than two (2) years.

(4) OPNAV N4 / Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) develop a Navy Exchange Micro Mart expansion strategy to provide increased access to nutritional food options to Sailors at private and public shipyards, remote bases, and overseas.

(5) OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change the BAS policy to provide BAS for enlisted Sailors during RCOH during the period of entering drydock to redelivery, regardless of galley operations.

(6) OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change the BAS policy to provide BAS for all enlisted Sailors, regardless of rank and sea/shore rotation.

(7) OPNAV N9 determine ability to provide funding for crew meals, at no cost to the Sailor, during RCOH for the periods when the shipboard food service is available regardless of the BAS status of the crew to facilitate duty section and onboard crew meals.

(8) OPNAV N9 determine ability to provide funding for crew meals, at no cost to the Sailor, during all shipyard maintenance availabilities for periods when the shipboard food service is available regardless of the BAS status of the crew to facilitate duty section and onboard crew meals.

Parking.

(9) PEO Aircraft Carriers with support from Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) / Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) / Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion & Repair - Newport News (SUPSHIPNN) / In-Service Aircraft Carrier Program Manager (PMS-312) conduct an analysis of alternatives to Sailor parking for ships at HII-NNS. The analysis should include the feasibility of creating a single centralized parking installation, the transit time to and from the parking to the ship, and limitations of local traffic infrastructure, to ensure QoS, including safety, is a priority.

(10) PEO Aircraft Carriers modify contracting with HII-NNS to improve contract language to provide more centralized parking for Sailors assigned to ships in the shipyard and for shipyard-provided transportation to and from provided parking.

(11) Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) / CNO work with industry, local government officials, and legislative partners to build out an overall Navy parking strategy across all public and private shipyards.

Habitability.

(12) U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), in conjunction with U.S. Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT), NAVSEA 05, and Type Commanders (TYCOMs), develop a universal definition, based on a technical requirement, for shipboard habitability, for all ship types and barges. This definition shall be codified in instruction and as the basis for deciding when to conduct crew-move aboard.

(13) USFFC / USPACFLT require commands to conduct a suitability survey before crew-move aboard to ensure living and working spaces are safe and ready for the crew in accordance with the universal definition and established technical requirements. In addition to the typical inspection team defined in the zone inspection bill referenced in OPNAVINST 3120.32D, the suitability survey team shall consist of a Supply Corps Officer, an Environmental Health Officer, and an Industrial Hygiene Officer.

(14) SECNAV / CNO implement policy that, when not underway, no Sailor should live on a ship or barge, with the exception of the duty section.

(15) OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change policy to provide BAH for all Sailors or provide Unaccompanied Housing (UH) for Sailors who do not currently rate BAH.

(16) NAVSEA review public and private shipyard contract language to establish the Department of Defense (DoD) standard for contractor supplied housing. If the DoD standard cannot be met, then take the following actions: (1) submit a waiver request via the respective TYCOM, CNIC, and Fleet Commander to CNO or SECNAV, approval level would be dependent on time required to meet DoD standards; (2) develop a plan for contractor upgrades to contractor supplied housing to meet DoD standards; and/or (3) include funding to contract suitable off-site UH.

Facilities.

(17) TYCOM / SUPSHIPNN / PMS-312 coordinate and assign lead to provide adequate ashore QoS facilities (e.g., Physical Fitness, Training, MWR access, etc.) for aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines at HII-NNS and other shipyards as applicable.

(18) NAVSEA develop detailed courses of actions to design and construct a system of UH, parking, shuttle transportation, and centralized support facilities for training, recreation, physical fitness, and administration services with capacity to support the crews of two aircraft carriers in RCOH, one new construction aircraft carrier, one submarine in refueling complex overhaul, and two new construction submarines (to support future U.S. and AUKUS shipbuilding requirements).

(19) NAVSEA conduct a programmatic review of private shipyards' capacity to deliver program of record of new construction and refueling complex overhaul aircraft carriers, new construction and overhaul submarines, and the SSN AUKUS program to ensure that the private shipyards can fully meet their contractual capacity and capability requirements.

(20) CNIC / NAVSEA / CNAL / Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic (CSL) determine capacity of the existing Sailor support infrastructure at HII-NNS (unaccompanied housing, parking, shuttle transportation, training, physical fitness, recreation and support facility capacity) and limit ships and submarines in HII-NNS shipyard until the support structure has the appropriate capacity to accommodate the number of Sailors associated with the crews of those ships.

General Navy Programs.

(21) TYCOMs implement and/or execute enhanced governance processes to ensure compliance and Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) oversight of established Navy Programs for all vessels in shipyards.

(22) OPNAV N17, in coordination with CNIC, reduce, consolidate, and centralize established Navy programs (e.g., Urinalysis, Physical Readiness, etc.) to facilitate efficiency and reduce the number of separate command programs in geographic locations.

(23) OPNAV N17 define what the minimum statistically significant participation level is for Command Climate Assessments (CCAs) based on scaled command size and develop guidance to ensure that CCAs meet that minimum to be considered scientifically relevant and reliable.

(24) OPNAV N1 develop Service-specific Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) questions regarding suicide prevention and awareness.

(25) OPNAV N2N6 evaluate implementation of a shipboard variant of the Interactive Customer Evaluation system or equivalent system to improve Sailor ability to anonymously communicate concerns directly with leadership and/or appropriate stakeholders.

(26) Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) / TYCOMs review, assess, and modify, as necessary, pipeline training for Sailors to ensure inclusion of prioritized Navy-wide

programs and initiatives in accordance with Ready Relevant Learning / Career-Long Learning Continuum requirements.

(27) OPNAV N17 conduct assessment of Command Resiliency Team / Human Factors Council programs to identify best practices for implementation at scale and revise applicable instructions as required to codify best practices.

(28) NETC/OPNAV N17 review current Navy suicide prevention training and commercial suicide prevention programs to determine if commercial programs should be resourced and implemented across the Navy to improve effectiveness.

Medical.

(29) Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) conduct review of Drug and Alcohol treatment programs to assess root causes associated with delays in Sailors obtaining timely treatment.

(30) BUMED / TYCOMs review the policy for effectiveness that requires Level I substance abuse treatment be conducted aboard aircraft carriers when in homeport / shipyards.

(31) CNIC / Fleet and Family Support Centers (FFSC) review deployed resiliency counselor training to ensure it adequately covers Navy-wide programs as well as positional roles and responsibilities.

(32) CNIC review and make recommendations to improve incentive pay structures designed to recruit and retain counselors at FFSC.

(33) DoD / DON / CNO prioritize mental health clinician recruitment and retention to ensure appropriate clinical mental health services for all Sailors.

(34) CNAF determine the requirements for additional mental health providers and behavioral health technicians for each aircraft carrier and ensure resources are available via the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and activity manning documents.

(35) CNIC evaluate the effectiveness of Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life (SAIL) referral system and any barriers to program participation.

(36) BUMED / NETC evaluate sufficiency of medical and mental health components in current Ready Relevant Learning / Career-Long Learning Continuum efforts to ensure they effectively provide training on how to mitigate reprisal and stigmas regarding medical and mental health services.

(37) BUMED / U.S. Military Entry Processing Command (USMEPCOM) enhance the annual review on administrative separation data for behavioral health conditions to monitor ongoing trends. Analysis should include specific behavioral health conditions leading to

administrative separation; methods for identifying specific behavioral health conditions; and methods to identify these conditions earlier before individuals enter the Service and/or the Fleet.

(38) USMEPCOM assess current behavioral health screening processes and procedures in an effort to identify potentially disqualifying behavioral health conditions prior to service entry.

(39) In conjunction with the USFFC Limited Duty (LIMDU) Sprint team efforts, TYCOMs monitor number of limited duty personnel assigned on a month-to-month basis to provide indications and warnings of changes in the work environment in comparison to historical norms and take actions to mitigate any adverse impacts resulting from these changes.

(40) CNAL establish a billet for a staff Force Psychologist.

(41) USFFC and USPACFLT evaluate if staff Force Psychologists are required at other TYCOMs.

Command and Control (C2) / RCOH.

(42) CNO shift administrative control (ADCON) of Pacific-based aircraft carriers and submarines to USFFC / CNAL / CSL as applicable for CNO depot availabilities on the East Coast to strengthen C2, ensure unity of command and effort, and clarify accountability.

(43) CNAL, once assigned as TYCOM for RCOH maintenance periods, develop governance and monitoring processes to provide continuity across coasts for aircraft carriers and monitor RCOH execution across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. CNAL shall lead a stakeholder working group to be conducted 12 months prior to entering RCOH to ensure RCOH readiness to commence requirements are on plan.

(44) CNAP / CNAL review and update COMNAVAIRPAC / COMNAVAIRLANT Instruction 3000.1 to clarify C2, with a specific focus on program oversight, missions, functions, and tasks.

(45) USFFC / USPACFLT comptrollers in concert with OPNAV and SECNAV Office of Budget review the feasibility of assigning CNAL as Naval Supervising Authority Control for the Sailor QoL portion of RCOH Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funding. Apportioned CNAL RCOH SCN funding must be sufficient to afford off-ship berthing for all Sailors no later than the start of RCOH until ship's redelivery.

(46) NAVSEA / PEO Aircraft Carriers evaluate, assess, and modify current processes for development and execution of integrated maintenance schedules in RCOH. This evaluation should also include a review of the contract strategy to ensure on-time delivery of vessels undergoing prolonged, depot maintenance or new construction availabilities.

(47) PEO Aircraft Carriers submit into Navy Lessons Learned Information System the Carrier Team One (CT1) lessons learned database on RCOH lessons learned to ensure the widest possible audience for those seeking information on common issues, to include QoS, related to long duration maintenance availabilities.

GW Specific Recommendation.

(48) CNAP / CNAL take action on all recommendations that are specific to USS GEORGE WASHINGTON to ensure programmatic compliance and corrective actions are being executed.

8. The recommendations above cover both short- and long-term actions, many of which have associated efforts that are already well underway.

9. While these efforts represent substantial improvements, their impacts can only be realized if they are acted upon and tracked to completion, which go beyond the capability of any single command and must become a Navy priority. More must be done to ensure that as we advance these QoS recommendations, we improve and properly resource how we maintain the Fleet while also enhancing the mental and physical readiness of our Sailors in the challenging shipyard environment.

10. The recommendations and corrective actions in this report should be formally tracked by the CNO's Learning to Action Board (L2AB) process.

11. My point of contact is (b)(6), and he may be reached at (b)(6) (b)(6), or (b)(6) @us.navy.mil.

D. L. CAUDLE

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5830
Ser N00 087
23 Feb 23

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on RDML Bradley D. Dunham, USN ltr 5830 of 28 Jan 23

From: Commander, Naval Air Forces
To: Commander, U. S. Fleet Forces Command

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO COMMAND CLIMATE AND SAILOR QUALITY OF LIFE ONBOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) INCLUSIVE OF SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES THAT IMPACT CARRIERS UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE OR CONSTRUCTION IN NEWPORT NEWS

1. Forwarded, concurring with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating officer (IO) as modified as previously endorsed and as modified below.

2. **Preliminary Statement.**

a. This investigation was conducted to assess the Quality of Service (QoS = Quality of Life Quality of Work) concerns associated with crews assigned to units conducting extended maintenance and construction periods in public and private shipyards, which was ordered by Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL) in response to findings from the tragic deaths of three Sailors attached to USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) (GW) in April of 2022. While no direct correlation was found between the three deaths, QoS challenges were evident. This report highlights the QoS challenges found on GW and at Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipyard (HII-NNS). The unique demands and added stressors on the thousands of Sailors working and living in the shipyard at HII-NNS cannot be fully captured without physically experiencing that environment. Based on my review of this report, I believe that the Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) process needs a fundamental shift to improve not only Sailor QoS, but also improve the quality and timely throughput of the CVN through RCOH. Our Sailors and our Nation deserve nothing less.

b. From this investigation, it is clear the infrastructure to support Sailor quality of life in the area surrounding HII-NNS is insufficient to support the crews of multiple aircraft carriers in overhaul and new construction in the shipyard. This is evident in findings 1, 2, 3, 51, 54, 57 59 and 60 in which investigators found inadequate parking, inadequate transportation, insufficient training space, and inadequate physical fitness facilities to support the number of Sailors assigned to ships in the shipyard which directly contributed to poor Sailor quality of life and morale. New and improved permanent infrastructure and facilities are needed at or in close proximity to HII-NNS to ensure our Sailors work in an environment that meets industrial standards and live in a comfortable accommodations separated from that same industrial environment. Use of floating accommodation facilities, while still necessary in certain situations, is not adequate to meet the requirements we place on CVNs in RCOH nor do they allow for the necessary services our Sailors need to thrive.

c. Oversight of New Build and RCOH carriers currently occurs within a spectrum of complex command and control relationships, dispersed programmatic oversight, and competing budgetary priorities. This complexity was highlighted in the report's findings. The Command and control of a west coast CVN follows the broad guidance known as the "Inouye Amendment" specifically; "none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be obligated to modify command and control relationships to give Fleet Forces Command operational and administrative control of United States Navy forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet: Provided, that the command and control relationships which existed on October 1, 2004, shall remain in force until a written modification has been proposed to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees: Provided further, that the proposed modification may be implemented 30 days after the notification unless objection is received from either the House or Senate Appropriations Committee: Provided further, that any proposed modification shall not preclude the ability of the commander of United States Pacific Command to meet operational requirements." This verbiage has been inserted in the NDAA and modified to its current form in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2019. In an attempt to satisfy the intent of the amendment, an instruction was developed and signed in February 2019, subject; "Type Commander Responsibilities Applicable During Coast-To-Coast Transfers In support Of Aircraft Carrier Refueling Complex Overhauls." The report's opinions and recommendations clearly identify many breakdowns in administrative control that are both dated and poorly defined in the Type Commander (TYCOM) instruction.

d. PEO Carriers must review the contracting process to incentivize quality on-time completion in order to return these capital assets to the operational commanders. CVNs undergoing RCOH continue to experience unnecessary delays, due to both underfunding of RCOH and the shifting of HII-NNS priorities away from RCOH work to new build CVNs or submarines. Financial incentives must be established for on-time delivery with all combat systems and ships service systems fully functional. Without on-time incentives, current delivery delays will continue, compounding the already backed-up shipyard. This shipyard backlog has put more CVNs and Sailors in the shipyard than current HII-NNS facilities and manning can support.

e. Ship's force makeup for a CVN in RCOH must be analyzed top-down to ensure the RCOH crew composition meets the needs of both shipyard and our Sailor requirements. RCOH demands a different crew composition with different skillsets than deploying CVNs. A professional RCOH crew, manned with the appropriate engineering and technical skills, could better partner with HII-NNS to effectively and efficiently execute RCOH. No first-tour non-nuclear or RCOH essential Sailor should ever be assigned to a CVN in RCOH for longer than two years.

f. Sailor Quality of Life (QoL) must be a priority for every unit commander. What is evident from this investigation is that units in a shipyard experience uniquely challenging conditions that require more QoL resources and attention than deployable CVNs at any other phase of the optimized fleet readiness plan. Policies, procedures, and resources must be adjusted to increase shipyard Sailor's pay, health, and wellbeing. I agree with the investigation recommendations on these issues, such as increasing BAH and BAS allotments, increasing access to adequate food, rest, fitness options and convenient parking, increasing staffing for chaplains, mental health counsellors,

Command Resiliency Team members and Fleet and Family Support Center services. Additionally, and specifically for shipyard crews, an increased availability of social media or cellular communications methods is required to communicate to a crew that has little or no access to a standard workspace or computer. These unique QoL factors that CVNs experience during RCOH negatively affect crew connectedness and morale.

3. **Findings**. I concur with the findings as submitted, except as listed below.

a. Finding 87 is added. "Underfunding of USS *George Washington* RCOH and shifting of shipyard priorities to USS *Gerald R. Ford* created undue stress upon the crew of USS *George Washington*. The resulting delays and introduction of USS *John C. Stennis* to HII-NNS only exacerbated pre-existing strain on resources and workplace stressors of shipyard life faced by Sailors."

b. Finding 88 is added. "Due to the excessive length spent by USS *George Washington* at HII-NNS, it experienced the equivalent of three crew turnovers creating additional leadership challenges."

c. Finding 89 is added. "Existing RCOH contract structure does not properly incentivize HII-NNS to complete within the expected timeframes."

d. Finding 90 is added. "HII-NNS will continue to be the homeport for thousands of Sailors manning New Build, RCOH, and inactivation CVNs for the foreseeable future."

e. Finding 91 is added. "Floating Accommodation Facilities are not adequate for long term use at HII-NNS and should be limited to supporting duty section personnel and office space needs that require close proximity to the CVN."

4. **Opinions.** I note the opinions of the IO and add chapter 6, a summary list of investigation opinions for ease of reading.

5. **Recommendations.** I concur with the recommendations as submitted, except as listed below.

a. Recommendation 1 is modified as follows to account for the time required for a Sailor to enter the orders window, receive orders, transfer, attend school and arrive at their new command: change "1-year" to "2-years".

b. Recommendations 2 and 5 are modified to add "The study should also establish minimum acceptable RCOH crew size by rating, taking into account phases of the RCOH required to overhaul the ship, test and establish conditions to redeliver the ship and safely take the ship to sea following redelivery. Additionally, OPNAV N1 and N98 should also direct an evaluation of an alternative RCOH manpower solution, the creation of a professional RCOH engineering and technical shore-duty augmentation detachment that would remain permanently stationed at the shipyard to solely

conduct RCOH duty to optimize time and quality in RCOH and allow for CVN operationally trained manpower to be distributed across the deployable CVNs."

c. Recommendations 15 and 81 are modified to recommend the CNO consider vice direct a shift in ADCON of Pacific-based CVNs to USFFC/CNAL for RCOH; however, the current TYCOM instruction should be modified to incorporate the oversight opinions and recommendations identified in this investigation. The modified instruction will be coordinated with CNAL and echelon II Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Modified recommendations follow:

(1) **Recommendation 15**: CNO should consider shifting administrative control (ADCON) of Pacific-based CVNs to USFFC/CNAL for RCOH to clarify C2 and ensure unity of command and effort.

(2) **Recommendation 81**: TYCOMs should update COMNAVAIRPAC/CONAVAIRLANT Instruction 3000.1 to clarify C2 while CNO considers ADCON shift.

d. Recommendations 6, 10, 17, 18, 20, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 58, 74, and 78 are concurred with as written, with follow-up and oversight of the TYCOM Force Resilience Team.

Action Update: CNAP has established a Force Resilience Team (FRT) to review fleet wide Sailor programs and conduct unit Resilience Assist Visits (RAV). During a RAV the FRT assesses COE programs, provides training, and shares best practices with each unit. Programs and services reviewed include the command resilience team (CRT), CRT-Human Factors Council (CRT-HFC), mental health services, medical services, religious ministry services, suicide prevention, command climate, military equal opportunity (MEO) program, suicide prevention, sexual assault and response prevention, command indoctrination, command sponsorship, drug and alcohol abuse prevention and response, Morale Welfare and Recreation, Expanded Operational Stress Control (EOSC) program, Warrior Toughness program, command manning and training programs. CNAP has established a People Centered Metrics Dashboard to track those programs and assist in identifying destructive behavior trends to prompt early TYCOM intervention. A CNAP FRT assist visit to the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT was completed 30-31 January 2023. I direct the CNAP FRT to execute an initial assist visit to every CVN by the conclusion of CY23.

e. Recommendations 8 is concurred with as written.

Action Update: As of December 2022, on new DEOCS registrations CCS personnel listed on the registration will now have a DEOCS account created for them. This allows the CCSs to view the DEOCS registration, monitor the survey while it is in the field, and download results in the Interactive Dashboard.

f. Recommendation 9 is concurred with as written.

Action Update: DEOCS can now be completed using a personal computer or mobile device which improves Sailor ability to privately and conveniently access the DEOCS survey.

g. Recommendation 71 is concurred with as written.

Action Update: In the POM-25 submission CNAF included one (1) additional mental health provider (Licensed Clinical Social Worker) and one (1) additional enlisted Behavioral Health Technician (BHT) to each aircraft carrier, which will double the mental health support to each CVN. This additional mental health manning was ranked #2 of the top 5 manpower investments by OPNAV N98.

h. Recommendation 84 is modified as follows to add: "Apportioned CNAL RCOH SCN funding must be sufficient to afford off-ship berthing for all Sailors no later than the start of RCOH until ship's redelivery."

i. Recommendations 14, 27, 84 (added from above actions) and 85 will be incorporated into the updated "Type Commander Responsibilities Applicable During Coast-To-Coast Transfers In support Of Aircraft Carrier Refueling Complex Overhauls" instruction.

j. Recommendations 46, 47, 50, 59 are GW specific and will be actioned by CNAP.

k. Recommendation 88 is added: "Recommend OPNAV N17 review and align current programmatic oversight responsibility, to include clarification and manning requirements, to ensure TYCOMs have sufficient personnel to exercise effective oversight for ADCON subordinates."

l. Recommendation 89 is added. "CNIC/PEO Aircraft Carriers centralize Sailor support services at a Navy owned and operated facility, in a secure location in close proximity, and with convenient government provided transportation, to HII-NNS. At a minimum, this should facility should be able to support medical/dental, mental health, FFSC, legal, MWR, Mini-NEX, barbershop, NMCI computer lab, physical fitness facilities, training, command career counseling, and admin."

m. Recommendation 90 is added. "CNIC/PEO Aircraft Carriers design and construct a system of unaccompanied housing, parking, shuttle transportation, and centralized support facilities for training, recreation, physical fitness and administration services with capacity to support the crews of two aircraft carriers in refueling complex overhaul and one new construction aircraft carrier."

n. Recommendation 91 is added. "CNIC/PEO Aircraft Carriers/CNAF determine capacity of the existing Sailor support infrastructure at HII-NNS (unaccompanied housing, parking, shuttle transportation, training, physical fitness, recreation and support facility capacity) and limit ships in HII-NNS shipyard until the support structure has capacity to accommodate the number of Sailors associated with the crews of these ships."

o. Recommendation 92 is added. "OPNAV N17/CNAP provide reliable, easily accessible DoD approved social media mechanisms available on personal devices to enable Commanding Officers and unit leaders to engage virtually, via text and/or chat with their crew."

p. Recommendation 93 is added. "CNAL establish a billet for a CNAL Force Psychologist."

6. While the Offices Providing Response (OPRs) and Offices Coordinating Response (OCRs) are clearly defined in each recommendation, I recommend that each be given a suspense of no later than six months after release of final endorsement to provide Commander, Naval Air Forces written status update for each assigned action. I also recommend this investigation and endorsements be turned over to the Learning to Action Board (L2AB) for oversight of execution to ensure actions are tracked to completion. The potential lessons learned and corrective actions applied to CVNs in RCOH can be broadly applied to all CVNs in a maintenance availability and to the surface and subsurface shipyard units and facilities.

7. My point of contact is (b)(6), and he may be reached at (b)(6) (b)(6), or (b)(6) @us.navy.mil.

K. R. WHITESELL

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5830
Ser N01L/033
30 Jan 23

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on RDML Dunham, USN ltr of 28 Jan 23

From: Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic
To: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO COMMAND CLIMATE AND SAILOR QUALITY OF LIFE ONBOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) INCLUSIVE OF SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES THAT IMPACT CARRIERS UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE OR CONSTRUCTION IN NEWPORT NEWS

Ref: (g) Title 37, U.S. Code Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services, Public Law 87-649 § 403 of 7 Sep 1962
(h) CNO msg 091334Z Sep 70 (Z-Gram #22) "Improving Shore Establishment Habitability"
(i) CNO msg 260045Z Sep 70 (Z-Gram #36) "Personal to All Commanders, Commanding Officers and Officers in Charge from Zumwalt Standards of Service"
(j) Naval Health Research Center, Rapid Response Surveillance, USS George Washington: six-month follow-up (9 Nov 22)
(k) (b)(6), Managing Director Defense Capabilities and Management, GAO ltr of 12 Jan 23

1. Forwarded, concurring with the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating officer, as modified below.

2. As discussed in the report, the command and control (C2) for the two aircraft carriers (CVNs) currently undergoing Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) in the Newport News shipyard align to Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific (CNAP). Certain Type Commander (TYCOM) responsibilities are shared between CNAP and Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic (CNAL) through mutual agreement. Accordingly, this investigation is forwarded to my immediate superior in command, United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC), and a copy is provided to CNAP for their review and endorsement.

3. Preliminary Statement. This review is long overdue, and sadly was prompted by the coincidental loss of life of three Sailors who died by suicide in April 2022, while assigned to a ship in the Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipyard (HII-NNS). Over time, decades in this case, the Navy has accepted that life in the shipyard is arduous. We have expected, without analyzing deeper and more thoughtfully, that our people would muscle through the way they always have and continue to accomplish the mission. However, over time, the length of time spent in the shipyard has increased, and due to aging infrastructure, living

conditions have degraded to an unacceptable state. Additionally, the standard by which we measure quality of life has changed significantly and it needs to reflect the societal changes of our force to include aspects such as computer availability, wireless internet (WiFi), and cellular service access. We failed to stop and account for the true costs of this process on our Sailors. The report discusses the idea of a "normalization of deviation" — a slow accreting acceptance of a degrading Quality of Service (QoS = Quality of Life + Quality of Work) that, viewed through a fresh set of eyes, is easily seen as being outside of the norm. In my nearly three years as CNAL, I have solidified my belief that we have focused too much of our time and attention on the material aspects of force generation (Fg): the ships, aircraft, tools, and equipment that make our Navy a lethal force. We understand the "stuff," and we can quantify it, test it, improve upon it, and master it almost to the level to where it becomes predictable. This is the area in which we are most comfortable, likely because we can control it with a level of precision. While extremely important, it pales in comparison to how we take care of the **people**. The people that maintain, train, preserve in, and operate our material represent the far more valuable asset in our Navy. Without people excited and engaged in their day-to-day work, the system fails, quality of works degrades, retention suffers, and people suffer. As a former Commanding Officer of a ship under construction in a shipyard, and more importantly, the father of an enlisted Sailor in the same shipyard, I am in a unique position to both highlight and understand these problems, and to advocate for our Sailors. This report attempts to highlight many areas for improvement, but also to shine a light on this most important people element of the shipyard environment (and perhaps for the Navy at large). I acknowledge the findings, opinions and recommendations and most certainly those that identify where I could have provided stronger oversight and support to those commands specifically assigned to shipyards.

4. I concur with the report's three key opinions which drive the associated recommendations across the chapters, specifically:

a. **Quality of life issues at HII-NNS have been so challenging and systemic that Navy leaders and deckplate Sailors view RCOH as an example of normalization of deviation.**

(1) The report found that work conditions for Sailors are poor.

(a) I strongly agree. I have been assigned to multiple ships during shipyard maintenance/construction periods, including at HII-NNS. Without question, the living and working environment at HII-NNS is unpleasant. This is especially true for our most junior Sailors—the ones most vulnerable and impacted by destructive behaviors. The report accurately reflects life onboard a carrier in the shipyard.

(b) The events of the past year have caused me to reflect on the ideas of "habitability" versus "suitability." Our shipyard ships may be habitable and able to sustain life (a minimum standard), but not suitable from a Quality of Life (QoL) standpoint (an acceptable standard). Insufficient attention has been given to analyzing the overall Quality of Service (QoS) for our Sailors assigned to these shipyard ships, and specifically to the areas affecting a Sailor's QoL.

Moreover, the Navy we have today is not the Navy of 20 years ago. Our Sailors have always been a cross-section of our society, and society and societal norms have changed dramatically over the past two decades. It is time to take these societal changes into account and reimagine habitability onboard Navy ships.

(c) For every other military service and even some naval platforms, enlisted members can more easily maintain a clear separation between their work and their personal lives. Even in a more supervised barracks environment, enlisted members have their own beds, semi-private bathrooms, and have access to basic amenities like cable television, high-speed internet, phone service, a refrigerator, microwave, video games, and even a closet. What sounds to any reasonable citizen as merely basics of normal everyday living, these are items our most junior Sailors do not have while assigned to sea-duty onboard a Navy warship. Internet and cellphone service alone have become ubiquitous in almost everything we do. Simply accessing your online bank accounts, leave and earnings statements ("pay stubs"), and Thrift Savings Plan accounts (retirement accounts) now require online access with two-party authentication (i.e., identity verification that requires either a cell phone or independent e-mail account), which is often inaccessible onboard the ship.

(d) Since at least 1962 (see reference (g)), basic allowance for housing/quarters has been restricted to exclude those junior Sailors on sea duty. Where other services provide housing to their junior service members at the installation, the Navy is able to rely, in part, on ships' berthing to house our Sailors. This berthing, while habitable and designed for an operational environment, is not suitable for supporting a standard of living to which most working class adults are accustomed. For ships berthed at Navy installations, a crew enjoys the benefits and nearby amenities organic to the installation (e.g., Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) services, cafes, internet lounges, recreation centers, fitness centers, movie theaters, bowling alleys, marinas, the Navy exchange (retail outlets), the commissary (grocery store), the galley (cafeteria), and other on-base dining options). There is also the option for Sailors to reside in off-ship on-base lodging, but there is not enough capacity to house every Sailor. It is time to review whether any Sailor should be required, during their off-duty hours, to stay onboard the ship when pier side. I draw a distinction between sleeping onboard as part of a necessary duty section for casualty response and force protection measures as distinctly different than residing onboard permanently.

(e) Over 50 years ago, in 1970, then-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr., undertook an initiative that he said was to "modernize and humanize the Navy." He embraced innovation on both the technological front and through updates to the Navy's personnel programs. He is seen as a social reformer who focused on QoL improvements for Sailors, at a time when the Navy was struggling to recruit and retain talent. We find ourselves in a similar predicament with a current labor market that boasts the lowest unemployment rates since 1970. In reference (h), one of Admiral Zumwalt's famous "Z-Grams," he stated the following, which clearly resonates with the findings of this investigation:

> *Although improvements have been made, years of limited funds for construction and maintenance have resulted in far too many substandard living quarters and personnel support, welfare, and recreation facilities which are most detrimental to the retention of the Navy man, our most valuable resource.*
>
> . . .
>
> *Specific areas to be given priority attention for immediate accomplishment nearest Fleet concentrations include living facilities, temporary lodgings, parking facilities, trailer parks, locker clubs and recreation clubs and welfare facilities.*
>
> . . .
>
> *The impact and importance of this program in enhancing all aspects of a Navy career cannot be over-emphasized, and early allocation and effective use of manpower and funding resources must be made to fully implement this concept as rapidly as possible. Local initiatives with respect to this program are desired and are to be encouraged to the utmost.*

Assuredly true 50 years ago, Admiral Zumwalt's words ring true today. We have underfunded and under-resourced our facilities with direct negative impact to ships in the shipyard for far too long. Investing in infrastructure to support our Sailors will provide them healthy outlets, provide safe places for Sailor fellowship, and help to foster and strengthen the bonds between Sailors, which are one of the main reasons Sailors stay Navy. These people-focused services are not just frills, but key to overall mission success. In the shipyard environment, these services are practically non-existent. Again, in reference (i), Admiral Zumwalt's words prove prescient and worthy of current reflection by all Navy and political leaders:

> *There is a strong temptation during times of force retrenchment to cut back on personnel services in order to preserve functions more directly related to our fighting and operating capabilities. I fully support efforts to pare away frills and "nice to have" capabilities at a time when money and people are in decreasing supply. However, I do not consider personnel services as "frills" or even as non-mission related. On the contrary, if they support our men and their dependents, I consider them vital to our readiness because they are directly related to the efficiency and motivation of the most important part of our weapons systems – our vital manpower resources.*

Though Admiral Zumwalt was speaking of those Navy services such as personnel offices, disbursing, household effects, and dispensaries, the same correlation between QoL items and mission success is equally true. Whether it be a lack of MWR services, or lack of housing, these QoL detractors decrease the QoS for our Sailors throughout the Navy, but especially in the shipyard environment. It is time to re-imagine RCOH, optimize it with a focus on improvements to QoL, and rapidly move forward with funding projects that Sailors can benefit from for years to come.

(2) The investigation found that RCOH environment limits the availability of the CVN to the Sailor. I strongly agree. As documented in the report, most of the ship's offices are moved off ship in the early stages of RCOH. This scatters the ship's embedded services and functions throughout this industrial shipyard environment. The shipyard is built to support industrial work, but has not been optimized to support Sailor support services.

(3) The investigation found that there was poor execution of quality of life programs onboard the USS George Washington.

(a) I agree that our ship Sailor "safety net" programs were degraded; however, that must be placed in the context of the environment they were emerging from after two years of isolation. That isolation not only impacted the connectedness of all commands, it also impacted those going through their initial training during this time as they dealt with multiple isolations throughout their training pipelines. The imposed mitigations implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic degraded face-to-face engagements, collaboration, and the ability for the command to physically lead Sailors on the deck plates. Technological limitations further limited the command's ability to engage with its Sailors online as many of the technological changes implemented by the Navy were not implemented at the waterfront level (e.g., video-messaging on personnel devices). This further exacerbated the challenges for our young Sailors, some of whom were coming to the USS George Washington (CVN 73) as their first duty station after basic training. The cumulative impact this has had on the crew and the larger toll this had on our total force is impossible to quantify. It is important to keep in mind that in April 2022, the Navy was just emerging from our lockdown measures, interacting as a crew, and removing our face masks. The Navy was finally coming back to life. As a result, many of our "safety net" programs were in a degraded state.

(b) Even at the TYCOM level, we are just now starting to reinvigorate Sailor programs that had fallen by the wayside during the pandemic. After two years, many key personnel transferred without proper turnover and important programs quietly died without notice. I recently tasked a working group to evaluate how I, as the TYCOM, manage, assess, and assist our units with implementing their people programs. All of the material aspects of the TYCOM have a dedicated N-Code directorate lead (e.g., supply (N41), aircraft materiel and engineering (N421), ship materiel (N43), weapons (N46), etc.), but there is no single code that focuses solely on people programs. Yes, we have a personnel directorate (N1), but they are not responsible nor currently manned to monitor and assess the various Sailor "safety net" programs that the Navy has designed to focus on people and creating a culture of excellence. I await the advice of this working group, but I am committed to making substantial improvements in this area. The goal is not to create another report carding program, but rather a team that hits the deck plates to personally assist commands in creating, implementing, and fostering strong programs. If the team recognizes a program that needs work, they will provide or arrange training to help improve it. I expect this code to be established in the next several months as it is wholly aligned with opinion 65.

(c) At the TYCOM, we have also recently hired a human factors engineer, in part, to improve force operational safety, to include improving human performance in a team setting, integrating human and team performance factors into a predictive analysis approach for assessing operational risk, and advising on improving human factors in system and training integration. One goal is to work in collaboration with CNAP to look at available data from our various programs in an attempt to become more predictive at identifying at-risk units. In an age of limited resources, this will allow the TYCOMs to apportion resources and training to the units identified as being most at risk. The submarine force has made tremendous strides in this effort, setting an example for other communities to follow.

b. **The complicated nature of RCOH coupled with the numerous stakeholders involved can see stakeholders shifting program risk among the various parties, ultimately disadvantaging the most at-risk Sailor.**

(1) I strongly agree, but this requires a fundamental shift in how the Navy approaches RCOH. Instead of manning RCOH ships at the lowest priority level, a new manning paradigm is required to optimize the crew specifically to handle the demands and requirements of RCOH. The focus should be on providing Sailors in-rate work that complements the RCOH work requirements. Manning may need to be staggered or phased to bring in appropriate work center personnel at a time when their work is needed and won't interfere with the RCOH work package. This is an area where we can likely affect change quickly. Perhaps a permanent shore detachment to provide transportation and medical, and other personnel support services could be established to centralize support and allow other personnel to be shifted to at-sea carriers. We need to think differently in this space.

(2) Adequate number of supervisor billets must be filled, and first-term Sailors should not be detailed to a ship in RCOH. If they are, it should be for no more than two years, and their follow-on assignment must be to a local operational sea-going command. I have met with numerous first-term Sailors from the shipyard whom were being administratively separated due to a diagnosed adjustment disorders (a condition not amounting to a disability, but keeping them from integrating into Navy life), and most recently I met with a Sailor suffering from alcoholism and being processed for separation as an alcohol treatment failure. Some were clearly troubled and likely would not have thrived anywhere in the Navy, but many simply hated life in the shipyard. Anecdotally, most of these Sailors were disappointed with out of rate work, or they experienced a recent deployment prior to coming to RCOH, and went from that operational high-tempo pinnacle of service to the doldrums of shipyard life. The themes they expressed to me are nearly universal. They feel underworked, underappreciated, bored, and unfulfilled. They don't have healthy options to occupy their free time, and many don't possess the means to leave the shipyard due to lack of transportation, and there is little to do within walking distance. Without adequate senior enlisted support and oversight, many find themselves lacking motivation and some turn to destructive behaviors or become lonely and depressed. Few Sailors stay in the Navy for the work alone, but rather they stay to fulfill a higher purpose and to be there for their shipmates. These shipyard Sailors hoped for more, to be part of something bigger than

themselves, and be part of a team. This ancient proverb conveys their sentiments better than I can: "Hope deferred makes the heart sick, but a longing fulfilled is a tree of life." Only after operational experience can a Sailor truly see their place in the Navy team. The priority for our first-term Sailors should be to be at sea supporting the Navy mission. Sailors joined the Navy "to see the world," accelerate their lives, or to be "forged by the sea," but not to see the shipyard or drive a bus.

c. **With the disjointed and dispersed nature of RCOH and unclear administrative command supervisory relationship, commanders are challenged to communicate priorities, intent, and oversight to execute the traditional chain of command in support of quality of life programs**. The C2, funding, and manning considerations need to be reimagined and codified to clearly place funding, authority, and oversight under a unified command structure. Over the years, and for various reasons, the Navy has created commands where one command acts as a service provider for another. In concept it centralizes expertise and knowledge, but in practice it places the end user in a disadvantaged role. The commander who owns the risk does not own the authority or resources to enact the solution or to apportion the risk. Examples include the creation of Commander, Naval Installation Command (CNIC) who is responsible for the shore installation support and reports directly to the CNO. The same holds true to Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC), who also reports directly to CNO, but acts on behalf of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy for both Research, Development and Acquisitions (RD&A) as well as Energy, Installations and Environment (EI&E). The fleet relies on these commands for services, but has little authority or funding to influence outcomes. In the case of managing a carrier in RCOH, the program manager for In-service Aircraft Carriers (PMS-312); Program Executive Office (PEO) Aircraft Carriers; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News (SUPSHIPNN); Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); CNAL; CNAP; and the respective Fleet commanders (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, and Pacific Fleet) all play a role. In the words of Admiral Hyman Rickover, "unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible." Specific to all TYCOM matters, I concur that the C2 should align directly to CNAL for all Pacific Fleet CVNs in RCOH. I would carry the C2 to all of the applicable aspects that are currently beyond the TYCOM's control, from the hiring of Deployed Resiliency Counselors, to the identification and resourcing of housing, the installation of WiFi service and the fitness center hours, which today, all impact quality of life, and all of which are beyond TYCOM authority.

5. **Chapter 1 – Description of Events**. I concur with the description of events, as written.

6. **Chapter 2 – RCOH Systemic Challenges**. I concur with findings, opinions, and recommendations, as written, and specifically highlight the following:

a. The Sailors' commute is intense and unlike any other Sailor's commute in the Hampton Roads area. I have walked from the closest parking area at 50th Street to the nearest ship to experience it for myself. The report accurately reflects the time and effort this takes, and I

walked this in the best of circumstances. Inclement weather, extreme temperatures, and early morning or nighttime walks only worsen the experience. We have increased bussing frequency, but Sailors still complain about the nature of their commutes and spend a considerable amount of time negotiating bridge-tunnel traffic, unproductive time that if minimized could reap benefits to the Navy — increasing productive work hours and increasing QoL. Beyond the long commutes and the distance from the parking lot to the ship, as I write this endorsement the crew is recovering from the break in of at least 10 vehicles in a shipyard provided parking area, for which the navy pays a considerable amount for not only parking, but security as well. While this is a relatively small number, it is yet another degradation in the QoL for those parking in shipyard provided parking.

b. Command Climate Assessment (CCA) and Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Program. There are numerous findings and opinions related to the CCA and CMEO program. Although I agree that by agreement with CNAP I was not responsible for the oversight of the CCA and CMEO program, the Commanding Officer, USS George Washington kept me well apprised of his challenges. Results of CCAs were briefed to me by multiple aircraft carrier commanding officers, and although I have no official record of these meetings being scheduled as CCA reviews, we specifically discussed the results. I know these were briefed to me as we took action to address complaints regarding poor command climate, which eventually led to changes in key leadership positions.

c. I strongly concur with the recommendation to shift administrative control (ADCON) to CNAL for all ships in RCOH. Although I serve as the reporting senior for these commanding officers, and serve as the flag-level reviewer for many of their programs, I do not have the authority to hold them accountable. This authority remains with CNAP. Responsibility without authority is less than ideal.

d. The report found consistently low Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) participation rates. Through the various DEOCS surveys discussed in this report, participation ranged from the high of approximately 600 Sailors to the low of approximately 250 Sailors. Obviously, low rates degrade the quality of the surveys. However, twice in a 6-month period 1,011 and 960 Sailors participated in the Rapid Response Surveillance Surveys conducted by the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC). See enclosure (136) and reference (j). The purpose of these studies were to understand the main threats to the health and readiness of the crew, and to work with leadership to identify possible solutions. These studies provided valuable information, had much higher command participation, and should be expanded. I recommend continued partnership with the NHRC on future studies. Valuable information could be gathered by continuing periodic studies onboard the USS George Washington as it leaves RCOH, the USS John C. Stennis as it continues its RCOH, and the USS Harry S Truman as she continues her transition from her most recent deployment into the shipyards. If these commands could be studied over a long-term period (e.g., 10 years), the Navy would have valuable data covering multiple ships in all phases of RCOH and the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP).

e. Ship Habitability. I have tasked the CNAL Ship's Maintenance and Materiel Readiness Directorate (N43) to codify, via instruction, how the TYCOM determines habitability and when habitability can/should be called. There should be formality and oversight of this key milestone event. Unless otherwise directed, I do not intend to conduct crew move aboard until the ship is complete with all shipyard work and shifted back to homeport, which is Naval Station Norfolk in the present case. This should be the standard moving forward.

f. Lodging. It came as a surprise to me that Navy unaccompanied housing falls below minimum adequacy standards set by the Department of Defense (DoD). I agree with the report that lowering accommodation standards instead of meeting the DoD-set standards must not be allowed. Our Sailors deserve better. New housing options that meet or exceed the DoD standard should be constructed to support Sailors.

g. Suicide-Related Behaviors. Although the report is inconclusive, there appears to be an increased risk of suicide for Sailors in the shipyard. The at-risk population for suicides is our youngest demographic, which continues to support my recommendation that no first-term Sailor be assigned to a ship going through RCOH for the entirety of their initial obligation. This data, when compared temporally over the life of our CVNs, and in particular the time they spend in the shipyard, as well as when data is weighted to account for actual crew size at the time of the event, shows a significantly higher incidence of suicide in a shipyard. For example, rough math would indicate that a CVN spends roughly 1/3 of its life in a shipyard, and 57% of CVN suicides occurred in shipyards over the last 5 years. Without accounting for the reduced crew size, that represents an approximate two times (2X) higher likelihood of suicide onboard a CVN in a shipyard. When crew size is factored in to the equation (i.e., RCOH at 75% manning, operational at 90%) the likelihood increases to at least three times (3X); however, resourcing of mental health providers nor supervisory manning does not reflect this elevated risk.

h. Command Indoctrination (INDOC). I agree with this section as written. However, it is worth highlighting the finding that the command had a hard time messaging the crew. Lack of reliable communication with Sailors inhibits the command from coordinating Sailors' attendance at INDOC. Our most junior Sailors our typically busy working on equipment or outdoors and are rarely required to check e-mail, nor do they have access to computers at the level those of us reading this report have. During the pandemic the Navy experimented with the Commercial Virtual Remove Environment (CVR) Teams, a Microsoft audio/video/chat software. The software was available for free to download to Sailors' personnel electronic devices. Anecdotally, I have heard how nice this was for Sailors to collaborate, host video calls, and group message each other. This is one of many commercially available products on the market today. Although these products may present certain vulnerabilities, the Navy should consider making collaborative software tools available as a means for Sailors to communicate professional, but non-sensitive, work matters. If we can communicate directly to a Sailor on their cell phone, these barriers to communication would be significantly reduced.

i. Mental Health Care. The report found that Sailors onboard the USS George Washington do not trust military mental health care providers. The investigative team based this off data contained in enclosure (136), the first of the Rapid Response Surveillance Surveys conducted by the NHRC. This initial study reported that 58% of Sailors distrusted military health care providers. Reference (j), the 6-month follow up study conducted by the NHRC showed a 12 point decrease in this number, down to 46%. Although a positive trend, and likely reflective of the command's efforts to promote mental health care, it still indicates roughly half of Sailors expressed distrust in the system. I do not believe this is an issue unique to the Navy or this command. Nor do I believe the solution to this problem is an easy one. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 included a provision known as the "Brandon Act." Now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1090b, the Brandon Act requires the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations, in part, to reduce the "perceived stigma associated with seeking and receiving mental health services," and to promote "the use of mental health services on a basis comparable to the use of other medical and health services." As the DoD works to promulgate this guidance, and the Services implement it, time will tell whether it will prove effective. In the meantime, I have encouraged all our Commanding Officers and leaders to embrace health-seeking behaviors for both themselves and their Sailors, when needed. Within the CNAL claimancy, we conduct a robust 4-day training course for prospective commanding and executive officers, command master chiefs, and their spouses. In this training, we devote significant time to diversity, equity, and inclusion; psychological safety and building safe spaces for our Sailors; behavioral safety; and mental health care for senior leaders. In a community loathe to speak up due to fear of being removed from the cockpit, we are working to change the culture by inculcating leaders with the openness to both seek and ask for help, and encourage the same behavior from their teams.

j. Administrative Separation (ADSEP) for Conditions not Amounting to a Disability (CnD).

(1) Although the USS George Washington CnD ADSEP data shows numbers below the aircraft carrier average, the increase in CnD ADSEPs throughout the aircraft carrier commands is alarming. CNAL conducted a limited analysis of CnD ADSEP data over the course of six months from May to November 2022. The goal was to attempt to identify possible trends, areas for increased attention, and areas for future study. The data, which consisted of 84 CnD ADSEPs, showed that separations between the two CVNs in the shipyard were roughly equal. It showed spikes in separations at the two and three years of service marks, and it indicated that there may be an increase in separations for those Sailors working outside of their rates. Having more data points over a longer period of time would add value and potentially provide additional insight. The inclusion of demographic data could help inform the data in additional ways to discover more trends. Additionally, adding in sea-going/operational commands and including the basis for separation (e.g., adjustment disorder, personality disorder, etc.) may also provide greater insight into which commands/rates are having the hardest time retaining Sailors. However, this sort of study needs to be conducted at a higher level to account for the total force. These 84 separations amounted to over 218 years of lost contract time (an averaged lost time of 2.6 years per Sailor) or a roughly 50% contract completion rate.

(2) I concur with recommendation 76, that BUMED should analyze CnD ADSEP data for behavioral health trends, but also believe Navy Personnel Command should analyze separation data for trends in separation data based on rank, rate, years of service, demographics, duty assignment, etc. This fidelity of data could help commanders identify at-risk Sailors and make assignment decisions that may help keep Sailors to the end of their contract terms. Accordingly Recommendation 76 is ***modified*** to read as follows (changes in **bold**):

> "Recommendation 76: BUMED **and Navy Personnel Command** collect and analyze 2017–2022 administrative separation data for behavioral health conditions, **demographic and service-specific factors, and other potential causal factors** to determine ongoing trends. Analysis should include specific behavioral health conditions leading to administrative separation; method of identifying specific behavior health conditions; and methods to identify these conditions earlier before individuals enter the Service and/or the Fleet.

k. Limited Duty (LIMDU). From a TYCOM perspective, and with the help of our new human factors engineer, we are endeavoring to analyze trends in various ships' LIMDU numbers to see what, if any, correlation there may be to a ship's schedule (e.g., shipyard periods, workups, deployments, etc.). Such trend data may help to identify ships that are above or below the average and who may require additional resources or TYCOM assistance. More fundamentally, the shore-establishment shoulders a heavy burden for supervising growing LIMDU populations. Within the CNAL claimancy, the LIMDU population has been growing mainly at the TYCOM level and at the Fleet Replacement Squadrons, whose primary mission is to train and refresh aviators on their operational platforms. Neither command is staffed or resourced to handle this population and their special needs. Similar to the issues we see in the RCOH environment, these Sailors often work outside their rates, on an as-needed basis. With some shore commands housing LIMDU populations in the range of several hundred personnel, the Navy needs to determine if there is a better way to centralize this demand to both effectively employ these Sailors and provide for their special needs.

7. **Chapter 3 – Refueling and Complex Overhaul Broader Implications**. I concur with findings, opinions, and recommendations, as written, and specifically highlight the following:

a. Funding of off-ship housing. Off-ship lodging should be funded for the entirety of a ship's time in RCOH. The report indicates that QoL considerations are not considered in the determination regarding habitability. As discussed above, habitability should be viewed as a minimum standard required to support on-board duty section personnel, but should not be viewed as an acceptable standard to allow for crew move aboard. Crew move aboard should be delayed to the greatest extent possible to maintain an acceptable QoL for our Sailors.

b. Lessons Learned. The report found that we failed to review and leverage past lessons learned. This was a missed opportunity. RCOH is by definition a complex process. Multiple ships have charted these waters, but it is clear that this process can and should be improved with every iteration. In my experience, we are very good at "lessons collected," but struggle to implement lessons learned. As evidenced by the relevance of Admiral Zumwalt's 50-year old Z-

grams to current events, we have institutionally failed to learn from the past. Reading the report's accounts of past QoL issues caused by pre-mature crew move aboard, solidifies the need to delay crew move aboard until the ship is ready for re-delivery. We documented this lesson before. RCOH requires a dedicated team, including senior civilians, who can provide continuity between RCOH, and they must be armed with, and incorporate, lessons learned throughout the RCOH process.

8. The investigation team did not coordinate with HII-NNS or assess their involvement in execution of RCOH. This was outside the scope of their review. From my experience, what is clear is that we continue to fail to get ships out of RCOH on time, and from a DoD contractor's standpoint, I do not see their incentive for on-time execution. The ship's force shoulders an extensive work package that may, at times, conflict with HII-NNS efforts and be seen as interfering with contract work. This work should be re-screened to determine what tasks should be handled by the shipyard, and what should be handled by ship's force. While some of this work can help build and sustain our Sailor's proficiency in maintaining the ship, as well as develop as sense of ownership, the majority of these functions are the responsibility of HII-NNS. Shifting the responsibility of this work to HII-NNS will not only improve QoL for these Sailors, but it will give HII-NNS greater control over the pace of work, previously-negotiated work packages, and prioritization of their completion.

9. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 requires the Navy to conduct an outside assessment of the capacity and capability of shipyards to meet the maintenance needs of the Navy, including their adequacy and whether additional investment in private shipyards is required. Reference (k) is a letter from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to the Secretary of Defense notifying the department that the GAO is beginning work on a study to review whether there is adequate crew manning relative to maintenance workload, as well as looking into Navy systems and processes to track maintenance performance. I strongly support these additional reviews. If we can set realistic RCOH timelines, and complete on time, the savings would easily pay for the infrastructure improvements necessary to increase the QoL for our Sailors in the shipyard. With HII-NNS as the only shipyard capable of supporting RCOH, we will continue to use this facility, and any investment made now will pay dividends for our Sailors well in to the future.

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO COMMAND CLIMATE AND SAILOR QUALITY OF LIFE ONBOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) INCLUSIVE OF SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES THAT IMPACT CARRIERS UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE OR CONSTRUCTION IN NEWPORT NEWS

10. My point of contact for this matter is (b)(6), who can be reached at commercial (b)(6), or via e-mail at (b)(6)@us.navy.mil.

J. E. MEIER

Copy to:
Naval Reactors
CNAF
CNIC
NAVSEA
PEO CVN
SUPSSHIPNN
PMS-312

5830
28 Jan 23

From: RDML Bradley D. Dunham, USN
To: Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO COMMAND CLIMATE AND SAILOR QUALITY OF LIFE ONBOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) INCLUSIVE OF SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES THAT IMPACT CARRIERS UNDERGOING EXTENSIVE MAINTENANCE OR CONSTRUCTION IN NEWPORT NEWS

Ref: (a) CNAL ltr N01L/118 of 4 May 22 (Convening Order)
(b) CNAL ltr N01L/146 of 1 Jun 22 (Extension)
(c) CNAL ltr N01L/229 of 18 Jul 22 (Extension)
(d) CNAL ltr N01L/265 of 17 Aug 22 (Extension)
(e) CNAL ltr N01L/301 of 14 Sep 22 (Extension)
(f) CNAL ltr N01L/403 of 17 Nov 22 (Extension and Modified Convening Order)

Encl: (1) Investigation into the Challenges for Aircraft Carriers Undergoing Refueling and Complex Overhaul

1. Reference (a), as modified by references (b) through (f), directed a comprehensive investigation and assessment, with the support of a team of subject matters experts (SMEs), of the relevant Sailor quality of life issues and related programs in support of aircraft carriers undergoing extensive maintenance or construction at the Huntington-Ingalls Industries, Newport News Shipbuilding subsidiary. Enclosure (1) is the required report.

2. This investigation reviewed execution, compliance, and effectiveness of the programs, policies, and procedures in place as of 1 May 2022. The investigation conducted several site visits, focus groups, interviews, and program reviews. During the course of the investigation, the team received outstanding support from all organizations consulted, including a myriad of commands within the Department of the Navy, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the City of Newport News.

3. I am available at your convenience to discuss the investigation.

B. D. DUNHAM

~~CUI~~

INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHALLENGES FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS UNDERGOING REFUELING AND COMPLEX OVERHAUL

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR FORCE ATLANTIC

CONTROLLED BY: NAVAL AIR FORCE ATLANTIC
CUI CATEGORY: INVESTIGATION
DISTRIBUTION/DISSEMINATION CONTROL: DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
POC: FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE, CNAL

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CHAPTER 3—Refueling and Complex Overhaul Broader Implications

Executive Summary

The Navy is a mission-focused force that sets and routinely achieves high standards. We clearly define the problem and propose achievable outcomes. In execution, we honestly assess our progress and strive to be our own toughest critics. The ability to achieve the desired end is reliant on the trust and confidence, among peers and between commanders and subordinates, of the risk that can be tolerated. After studying the challenges facing our ships and crews undergoing long-term maintenance, we find that the focus on the maintenance mission has degraded our ability to take care of our most junior and at-risk Sailors. This was not one seminal event, decision or individual's action, this was a series of actions and decisions shared by many that resulted in the wholly unnecessary conditions and challenges our Sailors face. The physical shipyard environment, such as parking and ship living conditions, attention to command climate, production schedule visibility, mentoring, Navy support programs and in-rate training all impact our personnel. The Navy can do and must do better in how we man, prepare, and execute long term maintenance in our nation's shipyards. Our junior Sailors, our nation's national treasure, deserve it.

In December of 2015 after a 7-month, 52,000-mile deployment following a 7-year stint as the forward deployed naval force in the Western Pacific based in Yokosuka, Japan, the USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) arrived in Norfolk, Virginia in preparation for her mid-life refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) at Huntington Ingalls Industries–Newport News Shipyard (HII-NNS). Starting in 2017, the planned 4-year RCOH event not only refuels the carrier's nuclear reactor, it provides an opportunity to perform intrusive inspections, and other maintenance and modernization evolutions that cannot be accomplished while the ship is waterborne. The USS *George Washington* arrived manned, trained, and equipped to perform her at-sea mission as the centerpiece of United States' naval forces, capable of controlling the sea, conducting strikes, and maneuvering across the electromagnetic spectrum, but was now entering a long-duration maintenance evolution that few, if any, crew had ever participated in previously.

Ship's crew are the key component of any combatant and their success or failure is critical to any assigned mission. Historically, commanding officers must balance and have successfully balanced the assigned mission with the Sailor's quality of life (i.e., Sailor workload, housing, shipboard living, training, work environment, medical care, pay and compensation). The RCOH event, by its very nature, presents tremendous challenges to crew quality of life due to both the shipyard environment and the long duration Sailors must live and work in that environment. The crew will be expected to disassemble a ship, scatter to multiple locations miles away, accept tasks outside their trained rating, and provide support services (i.e., food, housing, medical, administrative) to a widely dispersed crew all while challenged with a complicated work commute and potentially relocating their housing. USS *George Washington* faced all these challenges, further complicated by almost 2 years of pandemic protocols. RCOH has been accomplished for six other nuclear aircraft carriers, five in the same class as USS *George Washington*; however, the event is widely understood to be incredibly difficult, particularly with regard to the challenges maintaining adequate Sailor quality of life.

USS *George Washington* entered RCOH funded at $4.719 billion, which was $322 million less than required to cover all proposed "must do" items. This shortfall naturally placed pressure on the program office to find cost savings and efficiencies to complete the full scope of RCOH modernization within the budget, forcing decisions that inevitably impacted Sailors.

Based on the schedule delays and the challenges to quality of life, in April 2022, Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic (CNAL) directed a broad quality of service investigation of the resiliency and support programs that United States Navy ships field in support of the Sailor as it relates to the challenges for aircraft carriers undergoing RCOH.[1] This action was in response to the quality of life concerns that came to light following the tragic deaths of three USS *George Washington* Sailors in the same month.

The investigators believe that the fundamental approaches to reducing the challenges of RCOH on our Sailors are:

1. Reduce the population of Sailors most at risk to RCOH quality of life challenges and uncertainties biasing to a smaller, RCOH vice operational focused, more senior and experienced crew.

2. Reduce the basic challenges of commuting and subsisting by building and centralizing physical locations for support and work activities improving access and availability.

3. Provide certainty on future pay, housing, and support to set achievable expectations for our Sailors.

4. Reinforce and protect the traditional chain of command from the deckplates to the bridge so that they are present and unencumbered to sense and react to the needs of our Sailors.

5. Clarify and bolster the oversight of RCOH to ensure that a forceful backup is present and engaged to ensure all stakeholders are equally informed and heard in pursuit of our common objective.

The key findings, opinions, and recommendations of that broader quality of service investigation are as follows:

Key Findings

1. RCOH requires changes to support improvements to Sailor quality of life.

   - The administrative command supervisory relationships over the USS *George Washington* were overly complex, confused, and not fully understood by key program managers within the type or fleet commanders' staffs.

   - There are no identified minimum manning levels for aircraft carriers in RCOH or extended maintenance availabilities.

   - During RCOH, USS *George Washington* had insufficient supervisory manning to effectively provide training, mentorship, quality of life oversight, and overall development of assigned Sailors.

2. Work conditions for Sailors are poor.

   - Aircraft carrier leadership invested significant ship's personnel resources in both manpower and command attention to alleviate transportation challenges providing incremental benefit but costing significant manhours and detracting from Sailor's in-rate training and experience.

   - Instructions, policy, and guidance governing RCOH habitability do NOT:

     - Define conditions and criteria for ship habitability.

     - Assign responsibilities to the chain of command for deeming a ship habitable.

     - Require a determination of habitability as a prerequisite for the crew moving and living aboard.

   - Instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing RCOH do not specify the standard of ship habitability that must be maintained following crew move aboard.

   - Industrial hygiene surveys inform commanders on workplace conditions, yet were waived until conclusion of RCOH.

   - The USS *George Washington* crew move aboard was premature.

   - HII-NNS-provided accommodation at Huntington Hall does not meet Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Navy (DON) standards for accommodation.

   - Huntington Hall does not have sufficient barracks capacity to meet the demand of two carriers.

3. Conditions during RCOH are not optimized for Sailor efficiency or effectiveness.

   - Combining maintenance funding with Sailor quality of life funding within RCOH funding results in quality of life programs becoming bill payers for contract maintenance shortfalls in RCOH.

   - The crews of CVNs undergoing maintenance at HII-NNS experience disjointed and dispersed parking; episodic shuttle transportation; and a distant walk across the shipyard to the aircraft carrier in all weather conditions.

   - The disbursed nature of RCOH support buildings compounded a complex and dysfunctional parking and transportation situation.

   - The policy on the granting of basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) during RCOH and maintenance availabilities is convoluted, confusing, and generally disadvantages the most junior and at risk enlisted Sailors.

   - Center for Disease Control, Department of Defense, and Navy COVID-19 policies and restrictions exacerbated an environment where systemic quality of life issues were already present within RCOH and onboard USS *George Washington*.

   - The current focus of the overall Navy Lessons Learned Program is fleet focused, tasking the numbered fleet commanders, type commanders (TYCOM), training organizations (e.g., warfighting development centers, Carrier Strike Group Four and Fifteen) operational staffs, and unit commanding officers with designated command lesson mangers to collect and incorporate lessons but neither shore commands nor system commands (e.g., Carrier Team 1, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Program Executive Office (PEO) Aircraft Carriers) are addressed.

4. RCOH environment limits the availability of the CVN to the Sailor.

   - During shipyard availabilities and new construction at HII-NNS, fitness facilities are inadequate to support Navy physical fitness requirements.

   - Navy instruction does not specify responsibility for physical fitness facilities at commercial shipyards.

   - USS *George Washington* after-hours emergent mental health resource availability enabled consistent access for Sailors in crisis.

   - USS *George Washington* mental health staff experienced a significant increase in case load, increasing patient wait times for non-emergent issues.

   - USS *George Washington* has the correct “fit” or right type of mental health professionals but in insufficient quantity to meet demand aboard the ship.

   - USS *George Washington*’s psychologist encountered a significantly higher number of patients per month than the Defense Health Agency standard, indicating demand beyond what is acceptable for a single provider.

   - Across active aircraft carriers, ship’s psychologists exceeded the Defense Health Agency standard for patient encounters by 100 percent, indicating a force-wide mental health capacity issue.

5. Poor execution of quality of life programs in the RCOH environment.

   - USS *George Washington* command leadership did not have adequate level of knowledge to effectively implement the Navy’s Culture of Excellence program.

- The Command Resilience Human Factors Council (CRTHFC) aboard USS *George Washington* did not effectively review at-risk personnel as required.
- USS *George Washington* command indoctrination program did not effectively ensure the timely execution of required training.
- USS *George Washington* did not effectively track and monitor completion of command indoctrination.
- The USS *George Washington* command drug and alcohol prevention program is compliant with policy, but only partially available and adequate due to facilities limitations and manning levels.
- USS *George Washington* command financial management program does not have sufficient number for trained command financial specialists (CFS) for the size of the crew.
- USS *George Washington* suicide prevention program was not integrated into the command resilience team.

Key Opinions

Based on the findings, three main opinions inform the recommendations of this report.

Key Opinion 1. Quality of life issues at HII-NNS have been so challenging and systemic that Navy leaders and deckplate Sailors view RCOH as an example of normalization of deviation.

- The distributed and disjointed parking provided to ship's Sailors resulted in a perception that their increased commute and parking circumstances were not a primary concern to "Big Navy," despite the ship's leadership directing a significant outlay of their time and attention to improving parking.
- Sailor quality of life is negatively impacted by the parking assigned to ships at HII-NNS yielding long-term effects in Sailor morale and their perceived value as Navy personnel.
- Absence of identified minimum manning levels by skill position or key leadership role whittles down the effectiveness of crew functions, impacting mission accomplishment.
- Supervisor manning shortfalls have a disproportional impact on organizations since supervisors are expected to not only oversee the daily function of the organization, but also provide the guidance and training to fill lower-level manning gaps.
- Manning shortfalls are a systemic Navy problem; no amount of advocacy by leadership nor TYCOM triage of short-term fixes resulted in any long-term change, and were inadequate.

Key Opinion 2. The complicated nature of RCOH coupled with the numerous stakeholders involved can see stakeholders shifting program risk among the various parties, ultimately disadvantaging the most at-risk Sailor.

- The combination of USS *George Washington* being at the lowest billet priority level for the distribution of prospective manning and being one of the only ships to source Sailors in support of deploying CVNs has transferred and consolidated CVN-wide risk into a single RCOH unit.
- Absence of identified minimum manning levels by skill position or key leadership role whittles down the effectiveness of crew functions, impacting mission accomplishment.
- Combining procurement authority for both quality of life services and maintenance activities creates the perception of potential opportunity costs between two core missions.

Key Opinion 3. With the disjointed and dispersed nature of RCOH and unclear administrative command supervisory relationship, commanders are challenged to communicate priorities, intent, and oversight to execute the traditional chain of command in support of quality of life programs.

- Supervisor manning shortfalls have a disproportional impact on organizations since supervisors are expected to not only oversee the daily function of the organization, but also provide the guidance and training to fill lower-level manning gaps.

- The absence of routine immediate supervisor in command (ISIC) assessment of the command managed equal opportunity (CMEO) program limited program effectiveness and execution.

- Many factors impact the ability to deliver a command climate assessment (CCA) in a timely fashion. In the case of USS *George Washington*, these included competing workforce demands and the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting the ship's ability to effectively meet and collaborate.

- Delays in CCA delivery should be validated and approved by the TYCOM.

- Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) execution in the shipyard is limited by access to technology. Sailors may not have routine access to email and sufficient privacy to complete the DEOCS survey.

- It is unclear if CNAL or Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific (CNAP) executed responsibility for military equal opportunity program oversight.

- Ineffective oversight does not excuse ineffective program management and execution. Critical self-assessment is required.

Key Recommendations

1. RCOH requires changes to support improvements to Sailor quality of life.

    - Changes to Manning. By reducing the number of first tour Sailors and optimizing the number of Sailors to the mission of RCOH, the Navy will effectively improve quality of life by reducing the support requirement to crew, freeing crew for other CVNs, and decreasing prolonged out-of-rate work and subsequent dissatisfaction. These recommendations focus on reducing risk to one of our most valuable assets, our most junior Sailors. The following recommendations underpin this assessment.

        - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N1 prohibit first term Sailor assignments to aircraft carrier within 1 year of entering RCOH until after RCOH redelivery to reduce the most exposed and at-risk Sailors to quality of life challenges in order to reduce not only the risk to junior Sailors but also the training, mentoring, and administrative burden to the chain of command.

        - OPNAV N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center study to identify RCOH "essential" manning, to include ships leadership and support services (i.e., admin, supply, transportation) across all skill levels, in an effort to focus solely on RCOH and minimize crew size and the resultant RCOH impact to training, out of rate workload, admin support, medical support, support services (e.g., commute transportation), and onboard housing of crew.

    - Command and Control: Establish Unity of Effort and Unity of Command. Complex administrative control (ADCON) of our forces creates gaps and seams in effective oversight of our forces. The CNAL and CNAP division of labor created numerous oversight challenges that eroded effective

oversight of USS *George Washington* during RCOH. In turn, this created risk to force and risk to mission. Unity of command and unity of effort underpin effective command and control and should be the standard in all that we do.

- Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) shift ADCON of Pacific-based CVNs to Commander. United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC)/CNAL for RCOH.

- Assign CNAL as TYCOM for future RCOH to provide continuity across both coasts for CVNs and monitor RCOH execution across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

2. Optimize and improve Sailor work conditions

- **Environment.** The RCOH environment is austere, challenging Sailors on a day-to-day basis. Improving basic amenities, such as reducing distant parking challenges, providing convenient and available food options, and offering fitness convenience and access, all centralized for basic efficiency and functionality, will increase the overall quality of life and quality of service for Sailors assigned to aircraft carriers during RCOH.

  - PEO Carriers conduct an analysis of alternatives to Sailor parking for ships at HII-NNS to a single centralized installation, with security and quality shuttle buses of reliable frequency directly to the ships' piers. Cease contracting with HII-NNS to provide parking for Sailors assigned to ships in the shipyard and RCOH, making this a core Navy quality of life priority with clear Navy ownership.

  - PEO carriers conduct an analysis of alternatives to centralized off-ship support locations, ideally near centralized parking, improving efficiency and reducing transportation burden, while providing more access to Sailor services.

  - Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) conduct manning review of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) facilities at HII-NNS to identify appropriate manning levels to support robust accessibility for the projected number of Sailors assigned.

  - CNIC/Ship Supervisor Newport News/PMS-312 review Sailor usage of Huntington Hall MWR facilities and develop plan to increase capacity to meet Sailor demand.

  - Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News (SUPSHIPPNN)/ PMS-312/CNIC provide centralized facilities for support programming for each ship assigned to HII-NNS, ensuring either walkability and/or reliable, continuous transport.

  - OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change BAS policy to allow BAS for enlisted Sailors during RCOH during the period of entering of drydock to redelivery.

  - OPNAV N9 provide funding for crew meals, at no cost to the Sailor, during RCOH for the periods when the food service is allowable regardless of the BAS status of the crew to allow for duty section and onboard crew meals to improve quality of life in the shipyard environment.

  - SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 provide physical fitness facilities sufficient to support personnel associated with three aircraft carriers.

  - CNIC/TYCOMs review physical fitness facilities at Navy and commercial shipyards to determine adequacy.

- **Habitability: Formalize Standards.** Every Sailor must be able to work, live, and sleep in an environment that is clean, safe, and secure. To hold both commands and immediate superiors accountable to this standard, clear and objective standards are required to protect our Sailors. Because of the significant impact of crew move aboard on quality of life and quality of service for our Sailors, this habitability decision requires forceful backup, oversight, and external validation.

    - United States Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) and United States Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM) develop a universal definition for habitability and uninhabitability for all ships, assigning responsibility, authority, and accountability at all levels of the chain of command, specifying how the decision about whether a ship is uninhabitable or restored to a habitable condition will be made and by whom with continuing review as ship or shipyard conditions evolve.

    - COMPACFLT and USFLTFORCOM develop and codify a process to make the determination of whether the ship is habitable or uninhabitable leading to a recommendation from the commanding officer and approval by the TYCOM.

    - CNAF and CNAP align or establish instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections of RCOH to those of pre-commissioned ships.

    - COMPACFLT and USFLTFORCOM align or establish instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing Enhanced Quality of Life (EQOL) inspections of RCOH ships to that of other maintenance availabilities.

    - COMPACFLT and USFLTFORCOM examine the timing and sequencing of industrial hygiene surveys for both new construction and overhaul to ensure Sailors are adequately protected from potential health risks.

3. Improve RCOH conditions to focus on Sailor efficiency and effectiveness.

- **Certainty.** Project delays and work schedule adjustments cascade down to impact the lives of our Sailors. Providing reliable planning in schedules and being transparent about schedule changes reduces uncertainty for our Sailors and their families who must adjust their lives to accommodate schedule changes. A proactive approach to schedule uncertainty is to reduce the number of events impacted by the schedule changes such as allowances for food and housing, which translate to pay.

    - PEO Carriers identify the current barriers to publishing timely, realistic schedule updates and analyze where the resulting risk is held.

    - PEO Carriers evaluate, assess, and modify current process for development and execution of integrated maintenance schedules in RCOH.

    - OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change BAS policy to allow BAS for enlisted Sailors during RCOH during the period of entering of drydock to redelivery.

    - COMUSFLTFORCOM and COMPACFLT comptrollers in concert with OPNAV and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Office of Budget (FMB) should review the feasibility of assigning CNAL as Naval Supervising Activity Control for the Sailor quality of life portion of RCOH SCN funding.

- **Lessons Learned: Institutionalize Experience.** Because of the duration of RCOH, personnel turnover during this period, and the infrequency of RCOH activities, our ability to collect, process, evaluate, and disseminate lessons learned becomes increasingly important to avoid common mistakes

and issues. RCOHs will persist for at least the next 50 years at HII-NNS and lessons learned serve as the foundation for continuous improvement across shipyard periods. While lessons are often collected, they have not necessarily been consulted and applied in subsequent RCOH periods.

- Require all RCOH stakeholders to report during every major milestone, planning event and execution brief upfront on the title brief or slide the number of RCOH lesson learned items identified relating to the subject and the number of lessons learned that were incorporated, as a forcing function to drive active query of lesson-learned databases.
- PEO Carriers submit into Navy Lessons Learned Information System (NLLIS) the Carrier Team 1 lesson-learned database on RCOH lessons learned to ensure the widest possible audience of those seeking information on common issues, to include quality of life, relating to long duration maintenance.

4. Improve RCOH environment to make quality of life programs more available and responsive to a widely separated crew.

- **Medical and Mental Health: Resource and Assess.** To meet the nationwide mental health crisis impacting the service, the Navy must enhance the footprint of medical mental health providers and counselors ashore and afloat to meet increasing demand for services as a second line of defense in support of the chain of command.
  - CNIC review incentive structure to recruit and retain counselors at Fleet and Family Support Centers (FFSCs) in Hampton Roads.
  - DOD, DON, and CNO prioritize mental health clinician recruitment and retention to ensure adequate clinical services for all Sailors, particularly those assigned to aircraft carriers.
  - CNAF add additional mental health providers and behavioral health technicians to each aircraft carrier through the program objective memorandum and as an addition to the activity manning document.
  - Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)/Navy Education and Training Command (NETC) evaluate sufficiency of medical and mental health components in leadership development curriculums (all paygrades) to ensure they effectively provide training on how to mitigate reprisal and stigmas regarding medical and mental health services.
  - TYCOMs/Commands proactively leverage DEOCS results to support higher risk units in identifying, mitigating, and monitoring challenges. Focus on “Leadership Support—Ratings by Paygrade of Immediate Supervisor” and provide focused training to commands and departments scoring low in this category.

5. Improve the oversight and execution of quality of life in the RCOH environment.

- **Command Climate: Train and Effectively Monitor.** Command climate directly contributes to Sailor quality of life and quality of service. Our ability to monitor, assess, and act in a timely fashion to improve command climate serves as a protective factor for our Sailors. This requires proper oversight, adequate data analysis, and enhanced training. These recommendations focus on improving the CCAs. Because of the significant impact on quality of life and quality of service for our Sailors, this family of programs that underpin command climate requires forceful backup, oversight, and external validation
  - CNP/OPNAV N1/NETC provide training on interpreting DEOCS 5.0 for all CMEOs/command climate specialists.

- USFFC/United States Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) provide guidance on requesting extensions for CCA completion.
- TYCOMs review existing policy to ensure adequate tracking of commencement and completion of subordinate CCAs.
- OPNAV N1 revise the enhanced commander accountability (ECA) requirement to include a required endorsement by the ISIC and concurrence/nonconcurrence on findings, assessment, and way ahead.
- CNAL and CNAP publish guidance on ECA scheduling and completion.
- OPNAV N2N6 evaluate implementation of a shipboard variant of the interactive customer evaluation system or equivalent system.

- **Culture of Excellence and Sailor Programs: Revitalize and Re-emphasize.** To improve and enhance command climate and to enhance protective factors provided by both the chain of command and Navy-wide programs, the Navy implemented its culture of excellence (COE) initiative. Fundamentally, this initiative focuses on a holistic approach to command and individual readiness by creating more effective feedback loops and achieving unity of effort across Sailor programs to provide enhanced protective factors. Institutionalization of new programs requires informed and engaged leadership as well as time. Cross-functional approaches to problem solving require effective component programs. Effective program oversight is built upon internal and external inspection and assessment. The combination of COVID-19 mitigations and the RCOH environment challenged USS *George Washington*'s ability to train and to manage its programs while simultaneously implementing a new initiative. This condition may not be entirely unique to USS *George Washington*.
  - CNAL/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 provide adequate ashore facilities to support training for aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines at HII-NNS.
  - TYCOM command climate specialist review and improve oversight to ensure overall program compliance.
  - NETC/TYCOM review pipeline training for senior leaders to ensure inclusion of prioritized Navy-wide programs and initiatives.
  - OPNAV N17 conduct assessment of COE program implementation to determine effectiveness and to identify lessons learned for future initiatives.
  - CNAP/CNAL conduct cross-carrier assessment of CRTHFC programs to identify best practices for implementation at scale and revise instruction as required to codify best-practices.
  - CNAL/CNAP continue to monitor Expanded Operational Stress Control (EOSC) training progress across the aircraft carrier force.
  - NETC implement EOSC into initial ascension training for officers and enlisted personnel.
  - TYCOM review inspections process to ensure command sponsorship program is being adequately reviewed.
  - TYCOM direct review of command resilience team guidance and requirements by all commands to ensure forces align to policy.

Conclusion

The investigation team believe that the extensive maintenance or construction in a private shipyard and the many quality of life factors and resulting Sailors' stress are inextricably linked to the conditions set in the early stages, such as contract development, production planning, and execution scheme, conducted long prior to the arrival of the ship. The investigation was unable to conduct a thorough examination of advanced acquisition planning and requirements forecasting, tailored contract execution methods, the use of results-oriented metrics for accountability purposes, and contract incentives due to it being beyond the scope of this effort. The team recommends further examination of the current contract vehicles supporting the Navy's RCOH efforts, HII's prioritization policy of the depot maintenance projects at HII-NNS, and the extent to which these contracts may impact Sailor quality of life issues in the RCOH environment. The following additional recommendations are offered:

- USFFC in partnership with Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) conduct an assessment of the RCOH contract development, execution, oversight, and accountability to propose mechanisms that would balance contract incentives with disincentives to ship delivery dates. Provide incentives linked to post-event type commander and CVN commanding officer's assessment of contractor performance with respect to schedule transparency, schedule predictability, and overall shipyard environmental factors and their impact on stress to the Sailors, giving the voice of the Sailor the ultimate success of the event.

Additionally, outside the scope of this investigation, the investigation team did not review or assess the performance of HII-NNS, which has been one of the subjects of several recent studies including the RAND Study of USS *Nimitz* (CVN 68) RCOH Lessons Learned of 2002; GAO Report on Navy Maintenance of December 2019; GAO Report on Navy Shipyards of August 2020; GAO Report on Navy Maintenance of October 2020; DAU Study of USS *John C. Stennis* Engagement Team of 2021; GAO Report on Federal Contracting of July 2021; and GAO Report on Naval Shipyards of May 2022. Also beyond the scope of this investigation was an assessment of HII-NNS's involvement in and execution of the RCOH and specifically the company's impact to Sailor quality of life. As such, the investigation team neither interviewed nor consulted employees of HII-NNS regarding company performance.

- USFFC in partnership with Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) conduct an assessment of HII's prioritization policy within the overall body of Navy work. Assess the application of contractor labor across projects to gain financial cost incentives for one project at the expense of other less incentive projects impacting delivery schedules and adding stress to Sailors.

The investigation did not examine the overall medical and mental health screening process for Sailors upon accession into the Navy and leading up to assignment to sea duty. A comprehensive examination of this process from Military Entrance Processing Station to Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, Illinois and follow-on commands is not included, but may inform the Navy's assignment of personnel.

CHAPTER 1 Description of Events

1.1 Shipyard

At its most basic, a shipyard is a place where ships, specifically United States Navy ships, are built or undergo routine or emergent maintenance. Shipyards are both government owned and operated Navy shipyards as well as private sector shipyards that are contracted by the Navy to perform required maintenance to the Navy ships. Navy ships are complex, intricate platforms that, in the case of large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, possess all the accommodations of a city, compressed within the skin of the ship and integrated with various weapons systems to perform as combatants in support of the national defense. Since ships are predominately composed of metal, such as hardened steel and armor, shipyards are specifically equipped to deal with large, heavy metal sections and components possessing large, specialized areas housing cranes, drydocks, slipways, dust-free warehouses, painting facilities, and extremely large areas for fabrication and assemblies of ships. Shipyards are largely inhospitable and dangerous industrial environments, particularly to anyone experiencing them for the first time.

Newport News Shipbuilding is a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, which is the largest private sector shipbuilding company in the United States and the largest industrial employer in Virginia. All Navy aircraft carriers ever built, dating back to before World War II, and half of the Navy's nuclear-powered submarines, were built at the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia. Given its 90-year history of building aircraft carriers, Huntington Ingalls Industries-Newport News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS) is the only shipyard able to construct and refuel an in-service nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN). Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are one of the most complex machines ever made. The warfighting components of launching and retrieving jet aircraft make it complicated enough, but with two nuclear power plants, ammunition and jet fuel storage, food services, medical facilities, waste management systems, and desalination plants to convert sea water to fresh water, it is uniquely complex. Few machines are designed to last more than a decade or two, especially in an age of rapid technological advances, yet a CVN has a 50-year service life, and must undergo a refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) halfway through the combatant's 50-year service. The mid-life RCOH includes refueling of the nuclear reactors, overhauling most of the machinery, and modernizing warfare systems.

1.2 Refueling and Complex Overhaul

The RCOH program is planned to be a 4-year event for the mid-life overhaul and maintenance period for the refueling of the nuclear reactors, depot-level ships' maintenance, and modernization work. RCOH provides an opportunity to perform intrusive inspections, radiological surveys, and other maintenance-related evolutions that cannot be accomplished while the ship is waterborne. The long duration provides sufficient time to perform extensive propulsion plant repairs and testing that is not possible during other, shorter maintenance periods. Modernization work includes upgrading the ship's combat systems and other warfighting capabilities, as well as upgrading distribution systems such as potable water, electrical power, aircraft refueling, and air conditioning.

In April 1990, USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) was the first aircraft carrier to undergo RCOH. After USS *Enterprise*, five other *Nimitz*-class aircraft carriers completed RCOH: USS *Nimitz* (CVN-68), USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN 69), USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN 70), USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN 71), and USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72); RCOH continues today with the USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) and USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74).

The program manager for In-service Aircraft Carriers (PMS-312), pursuant to Title 10, U.S.C., is responsible for the overall execution of RCOH and reports to Program Executive Office (PEO) Aircraft Carriers in the acquisition chain of command underneath the Secretary of the Navy and outside the purview of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). PMS-312 maintains a continuous relationship with the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News (SUPSHIPNN), who works for Naval Sea Systems Command Industrial Operations Directorate (NAVSEA 04). Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) SUPSHIPNN is the onsite NAVSEA 04 representative for HII-NNS. SUPSHIPNN is the Naval Supervising Activity for RCOH and the administrative contracting officer providing for the day-to-day administration and oversite of RCOH contracts. They also hold the technical authority as waterfront chief engineer for Navy contracts executed by HII-NNS.

The administrative chain of command responsible for the general administration and support of aircraft carriers is the type commander (TYCOM) (i.e., Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic (CNAL) or Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific (CNAP)) reporting to the regional fleet commander (i.e., Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) or Commander, United States Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT)) underneath the CNO, whose responsibilities include the organizing, training, and equipping of forces for operational employment.

1.3 Refueling and Complex Overhaul Key Events

The RCOH project is marked by a series of milestones and key events planned years in advance. This detailed plan orchestrates every major event or milestone. Key events include:

- *Complete Offload Portion of Ship Consolidated Offload Outfitting Plan* is where the ship's equipment not required for RCOH is offloaded from the ship, and temporary systems needed for the RCOH period are installed. During Ship Consolidated Offload Outfitting Plan, the ship is declared uninhabitable and a majority of the ship's offices are moved onto temporary quarters known as the Floating Accommodation Facility, or to buildings located in the vicinity of the shipyard. Additionally, any Sailors who are living aboard and not qualified for basic allowance for housing (BAH) (i.e., monetary housing allowance for unaccompanied paygrades E-4 with less than 4 years of service) are moved to quarters ashore. While it fluctuates based on individual circumstances, approximately 800 of the E-4 and below Sailors assigned to RCOH CVN do not qualify for housing allowance.

- *Enter Drydock* is the beginning of the replacement of the carrier's nuclear fuel as well as other depot--level work. During this time, the carrier is partially deconstructed and becomes a large industrial work area. As an example, large holes are cut into the ship's hull or deck to facilitate equipment removal or allow temporary systems (e.g., electrical power, ventilation, and compressed air) to be run throughout the vessel to support ongoing shipboard work. In the drydock phase, noise, smoke, and sparks are omnipresent as workers grind, cut, and weld bulk steel plate and piping to remove worn-out ship systems and prepare the foundation for new equipment and system reinstallation. This period is scheduled to last approximately 18 months.

- *Crew Move Aboard* and *Complete Crew Move Aboard* are the key events that bookend the point at which the crew moves their equipment and operations back onto the ship. Members of the crew who are not entitled to a BAH vacate their shore-based lodging and return to the ship's berthing. This key event commences approximately 9 months prior to redelivery of the ship to the Navy, and is expected to take approximately 4 months from crew move aboard to complete crew move aboard. Preceding crew move aboard, the crew prepares the ship's offices and living quarters by painting, installing decking, conducting maintenance, and refurbishing berthing compartments, heads, laundry facilities, and galleys. After that, the crew moves all of their furniture, mattresses, galley equipment, and office equipment back onto the ship. All of this is accomplished in addition to Sailors' normal watchstanding duties, primary job responsibilities, and required training. It is common practice for ships executing crew move aboard to occupy spaces aft of frame 180 (i.e., the back one-half of the ship), where adequate messing facilities, berthing, and heads are located, which enables ongoing work to continue in the spaces forward of frame 180.

- *Fast Cruise* and *Sea Trials* are the key events following complete crew move aboard during which the ship tests all of the systems required for operations, both in port and at sea. The crew starts training and preparing for this milestone long before, but the trials themselves immediately precede redelivery of the ship.

- *Redelivery* is the final key event where the ship is turned over to the Navy from the shipyard.

- *Post-delivery Carrier Incremental Availability* is not a key event for RCOH; however, it is a post--availability maintenance period intended to accomplish any repairs identified during sea trials and post-RCOH modernization items. It is scheduled to take 60 days.

1.4 Sailor Compensation

- **Military Basic Pay.** Title 37 U.S.C. §§ 201-212 is the statutory authority for military basic pay.[2] Military pay tables are prescribed by law. The amount of Service members' basic pay is determined by their rank and years of service if they are on active duty in a pay status and not prohibited by law from receiving pay.[3] Service members may also receive additional "special pay," like career sea pay, in addition to basic pay.[4] A Sailor may also be eligible for basic entitlements in addition to their basic pay based on specific circumstances of the Sailor such as basic allowance for subsistence (BAS).

- **Basic Allowance for Subsistence.**

  - **Description.** BAS is a monthly allowance that is intended to offset a portion of the cost of meals and food for military members. This allowance is based in the historic origins of the military in which the military provided room and board (or rations) as part of a member's pay. This allowance is not intended to offset the costs of meals for family members, but rather to provide meals for the service member; its level is linked to the price of food. Therefore, each year it is adjusted based upon the increase of the price of food as measured by the United States Department of Agriculture food cost index and will not necessarily be the same percentage as that applied to the increase in the pay table, as annual pay raises are linked to the increase of private sector wages. BAS II a separate and additional monthly allowance payable to Sailors on duty at a permanent station, such as a ship, and assigned to single (i.e., unaccompanied) Government quarters, such as a ship where there are no adequate food storage and preparation facilities, where Government mess is not available, and where the Government cannot otherwise make meals available.[5]

  - **Entitlement.** Officers are entitled to BAS at all times on a monthly basis, and must pay for their meals while aboard ships. Beginning in January 2002, all enlisted members get full BAS, and must pay for their meals, including those provided by the Government, such as when onboard a ship.

- **Basic Allowance for Housing.**

  - **Description.** All military service members are entitled to either government-provided housing or a housing allowance. About 33 percent of service members receive government-provided housing (in the form of barracks, dormitories, ship berthing, or government-owned family housing). The remainder receive a housing allowance to offset the costs of renting or purchasing housing in the civilian economy, or for renting privatized housing on base. For those living in the United States, this allowance is known as BAH. The amount of BAH a service member receives is based on three factors: paygrade (rank), geographic location, and whether the service member has dependents. Paygrade and dependency status are used to determine the type of accommodation—or "housing profile"—that would be appropriate for the service member (e.g., one--bedroom apartment, two--bedroom townhouse, or three-bedroom single family home). Geographic location is used to determine the average costs associated with each of these housing profiles in a given locality. The median costs of these housing profiles are the basis for BAH rates, with some additional adjustments made on the basis of paygrade (that is, an E-7 without dependents will receive more than an E-6 without dependents, even though the appropriate housing profile for both of them is "two bedroom apartment"). As a result of this methodology, BAH rates are much higher in some areas than others. The intention is that service members of similar paygrade and dependency status are able to pay for roughly comparable housing regardless of their duty location.[6]

- **Entitlement.** Navy ships are designed to fully accommodate Sailors while operationally deployed at sea. While the ship is at homeport, the ability of the ship to house Sailors is dependent on the status and condition of the ship. Per Title 37 U.S.C. § 403, a member of the uniformed Service who is assigned to quarters of the United States or a housing facility under the jurisdiction of a uniformed Services appropriate to the grade, rank, or rating of the member and adequate for the member and dependents of the member, if with dependents, is not entitled to a basic allowance for housing.[7] So a Sailor assigned to a Navy ship is assigned to quarters, and their entitlement to BAH is based on their grade, rank, or rating of the member and members accompanied dependents. Unaccompanied Service members below the paygrade of E-6 assigned to a ship are not entitled to BAH. The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to make an exception for E-4 and E-5 Sailors assigned to sea duty, based on availability of quarters, but unaccompanied shipboard Sailors at paygrade E-3 and below are prohibited from receiving BAH.[8] Unaccompanied Service members who are not entitled to receive BAH are entitled to partial BAH.[9] While it fluctuates based on individual Sailor circumstances, approximately 800 of the E-4 and below Sailors assigned to an RCOH CVN do not qualify for housing allowance.

1.5 USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Command Investigation

In April 2022, CNAL directed a command investigation to determine the proximate cause of and assess any potential connection between the deaths that same month of three Sailors attached to USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) while the ship was undergoing RCOH at Newport News Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia. That investigation was narrowly focused on the various causal factors that may have contributed to the deaths of these Sailors. The final report was released in December 2022, and found that the deaths were independent events with no direct correlation between them. The investigation also identified some common quality of life challenges for crews of aircraft carriers undergoing RCOH. Concurrent with this effort, CNAL directed this broader quality of service assessment of the resiliency and support programs that Navy ships typically and successfully field in support of the Sailor.

CHAPTER 2 Refueling and Complex Overhaul Systemic Challenges

2.1 Physical Environment

Shipyard Conditions. While in RCOH, the daily commute for the crew becomes a major factor affecting their quality of life. Selection of a residence location includes a variety of factors. Regardless of the causal determinants, this decision impacts the duration of a Sailor's commute to and from their assigned duty location. Sailors who were assigned to a ship homeported at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia and then enter RCOH in Newport News, Virginia incur a longer commute and increase traffic congestion across the several tunnels dividing Hampton Roads. Upon arrival, non-Norfolk, Virginia based carriers allow the Sailor to select a residential location that may be more advantageous to a Newport News, Virginia commute; however, these locations may reduce access to other Navy services at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Based on time of day and season, the commute between HII-NNS and Norfolk, Virginia can increase as much as 1 hour or more in each direction. Sailors who commute to NNS arrive to their worksite in one of several ways: (1) drive a personal vehicle and park in one of many widely dispersed offsite assigned parking lots; (2) take a bus from lodging or assigned parking; or (3) walk from assigned lodging in Newport News, Virginia. All these options can be disadvantageous to the normal park and walk at the CVN piers in Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia.

Finding 1: CVNs undergoing maintenance at HII-NNS experience disjointed and dispersed parking; episodic shuttle transportation; and a distant walk across the shipyard to the aircraft carrier in all weather conditions.

Discussion. For RCOH, Navy pays HII-NNS to provide parking for Navy personnel assigned to ships undergoing maintenance and RCOH, including USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis*. Starting in 2017, the contract for USS *George Washington* obligated HII-NNS to provide 2,600 parking spaces. *The contract explicitly required "secure, lighted parking facilities for 1500 ship's force vehicles," "900 additional secure, lighted parking spaces for ships force vehicles*" (totaling 2,400 parking facilities) 2 months prior to the commencement of crew move aboard, and "*outdoor parking*" for 200 vehicles at the Ship's Force Work Package Warehouse. Without additional contractual specifics and measures of performance and effectiveness, HII-NNS provided *George Washington* 2,400 parking spots across six locations across the three, widely separated cities of Newport News, Virginia; Chesapeake, Virginia; and Suffolk, Virginia. HII-NNS provided parking facilities at 50th Street (Newport News, Virginia), Net-Center Office (Newport News, Virginia), Daily Press Building (Newport News, Virginia), Brooks Crossing (Newport News, Virginia), Tidewater Community College (Suffolk, Virginia), and Chesapeake Square Mall (Chesapeake, Virginia), with shuttle service to the gates of the shipyard. With three aircraft carriers simultaneously assigned to HII-NNS, the parking arrangement became increasingly complex. Figure 1 shows the widely dispersed and complex nature of simply parking and walking to a ship at HII-NNS. Figure 2 highlights the distributed nature of the assigned parking for *George Washington*.[10] Figure 3 highlights the average travel time (bus and/or walk) for a Sailor from contractor-provided parking to their assigned place of duty at HII-NNS.[11]



Figure 1. Huntington Ingalls Industries–Newport News Shipbuilding Parking Plan for Four Aircraft Carriers



Figure 2. Distant Parking Lots for USS *George Washington* at Tidewater Community College and Chesapeake Square Mall

AVERAGE TRAVEL TIMES FROM PARKING TO SHIP

Notes:

1) Satellite lots (remote locations, too far to walk) are denoted in yellow.
2) Travel times from satellite lots include 15 minutes as the average wait time for a bus/van.
3) Bus travel through tunnels are denoted in blue (tunnel delays often add travel time).

USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73)		
Location	**Number of spaces**	**Travel time**
50th St/Warwick	1,150	0+22
5200 W Mercury Blvd	350	0+38
TCC (Suffolk, VA)	300	0+50
Chesapeake Sq Mall	300	0+50
USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74)		
Location	**Number of spaces**	**Travel time**
50th St/Warwick	350	0+19
7505 Warwick Blvd	197	0+32
550 30th St	415	0+33
5200 W Mercury Blvd	420	0+34
TCC (Suffolk, VA)	555	0+47
USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN 78)		
Location	**Number of spaces**	**Travel time**
80 29th St	100	0+16
2900 Washington Ave	236	0+16
2901 Huntington Ave	60	0+16
3300 West Ave	80	0+15
3601 Huntington Ave	200	0+22
3300 Huntington Ave	59	0+21
3500 Huntington Ave	100	0+22
214 38th St	100	0+22
730 39th St	100	0+31
Chesapeake Sq Mall	236	0+45
5200 W Mercury Blvd	395	0+33
7116 Warwick Blvd	40	0+32
NS Norfolk	894	0+55
PCU JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVN 79)		
Location	**Number of spaces**	**Travel time**
30th St	670	0+10
2900 Warwick Blvd	270	0+17
TOTAL	*7,577 parking spaces needed*	
	3,375 parking spaces available near NNS	
	4,202 remote parking spaces (commercial contracts)	
	2,049 parking spaces require travel through tunnel	

Figure 3. Assigned Parking Spaces and Average Travel Time for Huntington Ingalls Industries–Newport News Shipbuilding-based Ships

A typical timeline for a USS *George Washington* Sailor who commutes to the ship from Chesapeake Square Mall parking highlights the challenge of simply arriving at work:

1. Sailor wakes up at 0400 and drives to Chesapeake Square Mall parking lot.
2. Shuttle bus leaves Chesapeake Square Mall parking lot at 0500.[12]
3. Shuttle bus arrives at 50th Street turnstiles between 0545 and 0600 (travel time varies while commuting through Monitor Merrimac Memorial Bridge Tunnel).[13]
4. Sailor walks 12 minutes from 50th Street turnstile to USS *George Washington*.[14]
5. Sailor musters at 0700.[15]

(b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, stated that parking was a long-term problem. (b)(6), executive officer, USS *George Washington*, stated that there is a perception among Sailors "that big Navy has said 'no' to fixing parking . . . previous executive officer fought on parking; he was shut down."[17] (b)(6) former Chief of Staff, CNAL, noted it was frustrating to be unable to help.[18] He said that CNAL has "collectively known parking was a problem for a long time, but did not have the authority to spend the money it would take to fix the problem."[19] (b)(6) former commanding officer, SUPSHIPNN, recalled parking being an issue as far back as 2005 during his first tour, and strongly recommended not overlapping USS *John C. Stennis* with USS *George Washington* in HII-NNS in part due to a lack of parking.[20]

When refusing possible parking solutions due to the distance from potential parking lots to the ship, (b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington* (2020–2022), stated:

> *I said this was unacceptable but eventually saw the writing on the wall and stopped fighting because the discussion was going nowhere. I told SUPSHIPNN that those parking areas were unacceptable and CNAL was briefed on this regularly . . . I believe all RCOH carriers experience the same parking issues. This is a solvable problem and it's really about money; it's an issue of the burden we put on Sailors versus the cost we (Navy, HII-NNS, and SUPSHIPNN) are willing to pay for that parking.*[21]

(b)(6), former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, stated that Sailor's day "all starts and ends with parking."[22] (b)(6) executive officer, USS *George Washington*, cited the parking situation as the number one complaint crew-wide.[23] Every USS *George Washington* Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) conducted over the course of several years contained numerous Sailor complaints regarding the direct impact the lack of parking had on morale. One anonymous survey comment stated, "Transportation/parking to the ship after [USS *John C. Stennis*] arrives is [an] important concern for moral[e]."[24] Another Sailor stated that "as [USS *John C. Stennis*] prepares for its arrival here in the yards, I believe the parking conundrum will be an all-around logistical nightmare, which will lead to some serious issues."[25] Regarding parking further away from the ship, one comment noted, "We cannot expect Sailors to add an additional bus ride over the bridge each way. The bridges/tunnels back up and a nominal 20-minute drive can become a 2-hour drive. Making Sailors do this would crush morale that is ok at this point but on a thin footing."[26]

Ongoing Parking Efforts

Following the tragic deaths of the USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) crewmembers, NAVSEA PEO carriers, SUPSHIPNN, and PMS-312 brought renewed attention to parking provided to CVNs at HII-NNS to increase Sailor quality of life.[27] This renewed effort (Figure 4) has:

1. Established additional bus routes within the shipyard to the RCOH CVNs to reduce walking.

2. Eliminated distant parking contracts at Chesapeake Square Mall (15 miles from the shipyard) and Tidewater Community College (9 miles from the shipyard).

3. Generated a funding request and contract inclusion for the USS *Harry S. Truman* (CVN 75) RCOH (tentatively scheduled for Fiscal Year-2024) to provide a parking garage adjacent to the shipyard. (Funding request submitted, resourcing in-progress.)

4. Relieved USS *John C. Stennis* of bussing duties for the 50th Street Shuttle.

5. Commenced a third-party parking study to identify alternate parking solutions that reduce commuting times and support Sailor quality of life. Results of this study are anticipated in spring 2023 and will provide potential courses of action for the development of parking garages near HII-NNS.

Figure 4. Current Parking at Huntington Ingalls Industries–Newport News Shipbuilding as of January 2023

Finding 2: Aircraft carrier leadership invested significant ship's personnel resources in both manpower and command attention to alleviate transportation challenges, providing incremental benefit but costing significant manhours and impacting Sailor's in-rate training and experience.

Discussion. As a result of the systemic parking challenges for aircraft carriers at HII-NNS, it is common practice for commands to organize an ad-hoc transportation division. As a result, approximately 130 ship's personnel work out of their assigned rating to drive buses and shuttles transporting Sailors. While the Navy contracts with HII-NNS to provide privately leased transportation, HII-NNS also leases buses from Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command. A ship's transportation division manages these Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command vehicles. In addition to shuttling Sailors to remote parking lots and lodging, a ship's transportation division is also responsible for shipping and receiving parts and materials, providing transit to and from satellite support facilities, accommodating distinguished visitors, and managing the 12 assigned parking spaces provided by HII-NNS inside the shipyard. The estimated workload of a transportation division with 130 personnel operating outside their rating equates to 250,000 manhours per year (assuming a 2,000-hour man-year less leave).

The *George Washington*'s RCOH transportation division, drawn mostly from the ship's weapons department, managed the operation and maintenance of 32 government vehicles to include twelve 15-passenger vans, seven standard school buses, seven 5.5-ton flatbed delivery trucks, three 2.5-ton delivery trucks, and three box-style delivery vans.[28] The transportation division officer noted her position was assigned to her as a collateral duty without training and in addition to her normal fulltime position. She maintains that this collateral responsibility monopolized her time, requiring her attention and direct oversight 7 hours a day. Assignment to the transportation division precluded Sailors from performing production maintenance on the ship, decreasing the available manpower for the ship's company during RCOH. Overall, across all four carriers assigned to HII-NNS, the estimated number of manpower hours lost to the provision of transportation was 780,000 hours per year.[29]

CVN leadership devoted significant time to parking and transportation concerns at the leadership level:[30]

1. Every month, command master chiefs of vessels at HII-NNS met with command master chief, SUPSHIPNN, to discuss issues with parking. The command master chief, SUPSHIPNN, served as liaison for communicating issues to the individual project teams, SUPSHIPNN contractors, and HII-NNS.31

2. Commanding officer, SUPSHIPNN, held a monthly meeting with HII-NNS to discuss matters that occurred over the preceding month. Attendees included HII-NNS facilities manager, HII-NNS parking lead, HII-NNS contracts, SUPSHIPNN contracts, and command master chief, SUPSHIPNN. SUPSHIPNN project leads were also invited as optional attendees or to address matters related to their specific vessel(s).[32]

3. Changes to parking requirements were handled at the SUPSHIPNN project level, often in conjunction with SUPSHIPNN contracts when modifications to contract terms were required.[33]

4. (b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington* (2018–2020), said he attended City of Newport News, Virginia City Council meetings to discuss Sailor safety and explore options to improve safety concerns for Sailors walking to and from the 50th Street lot and the ship.[34]

5. (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington* (2019–2021), communicated with Sailors about parking matters and solicited feedback.[35] Parking and transportation issues were communicated to the crew through the ship's public address system 1 Main Circuit (1MC), head of department discussions, and emails with the Chief's Mess that trickled down to the Sailors.[36] Leadership contacted HII-NNS and the City of Newport News, requesting local police assistance to ensure cars were safe in designated parking lots and minimize traffic concerns during the Sailor's walk to HII-NNS.[37] USS *George Washington*'s weapons department conducted transportation quality checks to evaluate how effective the RCOH support transportation team was at scheduling and operating the buses. The weapons officer would then report to the ship's executive officer and command master chief on the findings of the quality checks.[38]

6. (b)(6) commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, developed mitigation plans in 2022 to assist with the issues in parking and transportation by adjusting policy, resulting in prioritizing parking spots at 50th Street parking lot for the ship's reactor, security, and supply departments, who worked longer hours than most other departments.[39] Feedback from enlisted Sailors was positive for this change.[40]

<u>Recommendation 1:</u> Prohibit first-term Sailor assignments to aircraft carrier within 1 year of entering RCOH until after RCOH redelivery to reduce the most exposed and at-risk Sailors to quality of life challenges, reducing both risk to junior Sailors and the training, mentoring, and administrative burden to the chain of command.

<u>Recommendation 2:</u> Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center study to identify RCOH "essential" manning, to include ship's leadership and

support services (i.e., admin, supply, transportation) across all skill levels, in an effort to focus solely on RCOH and minimize crew size and the resultant RCOH impact to training, out of rate workload, admin support, medical support, support services (e.g., commute transportation), and onboard housing of crew.

Finding 3: The disbursed nature of RCOH support buildings compounded a complex and dysfunctional parking and transportation situation.

Discussion. During RCOH prior to crew move aboard, displaced offices and functions required that some Sailors work at one of four satellite support buildings. Personnel and administrative support services are provided for Sailors at the Administration Building, known as the "Bank Building."[41] General Electric Warehouse provides storage of shipboard equipment and mail deliveries and serves as the technical library.[42] The Light Industrial Facilities (LIFAC), refurbishes and calibrates shipboard equipment.[43] Huntington Hall houses the closest off-ship fitness center and provides additional off-ship berthing for Sailors before they are moved on ship. Support locations are widely disbursed and present challenges to simple routine operations.

Figure 5. Location of Satellite Support Buildings

Opinion 1: The distributed and disjointed parking provided to ship's Sailors resulted in a perception that their increased commute and parking circumstances were not a primary concern to "Big Navy," despite the ship's leadership directing a significant outlay of their time and attention to improving parking.

Opinion 2: Sailor quality of life is negatively impacted by the parking assigned to ships at HII-NNS resulting in long-term negative effects in Sailor morale and their perceived value as Navy personnel.

<u>Recommendation 3:</u> PEO Carriers conduct an analysis of alternatives of Sailor parking for ships at HII-NNS to a single centralized installation, with security and quality shuttle buses of reliable frequency directly to the ships' piers. Cease contracting with HII-NNS to provide parking for Sailors assigned to ships in the shipyard and RCOH, making this a core Navy quality of life priority with clear Navy ownership.

<u>Recommendation 4:</u> PEO Carriers conduct an analysis of alternatives to centralize off-ship support locations, ideally near centralized parking, improving efficiency and reducing the transportation burden, while providing more access to Sailor services.

2.2 Manning

A Navy combatant has two critical components——the ship and the crew—that must function in unity to achieve any outcome. Navy manpower planning has been described as "getting the right person to the right position at the right time."[44] Ensuring the right person, at the right place, at the right time requires a sequence of events across multiple years. This sequence includes recruiting, initial training, initial rate training, experience tour, leadership selection and promotion into leadership positions with additional training, identification, and designation to ensure the right person, in the right place, at the right time. Within the Navy personnel assignments, manpower is a term referred to as approved billets assigned to a ship, while manning is the assignment of personnel to those approved billets. The Navy is a closed labor market of military personnel. The planning necessary to generate future senior enlisted leadership or officers highlights the fact that resourcing decisions made years prior lead to trade-offs to meet short-term gaps in manning. As an example, travel restrictions as a result of federal budget continuing resolution or Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) may stop travel between assignments resulting in training disruptions or delays. These short-term incidents may lead to shortages in the fleet of trained personnel as training pipelines catch up to personnel backlogs. Departure and gains of personnel, prioritization of assignments, and/or unexpected personnel transfers lead to gaps in crew manning. Ships and TYCOM routinely struggle with managing this problem set. This section will discuss the assigned manning of aircraft carriers during RCOH.

Finding 4: There are no identified minimum manning levels for aircraft carriers in RCOH or extended maintenance availabilities.

Finding 5: During RCOH, USS *George Washington* had insufficient supervisory manning to effectively provide training, mentorship, quality of life oversight, and overall development of assigned Sailors.

Discussion. Over the last 3 years, USS *George Washington* supervisory manning levels averaged 69 percent. In addition to this supervisory manning shortfall, personnel were spread across too many tasks above and beyond their normal duties or the duties expected of their ratings. These manning deficits created second and third-order consequences on Sailor quality of life issues by impacting Sailor pay, training, and career development, among other issues. Supervisors complained that they needed trained personnel to do the work, but they were spread too thin to train the personnel they had. In addition to their divisional leadership role, supervisors are expected to manage multiple jobs, beyond their normal scope. This happens in the context of supervisors having to lead additional divisions lacking supervisors, leading one or more project teams, leading a duty section, and carrying one or more major collateral duties, while also grooming their own divisional spaces for redelivery.

One area impacted by this lack of supervisory manning and out-of-rate tasking is Sailor pay and entitlements. In the personnel division of the administrative department, the lack of supervisors resulted in thousands of pay transactions being processed through a single personnel clerk first class (PS1), with no one to perform the internal audit functions, leading to critical transactions being overlooked, such as making activation of extensions of active duty and properly processing missed meal requests, resulting in Sailors being underpaid or not receiving pay at all.

While there were expectations to maintain normal administrative and mentorship requirements, such as writing awards and evaluations, conducting Career Development Boards focused on junior Sailor development, and completing general military training and job-specific training, supervisors reported that some things fell through the cracks, such as missed evaluations and not being able to complete requirements for pending retirements. Supervisors did not have the time needed to check in with their Sailors regularly, provide mentorship and guidance, or correct deficiencies in military bearing, which had a deleterious impact on the most junior Sailors and the command overall.

Admin officer, USS *George Washington*, stated that the manning in the administration department is "terrible," and most of the enlisted personnel report to the department with little or no experience. She stated that they are manned at the E-4 level but not at the supervisory level.[45] Personnel division leading chief petty officer, USS *George Washington*, was assigned in February 2021, and she was the first supervisor in over a year. Supervisor manning dropped to 20 percent (one personnel specialist supervisor for five Billets Authorized) between November 2021 and May 2022. As a consequence of her arrival, personnel division leading chief petty officer, USS *George Washington*, said the monthly pending transactions report showed an increase in transactions not being timely processed, not because the numbers had actually increased, but because she had just started running the reports upon her arrival to the division. She said she was able to take corrective action only after identifying the discrepancies. Properly run reports that identify when Sailors are approaching their End of Active Obligated Service are used to identify when the personnel division should make a Sailor's service extension "active." She said that some extensions would "fall through the cracks," resulting in Sailor pay being stopped, and they would not be able to fix it until the Sailor alerted them of the problem resulting in temporary gaps in pay with pending Sailor bills.[46]

> **Opinion 3:** Absence of identified minimum manning levels by skill position or key leadership role whittles down the effectiveness of crew functions, impacting mission accomplishment.
>
> **<u>Recommendation 5:</u> OPNAV N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center manpower study to identify RCOH "essential" manning, to include ship's leadership and support services (i.e., admin, supply, transportation) across all skill levels, in an effort to focus solely on RCOH and minimize crew size and the RCOH impact to training, out of rate workload, admin support, medical support, and onboard housing of crew.**

Finding 6: The current method of managing ship's manning through Fit and Fill, with insufficient available supply of senior leadership, leads to a competition for scarce personnel, which further impacts those ships with insufficient prioritization such as CVNs undergoing RCOH.

Discussion. The CNO's Navigation Plan requires that all deployed units be ready to fight at the high-end of maritime warfare to support planned and unplanned peacetime operations and wartime combat.[47] Sea manning (i.e., normally ships vice shore-based assignments) is operationally focused in support of the Navigation Plan. Inefficiencies of the Navy personnel system relating to the departure and gains of ship's personnel, accessions, or unexpected personnel transfers, lead to gaps in crew manning.

TYCOMs have the responsibility of executing established fleet manning requirements and ensuring the readiness of assigned units.[48] TYCOM manning actions are executed to correct manning deficiencies that degrade a unit's readiness in regard to Fit or Fill when compared to Billets Authorized.[49] TYCOMs are tasked to intervene and manage ships that are identified below the standards set to alleviate the impact based on established prioritization.[50] Billets Required is the total number of billets, both funded and unfunded, required based on the workload assessment performed by the Naval Manpower Analysis Center.[51] Fit describes billets where manning matches both rating and payband (skill and experience). Fill denotes the total number of Sailors in the unit, compared to the total number of billets that unit is authorized.[52] For the purposes of manning and readiness, Sailors are categorized into the following paybands: Supervisor (E-7 to E-9), Journeyman (E-5 to E-6), and Apprentice (E-1 to E-4). This highlights gaps in experience since a newly trained Sailor is not viewed as a suitable substitute for a multiyear experienced Sailor. Sailors in the Apprentice payband include those who are being detailed to their first command following boot camp or initial rate training school. These Sailors typically lack experience to be considered for priority billets.[53] Figures 6 through 8 highlight the increasing gap between Fit (accounts for skill and experience) and Fill (manned billets without regard to skill or experience) as the competition for those skilled and experienced Sailors is distributed across the fleet by priority.



Figure 6. Sea Duty Supervisors Manning (E-7 to E-9)



Figure 7. Sea Duty Journeyman Manning (E-4 to E-6)



Figure 8. Sea Duty Apprentice Manning (E-1 to E-3)

The fleet commanders establish fleet manning requirements to ensure fleet units are manned to the approved manning thresholds.[54] Fleet commanders direct the advertisement of billets based on the number of Sailors available for orders at that time to fill the highest priority billets. They also direct manning actions for any unplanned losses and billets that cannot be filled by the normal detailing process.[55] Ships in maintenance, and those without an upcoming deployment date, are assigned a lower manning priority than new class CVNs and CVNs due to deploy.[56]

Figure 9 shows the manning prioritization determined by USFFC and COMPACLFT, where an RCOH CVN (priority 5) is prioritized below sea going deploying units and new construction CVN 78-class (priority 4).[57]

Billet Priority	Units
1	• Strategic nuclear forces • Special operations forces • Strategic nuclear forces (support) • Special operations forces (support)
2	• Forward-deployed naval forces (sea/shore type duty code 4)
3	• Overseas remote land-based sea duty (sea/shore type duty code 3)
4	• Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP) deployers (continental United States (CONUS)) • Additional sea duty units o CVN 78-class o DDG 1000-class o CG/LSD modernization (caretaker crews) o Maritime prepositioning ships squadron (MPSRON) 2 and 3 o In-port emergency team direct support activities o Surveillance towed-array sensor system (SURTASS) ships o Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ships o Submarine tenders
5	• All other sea duty

Figure 9. Manning Priorities (Sea) as Set by Navy Strategic Guidance (in priority order)

Figure 10 shows that when *George Washington* entered RCOH, the ship was manned to 88.7 percent Fit and 94.8 percent Fill.

	August 2017				April 2021			
	Billet Allowance	Onboard	Fit Percent	Fill Percent	Billet Allowance	Onboard	Fit Percent	Fill Percent
Supervisor	232	225	86.6 percent	97.0 percent	260	169	64.6 percent	65.0 percent
Journeyman	935	912	86.3 percent	97.5 percent	1,017	803	74.4 percent	79.0 percent
Apprentice	1,498	1,390	90.9 percent	92.8 percent	1,553	1,206	85.8 percent	77.7 percent
Summary	2,665	2,527	88.7 percent	94.8 percent	2,830	2,178	79.1 percent	77.0 percent

Figure 10. USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Manning (Data Source: COGNOS)

Following its last operational commitment, USS *George Washington*'s manning priority was reduced to the lowest level, shown in Figure 11 as "All other sea duty."[58] This leadership manning shortfalls in the engineering department negatively affected the culture and morale. Engineering department leading chief petty officer, USS *George Washington*, said, "*The normal mechanism you would have to set good order and discipline, we just don't have. We have five chiefs, including me, for 185 Sailors.*"

Manning Concerns

COMPACFLT, CNAL, and CNAP made an in-person visit together in mid-March 2021 to USS *George Washington* (CVN 73). (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, said that COMPACFLT conveyed how important the ship was to the fleet and how important it was to execute the maintenance schedule on the timeline. (b)(6) recalled that CNAP asked the triad what they needed to complete the mission and he told CNAP they needed manning. He recalled that CNAP pledged his assistance, but added that the former commanding officer needed to have a bigger perspective on manning. (b)(6) understood that CNAP meant that **there were a finite amount of resources to fix the manning issue.** Additionally, (b)(6) reported that he spoke to CNAL on several separate occasions about manning needed specifically for paygrades E-6 and above, with an emphasis on supervisory roles such as E-9 and senior officers. According to him, specific departments that required more manning included engineering, reactor, and combat systems, because they were considered essential for RCOH milestone completion. He said that overall chief petty officer shortfalls were hurting the command's ability to adequately supervise junior Sailors.[59]

(b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington*, said he had communicated with CNAL N1 regarding the manning shortfalls.[60] He said **under manning was a widely accepted risk across the force, noting that RCOH carriers pay a "heavier tax" on manning than operational carriers, meaning they often have to provide Sailors for deploying ships**.[61]

During CNAP's 2021 holiday visit, (b)(6) commanding officer, USS *George Washington* said he expressed his concern to CNAP about manning within specific departments that were critical to the mission such as engineering, supply, security, and medical departments. He said manning in the engineering department had been an issue due to maintenance requirements, because there were not enough personnel in paygrades E-6 to E-9, and there were E-4 and below Sailors without adequate supervision.[62]

(b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington*, mentioned lower manning levels in the E-6, E-7, and E-9 paygrades across the crew and higher than expected manning numbers in the E-5 and below paygrades, citing gaps in khaki leadership across the crew but most notably in the engineering department. He stated that the Ship's Force Work Packages required a significant amount of technical expertise in the E-6 and E-7 paygrades, and, therefore, a lack of manning in those paygrades resulted in less than optimal work product.[63]

TYCOM did take action to address supervisor shortfalls, when shortfalls were communicated to CNAL in the fall 2020. Sailors were sent on temporary additional duty orders from other commands in the geographical area until permanent replacements arrived. Between January 2021 and April 2022, CNAL directed 298 temporary additional duty orders to include more than 25 supervisors. At least one witness stated that utilizing temporary additional duty supervisors is suboptimal because they are not part of the command team and often perform like advisors. According to a prior RCOH program manager at SUPSHIPNN, USS *George Washington* struggled to get some temporary additional duty supervisors "to step up and own it."

Supervisor manning was a concern on board USS *Abraham Lincoln* throughout RCOH as well. One example was that the number of khaki personnel in the engineering department dropped from 40 to 20 by the end of the maintenance period.[64] However, supervisor fill for the ship remained above 80 percent until December 2016, 6 months prior to completion of RCOH in May 2017.[65]

> **Opinion 4:** Supervisor manning shortfalls have a disproportional impact on organizations since supervisors are expected to not only oversee the daily function of the organization, but also provide the guidance and training to fill lower-level manning gaps.

Opinion 5: Manning shortfalls are a systemic Navy problem; no amount of advocacy by leadership nor TYCOM short-term fixes resulted in any long-term changes, and were inadequate.

Opinion 6: The combination of USS *George Washington* being at the lowest billet priority level for the distribution of prospective manning and being one of the only ships to source Sailors in support of deploying CVNs has transferred and consolidated CVN-wide risk into a single RCOH unit.

Opinion 7: Sea duty billet prioritization with inadequate manning supply simply shifts risk among units, creating an environment of manning winners and losers.

Opinion 8: Without appropriate balancing of supervisor and subordinate manning, manning practices add risk to mission accomplishment and negative quality of life impacts from a lack of oversight, mentorship, guidance, and other Navy leadership efforts.

Recommendation 5 (Restated): OPNAV N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center manpower study to identify RCOH "essential" manning, to include ship's leadership and support services (i.e., admin, supply, transportation) across all skill levels, in an effort to focus solely on RCOH and minimize crew size and the RCOH impact to training, out of rate workload, admin support, medical support, and onboard housing of crew.

2.3 Command Climate

The command climate assessment (CCA) process focuses on the "health" and organizational effectiveness of the command's climate. The CCA looks at the overall functioning of the command, the effectiveness of the command's personnel readiness programs, the thoughts and perceptions of command members, and the effectiveness of follow-up actions on previous command climate concerns. The CCA utilizes a command-wide DEOCS, focus groups, interviews, observations, and records review to evaluate the command climate and validate findings. Sailor participation is voluntary. When the evaluation is complete, the command resilience team (CRT) is responsible for preparing an executive summary to include significant findings, strengths, areas of concern, recommended corrective actions, analysis of trends, and effectiveness of changes, diversity considerations, and conclusions. The CRT also develops a plan of action and milestones (POA&M) to address and correct areas of concern. Commands are required to complete CCAs each fiscal year and within 120 days following a change of command. The CCA process should take 60 days.[66] To support Enhanced Commander Accountability, the CCA executive summary and POA&M must be forwarded to the command's immediate superior in command (ISIC) within 30 days and face-to-face debrief conducted within 60 days.[67]

The CRT, Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) program manager, and command climate specialist are assigned duties and responsibilities for CCA management, oversight, and execution.

The CRT is designed to help the commander monitor the command climate, and through collaboration, implement positive measures to promote well-being and resilience. The CRT is required to perform the following actions:

- Meet quarterly and document results via memorandum
- Administer an annual CCA
- Develop a POA&M to address areas of concern identified
- Monitor the implementation of the POA&M.[68]

The CMEO program manager is typically assigned as a collateral duty by the commanding officer with the following duties and responsibilities:

- Serve as the CCA coordinator
- Assist Service members who believe they have been subjected to harassment or prohibited discrimination to submit complaints, and track those complaints through resolution
- Maintain the command continuity folder containing the last 3 years of records of CCAs, including the executive summary and POA&M, inspection results, a complaint log and documentation of all harassment and prohibited discrimination complaints, and documentation of all administered command Military Equal Opportunity training.[69]

Command climate specialists serve as trusted advisors and subject matter experts to their command and subordinate commands. Larger commands, such as aircraft carriers, have two dedicated command climate specialists assigned. In these cases, the command climate specialist is a primary duty.[70] Immediate superiors in the chain of command also have supervisory command climate specialists to provide oversight, assistance, and training to subordinate commands. The major duties and responsibilities of a command climate specialist include, but are not limited to:

- Advise the commander on harassment and prohibited discrimination complaints
- Track complaints through resolution
- Conduct assessments and inspections of subordinate commands every 2 years
- Provide oversight of the Military Equal Opportunity program, CRT, and CCA
- Conduct assist visits and training to the command and subordinate commands
- Maintain 3 years of subordinate commands' CCA records
- Review all CCA executive summaries, POA&Ms, and survey results
- Provide a report to the ISIC prior to a commander's face-to-face debrief.[71]

Finding 7 (Noncompliance/Deficiency): USS *George Washington* CRT functioned poorly and did not execute its duties and responsibilities effectively.

Finding 8 (Deficiency): Command climate specialist program level of knowledge was insufficient to provide effective program oversight.

Finding 9 (Noncompliance): USS *George Washington* leadership did not provide effective oversight of the CRT.

Discussion. CRT is required to perform the following actions:

- Meet quarterly and document results via memorandum
- Administer an annual CCA
- Develop a POA&M to address areas of concern identified
- Monitor the implementation of the POA&M.[72]

USS *George Washington* had two CRTs: one consisted of the membership required by instruction, and one that was E-6 and below.[73] The latter CRT was comprised of five team members.

USS *George Washington* CRT reported various periodicities for CRT meetings from monthly to quarterly or less frequently. During a May 2022 CNAL inspection of the CMEO program, the command was unable to produce CRT meeting memoranda for the record.[74] The senior command climate specialist was not aware of this requirement.[75] CRT meetings were not listed on the command calendar.[76]

CRT members were not designated in writing by the commanding officer. The senior command climate specialist was not aware of this requirement.[77]

Based on interviews, CRT meetings that did occur were poorly attended. CMEO program leadership attributed this to competing priorities.[78] [79] [80] [81]

In 2021, the CMEO program leadership (CMEOs/command climate specialists) administered the survey, advertised the survey, analyzed results, identified trends, formulated focus group questions, conducted focus groups, wrote the CCA executive summary, and drafted the POA&M.[82] [83] The CRT did not formally meet to review the CCA. Inputs were individually provided.[84] The assessed level of CRT inclusion and participation in the CCA varied between CMEO program leadership (CMEO/command climate specialist) and CRT membership. CRT members reported that they did not contribute to CCA POA&M development and access to the survey remained limited.[85] [86]

CMEO program leadership (CMEOs/command climate specialists) reported that the CRT was not monitoring the implementation of the CCA POA&M.[87]

By instruction, the executive officer is head of the CRT. The executive officer, USS *George Washington*, was not aware of this requirement and had not attended any CRT meetings during his first 4 months aboard.[88] The commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, stated that the CRT has a representative from each department, and the CRT reviewed the CCA at their meetings.[89]

> **Opinion 9:** USS *George Washington* failed to institutionalize and prioritize CRT participation.
>
> **Opinion 10**: Command climate specialist level of knowledge was insufficient to conduct program oversight.
>
> **Opinion 11:** Treatment of the CMEO program as a collateral requirement sets the condition for conflicting priorities for personnel.
>
> **Opinion 12:** Assignment of multiple CMEOs increases the risk of social loafing (i.e., puts in less effort because they are being judged as a group and not individually) undermining program effectiveness.
>
> **Opinion 13:** Given the scale of the command, multiple CMEOs may be required; however, overall program responsibility should reside with a single, dedicated CMEO.
>
> **Opinion 14:** Self-assessment is a critical command function. Effective self-assessment in accordance with OPNAVINST 5354.1 would more than likely have corrected program deficiencies if not program outcomes.

Finding 10: Internal and external assessments of the CMEO program were inadequate.

Discussion. OPNAVINST 5354.1 (series) requires immediate superiors in command to conduct assessments and inspections of subordinate commands' command managed equal opportunity (CMEO) program every 2 years.

USS *George Washington*'s leading CCS reported that there have been no outside inspections of the program in the last 2 years.

The leading CCS reported that USS *George Washington* conducted a program assessment in fall of 2021; however, the results of this inspection were not made available/retained. Despite reportedly utilizing the program self-assessment check sheet, the leading CCS indicated that she was unaware of specific program requirements listed on this check sheet.

Opinion 15: The absence of critical self-assessment of the CMEO program limited program effectiveness and execution.

Opinion 16: The absence of routine ISIC assessment of the CMEO program limited program effectiveness and execution.

Opinion 17: Because of the division of responsibilities between CNAL and CNAP, external inspections of the CMEO program did not occur as required.

Recommendation 6: **CNAL/CNAP review periodicity and currency of CMEO inspections across U.S. aircraft carriers.**

Finding 11 (Noncompliance/Deficiency): USS *George Washington* failed to meet established timelines for CCA completion and reporting.

Discussion. USS *George Washington* exceeded the 60-day timeline to complete their CCA in 2020 (annual) and 2021 (change of command). The CCAs were delayed by 100 and 120 days, respectively.

Opinion 18: Completion of the CCA in a timely fashion demonstrates the importance of the CCA to the command.

Opinion 19: Many factors impact the ability to deliver a CCA in a timely fashion. In the case of USS *George Washington*, these included competing work force demands and the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting the ship's ability to effectively meet and collaborate.

Opinion 20: Delays in CCA delivery should be validated and approved by the TYCOM.

Recommendation 7: USFFC/USPACFLT provide guidance on requesting extensions for CCA completion.

Recommendation 8: TYCOMs review existing policy to ensure adequate tracking of commencement and completion of subordinate CCA.

Finding 12 (Deficiency): From 2019, USS *George Washington* DEOCS participation remained low.

Discussion. The CRT Guide advises that to overcome low survey participation, participants need to believe the survey is truly anonymous and that leaders will do something with the results.

Required POA&M did not identify specific measures to remedy low participation levels.

In 2020, survey participation increased to 24 percent with some department reporting over 100 percent completion rates. The source of this anomaly represents single users completing multiple surveys or miscalculation of registered participants for each department.

In 2021, two DEOCSs occurred, one for the change of command and one as required by Navy administrative (message) (NAVADMIN). Participation rates fell to 12 percent and 11 percent, respectively.

Both 2021 surveys occurred between crew move aboard and complete crew move aboard.

Opinion 21: DEOCS execution in the shipyard is limited by access to technology. Sailors may not have routine access to email and sufficient privacy to complete the DEOCS.

Opinion 22: The convenience of survey delivery and completion greatly impacts performance.

Opinion 23: DEOCS execution during crew move aboard likely limited participation as individual access to computers was likely reduced.

Recommendation 9: **TYCOMS ensure commands with low participation rates for CCAs effectively identify root causes and identify methodologies to increase participation in follow-on CCAs.**

Recommendation 10: TYCOMs track, monitor, and assess participation rates through Enhanced Commander Accountability process.

Finding 13 (Deficiency): Varying DEOCS report formats and changes in key climate measurements make year-over-year and long-term, data-driven CCAs challenging.

Discussion. Between 2019 and 2021, DEOCS changed significantly to include different command climate measurements; removal of demographic details in reports; removal of Navy-wide and class-wide comparative measures; and exclusion of the ISIC from direct survey results.

In 2019, USS *George Washington*'s DEOCS results were below aircraft carrier and Navy-wide averages in all assessment categories. All areas required "caution" or "need[ed] improvement." In 2020, USS *George Washington*'s DEOCS results indicated that all areas assessed still required "caution" or "need[ed] improvement." Command climate factors did not improve. Comparative aircraft carrier and Navy-wide averages for command climate indicators were not provided in the report.

DEOCS 5.0 transition did not include guidance on how to conduct time-series analysis and cross-walk new measures to legacy measures. CMEOs received no training to aggregate and interpret results of the new DEOCS 5.0.

Between 2019 and 2020, DEOCS stopped providing specific minority demographic breakdowns to commands.

In 2020, DEOCS stopped providing class-specific and Navy-wide command climate averages in the report.

DEOCS 5.0 prevents ISIC command climate specialists from automatically accessing their subordinate command's survey results. USS *George Washington*'s April 2021 DEOCS 5.0 was only made available to the command. In subsequent surveys, command and ISIC command climate specialists had to take extra steps to access survey results.

In 2021, the DEOCS 5.0 reports did not present all the protective and risk factors in a single aggregated format. DEOCS 5.0 provided "top three" and "bottom three" risk and protective factors. All other risk and protective factors were covered elsewhere in the document. DEOCS 5.0 removed the rubric to assess performance because the metric was arbitrarily defined.

DEOCS 5.0 stopped presenting the results of questions regarding awareness of suicidal ideations, attempts, and deaths by suicide within the unit. From 2019 DEOCS to 2020 DEOCS, service member awareness of suicidal ideations within the organization increased from 31 percent to 56 percent. USS *George Washington* CCA POA&M did not address this finding.

During the investigation, (b)(6) commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, observed that "there was nothing out of the ordinary that was voiced in that survey that could have given the awareness of a massive problem or anything particularly related to suicidal ideations."

Opinion 24: The removal of both the DEOCS assessment rubric and the comparative data created a critical void in command climate self-assessment.

Opinion 25: Despite challenges in data analytics, annual and situational DEOCS results show a command suffering from a chronically poor command climate.

Opinion 26: While there are benefits to the military's adoption of DEOCS 5.0, the switch likely disrupted long-term trend analysis at both the command and TYCOM level.

Opinion 27: Adopting any new system creates adjustment and adoption risks and this risk must be mitigated through robust feedback loops from users to program managers.

Opinion 28: Providing benchmarks of performance for the Navy and the specific type of command provides critical context for analyzing CCA results.

Opinion 29: The current presentation of data in the DEOCS 5.0 report format requires significantly more effort to interpret than previous formats. Misinterpretation of data regarding command climate creates risk to force and risk to mission.

Opinion 30: DEOCSs exist to provide the commander with a tool. Utilizing the term "organization" instead of "command" or "unit" may lead to misinterpretation.

Recommendation 11: Chief of Naval Personnel provide training on interpreting DEOCS 5.0 for all CMEOs/command climate specialists.

Recommendation 12: Chief of Naval Personnel require all DEOCSs to include a survey question regarding awareness of suicidal ideations and suicide-related behavior.

Finding 14: USS *George Washington* did not comply with the requirements of the CCA.

Discussion. From 2019 to 2021, each CCA executive summary provided to the TYCOM acknowledged that a review of records and reports was conducted. USS *George Washington* CMEO program was unable to produce any records. The senior chief command climate specialist, said they did not understand it was a requirement.

OPNAVINST 5354.1H states a "complete assessment includes a DEOCS in addition to using data gathered from interviews, observations and existing records or reports in order to form a complete and actionable picture of organizational climate." Furthermore, the instruction requires that "records and reports must be maintained and reviewed quarterly."

The CRT guide provides amplifying guidance on how to execute this process.

Opinion 31: The hierarchical structure of the CMEO program should enable effective reach back to clarify unclear requirements. A questioning attitude is an expectation for every Sailor, regardless of grade.

Opinion 32: The governing instruction does not adequately detail what records and reports should be reviewed as part of a CCA, creating some degree of ambiguity.

Opinion 33: As the document was routed for signature across several different chains of command, it is apparent that no one asked "how" the required elements were executed.

<u>Recommendation 13:</u> Chief of Naval Personnel explicitly define what records and/or reports must be included in a CCA and include this requirement in the associated command climate specialist checklist.

Finding 15: CNAP/CNAL RCOH instruction inadequately assigns oversight of Sailor focused programming.

Discussion. USS *George Washington* CCA executive summaries were addressed to CNAP via CNAL. The CNAP command climate specialist did not have any record of USS *George Washington* CCAs from the RCOH period. Despite addressing the report to CNAP in 2020 and 2021, no records indicate that CNAP received the report. Command climate specialist, USS *George Washington*, reported they did not interact with CNAP command climate specialist. CNAP/CNAL instruction states that all duties and responsibilities not assigned to CNAL shall be retained by CNAP. CMEO program oversight is not explicitly listed in the CNAL/CNAP RCOH instruction. The instruction does not cover the transfer of duties and responsibilities for oversight of any Sailor support programs.

Subordinate commands are required to forward the CCA executive summary and supporting documents to the ISIC for review and debrief. (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, could not recall if he conducted Enhanced Commander Accountabilities with CNAL in 2019 or 2020. (b)(6) current commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, did not debrief CNAL in 2021. There are no indications that either commanding officer debriefed CNAP. OPNAVINST 5354.1H requires ISICs to issue guidance on scheduling CCA debriefs. The investigation was unable to locate guidance from either CNAP or CNAL. USS *George Washington* did turn in executive summaries but were time late and more than 100 days overdue. The investigation did not find any indications that the command was held accountable for delay.

There have been no outside inspections of the CMEO program in the last 2 years. Senior chief command climate specialist, USS *George Washington*, said she conducted the last internal inspection of the CMEO program in October 2021 using the checklist provided in the instruction.[90]

Commencing in early 2022, the new CNAL command climate specialist started to provide oversight, training, and assistance to both USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis*.

Opinion 34: Military Equal Opportunity program oversight for RCOH should reside under a single TYCOM (CNAL).

Opinion 35: Program oversight functions are not adequately covered in CNAL/CNAP, creating risk to force.

Opinion 36: The omission of oversight responsibilities in the CNAL/CNAP instruction limited effective oversight of USS *George Washington* and created risk to force.

Opinion 37: It is unclear if CNAL or CNAP executed responsibility for the Military Equal Opportunity program oversight.

Opinion 38: In the absence of explicit transfer of oversight responsibilities, CNAP retained responsibility for the Military Equal Opportunity program.

Opinion 39: Because of confused command and control, USS *George Washington* command climate did not receive necessary oversight.

Opinion 40: Lack of oversight does not excuse ineffective program management and execution. Critical self-assessment is required.

Opinion 41: At the ISIC/TYCOM level, a gap exists that allowed a subordinate command to proceed without a proper Enhanced Commander Accountability debrief to the ISIC.

Opinion 42: In 2020 and 2021, routine business and administrative functions and timelines were disrupted across the world as a result of COVID-19. CCA requires a significant amount of meetings and focus groups, which could not be conducted in a shipboard/shipyard environment given limited access to virtual platforms and computers. Delays were to be expected.

Recommendation 14: CNAL/CNAP revise instruction to include oversight of Sailor programs for CVNs during RCOH as a CNAL function.

Recommendation 15: CNO shift administrative control (ADCON) of Pacific-based CVNs to USFFC/CNAL for RCOH.

Recommendation 16: OPNAV N1 revise the Enhanced Commander Accountability requirement to include a required endorsement by the ISIC and concurrence/nonconcurrence on findings, assessment, and way ahead.

Recommendation 17: CNAL and CNAP publish guidance on Enhanced Commander Accountability scheduling and completion.

Finding 16 (Deficiency): USS *George Washington*'s CCA corrective POA&Ms were ineffective in improving measurements of command climate.

Discussion. The 2019 CCA executive summary identified five areas for corrective action, namely job satisfaction, organizational processes, inclusion, group cohesion and survey participation. Additionally, it assessed that low participation resulted from a lack of trust in the anonymity of the survey and/or belief that leadership would not do anything with the results. Neither of these self-identified issues appeared in the 2019 CCA POA&M.

The 2020 CCA executive summary identified seven areas for corrective action: suicide prevention, job satisfaction, organizational processes, group cohesion, inclusion, and sexual harassment and sexual assault prevention. The 2020 CCA POA&M provided to the investigation team was identical to the 2019 POA&M except the date was changed.

In 2020, DEOCS results indicated an increased awareness of suicide ideation and suicide-related behaviors among the crew. This DEOCS indicator increased from 31 percent in 2019 to 56 percent in 2020. The 2021 CCA executive summary identified ten areas for corrective action: job satisfaction, low morale, work-life balance/moderate and high stress, fair treatment, habitability, communication, lack of training opportunities, sexually/racially harassing behaviors, manning shortfall, and survey participation. The 2021 CCA POA&M provided no explicit deadlines for implementation, listing most actions as continuous/ongoing.

The CRT Guide provides a template for CCA POA&Ms; however, it does not utilize a specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely goal format. Furthermore, the guide includes neither measures of performance nor measures of effectiveness to determine level of execution and impact of corrective actions.

The CRT Guide recommends sharing the CCA corrective action POA&M with the command and providing periodic updates. It explicitly recommends that the command be "informed on a regular and frequent basis, about progress that has been made completing the action items outlined in the POA&M."

The CRT is responsible for monitoring the CCA POA&M. CRT meetings were infrequent and did not provide oversight and feedback on the CCA POA&M.

Opinion 43: The connection between the USS *George Washington* executive summary and associated corrective action POA&Ms appeared disconnected across calendar years and chains of command. The investigation team struggled to identify linkages between problem areas identified in the executive summary and corrective actions listed in the POA&M.

Opinion 44: Given that command climate indicators remained low or worsened from 2019 to 2020, corrective or remedial actions proscribed in the POA&M were ineffective in improving command climate.

Opinion 45: Addressing issues in a CCA requires a strategic plan and follow-through to make meaningful changes. Leading strategic planning session an aircraft carrier is an executive-level function that was left to mid-level managers without sufficient training.

Opinion 46: If dedicated command climate specialists struggle to create effective POA&Ms that improve command climate, it is likely that individuals who support the CMEO program as a collateral duty may also be struggling.

Opinion 47: Training curriculum must be evaluated to ensure that POA&M development, a critical element of program execution, is adequately covered and emphasized.

Opinion 48: While the 2020 CCA POA&M may have been lost in the movement and disruption of crew move aboard or program turnover, the presentation of an identical POA&M as previously submitted represents a culture of complacency and normalization of deviation.

Opinion 49: Repetitive use of the same CCA POA&M across years irrespective of changes in the data undermines the culture of excellence that we strive for in the Navy.

Opinion 50: Increased awareness of suicidal ideations and behaviors within the organization should have triggered both concern and invasive action by the chain of command.

Opinion 51: Transparency is critical to building and maintaining trust between senior and subordinate. The process for correcting known command climate deficiencies remained opaque on USS *George Washington*, undermining trust in leadership at all levels.

Opinion 52: It appears likely that USS *George Washington* went 3 years without tracking a CCA corrective action POA&M, enabling a poor command climate and culture to continue.

Recommendation 18: TYCOMs review methodology of tracking and monitoring CCA POA&M actions and effectiveness.

Recommendation 19: OPNAV N170C review CCA POA&M process to ensure it provides the framework for the development of result oriented performance improvement.

Finding 17 (Compliance): USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis* effectively process, track, and report formal, CMEO complaints.

Discussion. The investigation team reviewed the number of formal CMEO complaints; informal CMEO complaints; Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 1150 Complaint of Wrongs against a Superior; and UCMJ Article 138 Complaints of Wrongs; and Inspector General complaints aboard USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis.*

Between Fiscal Year 2020 and June 2022, 28 Sailors aboard USS *George Washington* filed NAVPERS 5354/2 formal complaints.[91]

Fiscal Year 2020—11 total complaints

- Four sexual harassment complaints
- Five discrimination (sex-based, sexual orientation) complaints
- One harassment (race-based) complaint

Fiscal Year 2021—10 total complaints

- Seven sexual harassment complaints
- One equal opportunity complaint
- One discrimination (race-based) complaint
- One harassment (race-based) complaint

Fiscal Year 2022 (to date)—Seven complaints

- Two sexual harassment complaints
- Four bullying complaints
- One harassment[92] complaint

During the same period, 31 Sailors aboard USS *John C. Stennis* filed NAVPERS 5354/2 formal complaints.[93] [94] [95]

Between Fiscal Year 2020 and June 2022, 18 Sailors aboard USS *George Washington* filed informal complaints as follows:

Fiscal Year 2020—9 total informal complaints

- Seven sexual harassment complaints
- One discrimination (unspecified) complaint
- One harassment (race-based) complaint

Fiscal Year 2021—7 total complaints

- Four sexual harassment complaints
- Three discrimination (race-based, sexual orientation) complaints

Fiscal Year 2022 (to date)—Two complaints

- Two bullying[96] complaints

During the same period, 8 Sailors aboard USS *John C Stennis* filed informal complaints.[97]

Between Fiscal Year 2019 and June 2022, USS *George Washington* personnel filed neither an Article 1150 complaint nor an Article 138 complaint.[98] During the same period, USS *John C. Stennis* personnel filed neither an Article 1150 complaint nor an Article 138 complaint.[99]

In 2021 and 2022, the Inspector General received seven complaints relating to USS *George Washington* to include allegations of uninhabitable living conditions, safety violations, unfair treatment, mistreatment of Sailors, mishandling of a sexual assault case, BAS (pay and entitlements), and fraternization.[100] During the same period, the Inspector General received eight complaints relating to USS *John C. Stennis* to include harassment, bullying regarding the COVID-19 vaccine, equal opportunity violations, abuse of authority, toxic work environment, adultery, misuse of government resources, and non-support of dependents.[101]

Opinion 53: Execution of the CMEO complaint process did not negatively contribute to the command culture on USS *George Washington*.

Opinion 54: The number of equal opportunity related complaints aboard USS *George Washington* was not significantly different from USS *John C. Stennis*.

Recommendation 20: TYCOM continue to provide oversight of the Military Equal Opportunity program as required.

Finding 18 (Deficiency): USS *George Washington*'s virtual commanding officer suggestion box compromised Sailor anonymity in reporting issues.

Discussion. USS *George Washington* developed and employed an electronic commanding officer's suggestion box. This virtual suggestion box complemented the traditional, sealed mailbox utilized by Navy commands. The command developed this electronic tool to help Sailors who were working off-site or executing quarantine and restriction of movement (ROM) during COVID-19. The tool enabled Sailors to communicate their needs back to the ship. The system design required submission of identifiable information (e.g., the Sailor's name); however, the command advertised the system as anonymous. The ship's administrative officer was responsible for removing identifiable information before transmitting the complaint to command leadership for action. The investigation revealed no indications that process integrity was compromised.

The Interactive Customer Evaluation system is a web-based tool that collects feedback on services provided by various organizations throughout the Department of Defense (DOD).

Opinion 55: Reduced anonymity may create fear of reprisal.

Opinion 56: Every command requires an effective feedback mechanism that can be accessed both on and off the ship.

Opinion 57: A virtualization feedback path provides additional accountability for command leadership.

Opinion 58: Across echelons, afloat and ashore, commands would benefit from virtual commanding officer suggestion boxes.

Recommendation 21: OPNAV N2N6 evaluate implementation of a shipboard variant of the Interactive Customer Evaluation system or equivalent system.

Recommendation 22: USS *George Washington* redesign the virtual submission tool to make personally identifiable information optional.

2.4 Crew Health and Well-being

Crew health and well-being is a broad set of conditions and Navy programs focused on the crew of a ship. It encompasses many disparate Navy programs that all have a focus on the crew and an outcome that is focused on individual Sailors.

2.4.1 Ships Habitability

Habitability is defined as the "military characteristics of Navy ships directed toward satisfying personnel needs [that] are dependent upon physical environment."[102] Habitability criteria are intended to promote morale, safety, and health and comfort, sufficient to maximize personnel effectiveness and retention.[103]

Finding 19: Instructions, policy, and guidance governing RCOH habitability do NOT:

- **Define conditions and criteria for ship habitability.**
- **Assign responsibilities to the chain of command for deeming a ship habitable.**
- **Require a determination of habitability as a prerequisite for the crew moving and living aboard.[104]**

Discussion. Instructions and manuals issued by OPNAV, USFFC, NAVSEA, CNAP, and CNAL address various considerations for determining whether a ship is "habitable" or "uninhabitable."[105] Ship habitability encompasses ship's systems and spaces that help satisfy a crew's basic human needs. These include a ship's facilities and systems for eating, sleeping, hygiene, ventilation, climate control, drinking water, medical, and leisure activities.[106]

A ship becomes uninhabitable when it loses its ability to berth and mess the crew, and provide adequate training and administrative facilities to support ship functions.[107] For ships undergoing RCOH, the ship's commanding officer is responsible for requesting a declaration of "uninhabitability" which the TYCOM approves or disapproves that request. This request typically occurs 18 months prior to the start of RCOH. The TYCOM (CNAL or CNAP) formally declares a ship uninhabitable through record message traffic. A declaration of "uninhabitability" triggers the planning and funding needed for alternate crew accommodation plans, such as the use of a barge.[108]

In making its determination of "uninhabitability," the TYCOM must consider four general areas: berthing spaces, sanitary facilities, food services and spaces, and the safety of personnel. In particular, CNAL or CNAP must consider the importance of Sailor privacy, noise and temperature inconveniences, cleanliness, convenience of living and working spaces to operational sanitary facilities, interruption of food preparation services, and the potential for safety hazards.[109] A ship may be deemed wholly or partially uninhabitable, and is not automatically considered uninhabitable solely because it is undergoing a maintenance availability.[110]

Crew move aboard is an RCOH production milestone, marking the completion of work in all crew move aboard coded spaces. SUPSHIPNN, HII-NNS, and ship's force work together to close out crew move aboard spaces in order to claim completion. The crew does not move aboard at the time that crew move aboard is claimed as complete, but rather, after a declaration that the ship's crew move aboard-coded spaces are "habitable."[111]

In the case of USS *George Washington*, stakeholder interviews revealed divergent opinions regarding who had the authority to declare habitability and the criteria to reach this determination. Inter- and intra-organizational differences of opinion transcended all echelons of command to include USFFC, CNAF, CNAL, PMS-312, SUPSHIPNN, USS *George Washington*, and USS *Abraham Lincoln*.[112] [113] [114] [115] [116] [117]

> **Opinion 59:** The absence of habitability guidance for ships undergoing RCOH created confusion for RCOH stakeholders involved in habitability planning and decision-making.[118]
>
> **Opinion 60:** The instructions governing "habitability" fail to specify the parties responsible for determining whether a ship is sufficiently habitable for Sailors to work and live aboard, or even that such a determination is required for a ship in RCOH.

Opinion 61: The absence of instruction fosters confusion and enables a lack of accountability among RCOH stakeholders.

Recommendation 23: USFFC and USPACFLT to develop a universal definition for habitability and uninhabitability for all ships, assigning responsibility, authority, and accountability at all levels of the chain of command, specifying how the decision about whether a ship is uninhabitable or restored to a habitable condition will be made and by whom with continuing review as ship or shipyard conditions evolve.

Recommendation 24: USFFC and USPACFLT to develop and codify a process to make the determination of whether the ship is habitable or uninhabitable, leading to a recommendation from the commanding officer and approval by the TYCOM.

Finding 20: Instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing RCOH do not specify the criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections.

Discussion. In accordance with the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual for pre-commissioning ships, the pre-commissioning ship's commanding officer and SUPSHIPNN request a TYCOM habitability inspection. The TYCOM is required to conduct a habitability inspection to determine whether the ship is ready for its crew to move aboard.[119] This inspection must occur prior to crew move aboard.[120] Inspectors are required to use an inspection checklist, covering factors for berthing, food services, potable water, sanitary spaces and systems, lounges, and laundry and dry cleaning.[121] The instruction describes the inspection as a "qualitative judgment" to determine whether there are any unsatisfactory habitability conditions (i.e., "safety deficiencies").[122]

The inspection team must then provide a deficiency list to the SUPSHIPNN project manager representative, pre-commissioning ship's CO, and TYCOM. Before a ship can receive its crew, correcting this list of deficiencies and receiving a satisfactory inspection report are prerequisites. The ship cannot be placed "in service" and its crew cannot move aboard until it is deemed habitable.[123]

Equivalent requirements do not exist for in-service CVNs undergoing extensive maintenance periods such as RCOH.

Opinion 62: OPNAVINST 9640.1C, OPNAVINST 4700.7M, COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 (the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual), and COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B vaguely outline the types of spaces and facilities tied to habitability, and fail to identify specific habitability standards that should be achieved prior to moving a crew aboard a ship undergoing RCOH.

Opinion 63: The existence of habitability criteria for new construction ships but not for ships undergoing RCOH creates confusion and allows stakeholders to selectively enforce standards and requirements.

Recommendation 25: USFFC and USPACFLT align or establish instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections of RCOH to those of pre-commissioned ships.

Finding 21: CNAL habitability inspections of USS *George Washington* were inadequate due to the absence of a formal inspection requirement, standard, and process.

Finding 22: CNAL habitability and Enhanced Quality of Life (EQOL) inspections treat RCOH ships differently from other maintenance availabilities.

Discussion. On 6 May 2020, SUPSHIPNN sent a formal letter to CNAL requesting a "habitability inspection of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) in support of Crew Move Aboard" using pre-commissioning habitability inspections as "guidance."[124] The letter specifically requested CNAL to inspect galleys, laundry facilities, and

berthing spaces, "as well as support systems for initial move aboard phases," including collecting, holding and transfer systems and potable water.[125] CNAL RCOH Program representatives forwarded this letter to CNAL Maintenance (N43), responsible for pre-crew move aboard inspections for messing, laundry, and berthing spaces. This request was consistent with previous RCOH projects.[126]

CNAL utilizes two, separate in-house teams to conduct pre-crew move aboard inspections on ships, including in-service and pre-commissioning ships.[127] These inspections are "a type of assessment to determine whether the ship is ready for day-to-day operations, and whether berthing spaces are 'production complete.'"[128]

- The EQOL Program is staffed by contracted inspectors tasked to provide technical guidance, training, and assistance to ship's force regarding the maintenance, operation, and condition assessment of food service and laundry equipment.[129] The EQOL team primarily provides support to in-service ships undergoing maintenance at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Virginia. Ships undergoing RCOH are not a primary element in the program, and the EQOL team only provides support upon request.[130] For RCOH, the EQOL team is required to provide assessment and inspection of the equipment and ventilation systems within messing and laundry spaces. The statement of work does not specifically contain a training requirement for ships undergoing RCOH. Following these assessments, CNAL's EQOL program manager submits a list of deficiencies to SUPSHIPNN.[131] EQOL Program assesses the status of equipment, but neither provides nor recommends "any conclusions derived from those inspections."[132]

- The habitability program manager is responsible for conducting habitability inspections of berthing and sanitary spaces on pre-commissioning ships, in-service ships, and ships undergoing RCOH.[133] [134]

CNAL inspectors are not required to use production lists identifying crew move aboard-coded items and are not required to utilize standards or checklists of inspection criteria.[135] In the absence of formal guidance, inspectors sometimes refer to instructions for pre-commissioning ships as guidance.[136] The EQOL program relied upon previous process experience to conduct the inspection on USS *George Washington*.[137] The EQOL program manager does not require inspectors to bring Navy technical manuals for inspections. Instead, inspectors use professional knowledge and skill to determine if equipment is operating in accordance with technical requirements.[138]

Following each CNAL habitability inspection, CNAL N43 typically documents and summarizes inspection results.[139] CNAL N43 was unable to locate habitability inspection results for USS *George Washington*.[140]

From December 2020, SUPSHIPNN coordinated with the CNAL EQOL team to schedule inspections of laundry and galley equipment for crew move aboard.[141] The EQOL team conducted its first inspection on 25 January 2021. SUPSHIPNN scheduled follow-on inspections as messing and laundry spaces were ready for close out.[142] Over approximately nine visits, the CNAL EQOL team inspected seven galleys and various laundry facilities.[143] During these inspections, EQOL inspectors stated they were joined by representatives from ship's force, SUPSHIPNN, and contractors (e.g., HII-NNS).[144] EQOL inspectors used SUPSHIPNN equipment lists to ensure the equipment was operable and in good working condition within those specific spaces.[145]

Following each inspection, the CNAL EQOL program manager submitted an inspection summary identifying material deficiencies requiring correction before crew move aboard. SUPSHIPNN was responsible for ensuring deficiencies were corrected and providing status reports to the RCOH project team.[146]

In April 2021, USS *George Washington* requested a CNAL habitability inspection prior to crew move aboard.[147] Ship's force provided CNAL Habitability Program with crew move aboard berthing and sanitary spaces to inspect.[148] In advance of inspection, CNAL Habitability Program provided the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual "Pre-commissioning Habitability Inspection Checklist for New Construction Ships" and informed ship's force that the checklist also applied to ships undergoing RCOH.[149]

USS *George Washington* scheduled the CNAL habitability inspection from 1–3 June 2021.[150] This inspection focused on berthing and sanitary spaces aft of frame 180.[151] CNAL provided two inspectors for the CVN's

spaces.[152] While scheduled for 3 days, ship's force reported that the inspection occurred in a single day.[153] CNAL habitability program reported that it lasted 2 days.[154] During inspections, CNAL habitability program inspectors did not carry habitability design criteria or checklists. The inspectors looked for things that did not "look right."[155] Inspectors checked to ensure that toilets were operational, shower heads were functional, water was hot by running the water over their hands, there was power at vanity outlets, and that lights were functional. They checked water fountains by turning them on and ensuring there were no leaks. In the ship's berthing spaces, they checked to ensure that the ship had an appropriate number of racks, that racks and lockers had been welded down, there were egress labels, there was functional lighting, and there were no tripping or other safety hazards. They also checked ventilation systems by placing their hand over the vents.[156]

Following the inspection, the CNAL habitability program manager conducted an out-brief with the CNAL RCOH program manager, USS *George Washington*'s executive officer, and USS *George Washington*'s habitability coordinator. No major deficiencies were noted that would prevent crew move aboard.[157] At the commanding officer's agenda meeting on 9 June 2021, USS *George Washington*'s habitability coordinator reported that CNAL habitability inspections were complete, and the ship was awaiting final inspection results.[158] On 6 July 2021, CNAL habitability program submitted a summary of inspection results to USS *George Washington,* informing the command that no major deficiencies were identified and recommending that the "crew could move aboard with no problems." [159] Crew move aboard began on June 8, 2021.[160] [161]

At the CNAL supervisory level (N43 Directorate and Maintenance Supervisor), leadership believed that EQOL inspectors provide deep-dive training to ship's force on how to operate galley equipment and fix deficiencies of all carriers including those undergoing RCOH.[162] [163] CNAL EQOL and habitability program managers viewed their inspections as informal, serving as a second or additional set of eyes without making a recommendation on habitability.[164] [165] [166] [167] SUPSHIPNN requested EQOL inspectors to "certify" the ship's spaces.[168] PMS-312 Program Office observed that a ship may move a crew aboard after it passed CNAL inspections.[169] The USS *George Washington* command triad believed the CNAL habitability and EQOL inspections certified that galleys, heads, and berthings coded for crew move aboard met standards. Furthermore, they believed CNAL inspections declared the ship's spaces as habitable and ready for the crew to move aboard.[170] [171] **(b)(6)** , former executive officer, USS *George Washington*, said that the quality of life inspectors who certified the ship said it was "not ideal, but that it was ready."[172] He expected the inspections to be more "robust" than they were executed.[173]

Opinion 64: The lack of a formalized requirement created a disparity between expectations for and execution of habitability inspections.

Opinion 65: EQOL and habitability programs require oversight by a single TYCOM entity that can holistically evaluate habitability.

Opinion 66 Because of the length of RCOH, EQOL programming that "finds, fixes, and trains" is of equal importance to in-service ships to ensure ship's effectively exit the yards at full habitability standards.

Opinion 67: The current informal approach to habitability determinations, involving subjective judgments and ununiformed standards, is inadequate given the magnitude of the decision and its human cost.

Opinion 68: Objective criteria enables ship's force and inspectors to hold themselves and each other accountable for a standard of performance. Self-assessment is vital to self-sufficiency.

<u>Recommendation 26:</u> USFFC and USPACFLT align instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections of RCOH to those of pre-commissioned ships.

<u>Recommendation 27:</u> CNAL align or establish instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing EQOL inspections of RCOH ships to that of other maintenance availabilities.

Finding 23: Instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing RCOH do not specify the standard of ship habitability that must be maintained following crew move aboard.

Finding 24: USS *George Washington* maintenance team experienced difficulty managing shipboard habitability outages.

Discussion. Based on recommended guidelines, the RCOH project team should continue to track habitability conditions following crew move aboard to ensure the safety of personnel living aboard. To that end, the RCOH habitability and crew move aboard strategy recommends that HII-NNS, SUPSHIPNN, and ship's force create a habitability outage team to coordinate any outages of habitability services (e.g., lighting, ventilation, climate control systems, and water) before they occur.[174]

When an outage is identified in advance, the habitability outage team should develop a habitability outage sheet, which is routed through ship's force and approved by affected departments.[175] The outage should also be noted in the daily work integration agenda. For a major outage affecting more than one department on the ship, the habitability outage team is responsible for scheduling the outage. The RCOH habitability and crew move aboard strategy recommends that the RCOH project team does not execute the outage until the outage sheet is signed and approved, and the habitability outage team is briefed. The habitability outage team should meet on an as-needed basis, typically weekly.[176]

Opinion 69: The frequency and duration of outages make normal shipboard work and life challenging in an environment devoid of alternative options.

Opinion 70: Even ideal management of habitability outages does not create the stability, predictability, and continuity we require for our Sailors who live and work aboard.

Opinion 71: Work packages that impact habitability create a potential trade-off between timely project execution and Sailor quality of life. When project execution is prioritized over Sailor quality of life, risk is transferred from the contractor to our Sailors.

Opinion 72: There are no specific criteria or standards defining the condition in which each of these spaces must be while Sailors live aboard a ship that is undergoing RCOH or any other type of maintenance availability.

Finding 25: Industrial hygiene surveys inform commanders on workplace conditions, yet were waived until the conclusion of RCOH.

Finding 26: USS *George Washington* industrial hygiene and monitoring and survey program could not be evaluated due to apparent inadequacies in record keeping.

Discussion. USS *George Washington* is required to conduct periodic industrial hygiene surveys every 3 years "to address changes that have occurred in work processes, ship configuration, or equipment."[177]

Navy industrial hygiene surveys identify, evaluate, and make recommendations to control unacceptable workplace exposures. The purpose of the program is to:

1. Assess potential health risks to Navy personnel by differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable exposures with the goal to prevent or control unacceptable exposures.

2. Establish and document a historical record of exposure levels for Navy personnel and to communicate exposure monitoring results.

3. Ensure and demonstrate compliance with safety and health exposure criteria.

4. Provide a basis for exposure medical surveillance examinations.[178]

Commanding officers may request industrial hygiene assistance from their supporting Navy environmental and preventive medicine units or military treatment facility, especially following a major availability or major ship alteration.[179]

Prior to the start of RCOH, USS *George Washington* completed a ship-wide Navy Industrial Hygiene survey on 1 July 2015.[180] In a memorandum dated 7 March 2016, USS *George Washington* requested a waiver from CNAL for the ship's next industrial hygiene survey, which would have been due 1 July 2018. This waiver submission requested a baseline industrial hygiene survey upon completion of RCOH.[181] Ship's force was unable to produce CNAL's approval of this waiver request.[182]

Opinion 73: Execution of industrial hygiene surveys creates a foundation to inform and protect our Sailors.

Opinion 74: Execution of industrial hygiene surveys after our Sailors are living and working aboard a naval vessel creates risk to force.

Opinion 75: In the absence of an external inspection, it is incumbent upon commands to execute their own safety and operational health programs, particularly in the shipyard environment.

Opinion 76: Commanding officers with TYCOM assistance should request an interim or partial industrial hygiene survey before crew move aboard.

Opinion 77: The timing of industrial hygiene surveys must be re-evaluated to ensure we are insulating our most junior Sailors from potential health risks.

Recommendation 28: USFFC and USPACFLT examine the timing and sequencing of industrial hygiene surveys for both new construction and overhaul to ensure Sailors are adequately protected from potential health risks.

Recommendation 29: USFFC and USPACFLT require commands to conduct industrial hygiene survey assist visits before crew move aboard to ensure living and working spaces do not present undue risk to Sailors.

Finding 27: The USS *George Washington* Crew Move Aboard was premature.

Discussion. On 5 April 2017, USS *George Washington* was declared uninhabitable. Crew members could no longer live aboard ship. Ship's force day-to-day activities shifted to the Floating Accommodation Facility, providing temporary living space for the ship's duty section personnel.[183]

During RCOH, key events mark the start or completion of work. Key events, including crew move aboard and complete crew move aboard, are assigned estimated dates on an integrated schedule. Each key event is tied to specific tasks called "work packages," which are tracked by RCOH project team personnel.[184] Crew move aboard and complete crew move aboard can be claimed when all work packages, testing, certifications, and inspections tied to those key events are marked as complete.[185]

Figure 11 provides an overview of the timeline for key events leading up to crew move aboard.

Key Events	
Originally scheduled crew move aboard	21 AUG 2020[186]
Actual crew move aboard declared	16 APR 2021[187]
Floating Accommodation Facility vacated	04 MAY 2021[188]
First Sailors move aboard	08 JUN 2021[189]
400 Sailors living aboard	20 JUL 2021[190]
Actual complete crew move aboard	08 OCT 2021[191]
Sailors given option to move off USS *George Washington*	25 APR 2022
First Sailors vacate USS *George Washington*	02 MAY 2022[192]

Figure 11. Crew Move Aboard Key Events Timeline

At the time complete crew move aboard was claimed, some departments were assigned to berthing spaces forward of frame 180, so long as those spaces were verified as "habitable."[193]

PMS-312, SUPSHIPNN, and USS *George Washington* stated that major schedule shifts did not occur until the period between crew move aboard and complete crew move aboard.[194] [195] [196] Until this point, the schedule remained within 5–10 percent of historic norms (less than 5 months of schedule overruns).[197] Delays during this period occurred as a result of the steam test program and the failure of the Emergency Diesel Generator turbocharger, which was installed but not tested before crew move aboard.[198] [199]

USS *George Washington* tracked completion of crew move aboard-coded spaces at the weekly commanding officer's agenda meetings.[200] The ship's executive officer conducted weekly walkthroughs of the ship's space. Based on self-assessment, the leadership team on USS *George Washington* viewed crew move aboard as "incredibly late."[201] Ship's force work package schedule also remained unchanged as the broader RCOH milestones shifted and prerequisite conditions for work were unmet. This resulted in the ship showing as delinquent or late on its own availability package.[202]

Potential Contributing Factors

Senior Leader Engagement

In mid-March 2021, Admiral John Aquilino, then commander, COMPACFLT, along with CNAP and CNAL, visited and toured USS *George Washington*. They met with representatives from HII-NNS, SUPSHIPNN, PMS-312, and ship's force. According to (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, the message from COMPACFLT was about the importance of the ship to the fleet and the importance of executing the maintenance schedule on timeline. The key takeaway for all stakeholders was the need to "get this done." While his priorities remained unchanged, he did feel more pressure to execute the schedule as published.[203] The former executive officer viewed the expectations of COMPACFLT as entirely reasonable—pull out all stops and figure out how to get the job done. From a leadership perspective, the visit did not influence the decision to commence crew move aboard or to assume unreasonable risk.[204]

USS John C. Stennis *Arrival*

On May 6, 2021, USS *John C. Stennis* arrived a HII-NNS. As a result, USS *George Washington* was told that in order for USS *John C. Stennis* to commence its RCOH, USS *George Washington* needed to vacate Huntington Hall (housing unaccompanied USS *George Washington* Sailors) and the Floating Accommodation Facility (housing duty section personnel and ship's offices). Former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, viewed the arrival of USS *John C. Stennis* as one of the main drivers behind the team's decision to claim crew move aboard.[205]

Institutional Paradigm—Crew Move Aboard Creates Ownership

Within the Navy maintenance community, there is an established practice to return Sailors to living and working aboard the ship at the earliest opportunity for a variety of reasons. First, as a major milestone, it impacts redelivery and accelerates the final actions of a maintenance availability.[206] [207] Furthermore, it shifts the mindset for both the maintenance team and ship's force by signaling that production work is concluding and transitioning to testing and fleet operations. In this view, ship's force must "take back the ship" and assume ownership.[208]

This belief is reportedly common across all commanding officers, who go through maintenance availabilities. (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, reportedly wanted to get Sailors aboard the ship to keep pressure on them to meet ongoing work timelines and to take care of their spaces. Crew move aboard was one of the few things USS *George Washington* had influence over in RCOH.[209]

In general, proponents of this view also cautioned that crew move aboard represented a trade-off because after crew move aboard, Sailors had to live in a construction zone.[210] Furthermore, crew move aboard must occur "at the appropriate time" to be an effective signal to the shipyard and the crew.[211]

Barge Availability and Suitability

Although USFFC maintains other barges for CNO maintenance availabilities, using one at HII-NNS was not feasible due to available pier space and environmental factors (e.g. high winds).[212] USS *John C. Stennis* examined a temporary barge as an alternative to the Floating Accommodation Facility; however, this effort would require two moves. First, it would require a move from the ship to the temporary barge and then from the temporary barge to the Floating Accommodation Facility.[213] Fleet barges are out-of-date and contain numerous maintenance challenges. They do not have internet capability and some lack appropriate furniture for the crew.[214] USFFC has been able to meet demand for barges, but there is not enough time for proper upkeep. Since 2000, there have been 28 barges in inventory. USFFC has two ongoing new construction programs for barges and recently received its first new barge in 20 years. Auxiliary Personnel Lighter or APL-class barges, which was the type of barge USS *John C. Stennis* considered, date back to the World War II era, making them ill-suited for modern use. The current program allows USFFC to refurbish barges but not redesign them. New barges are designed for duty section berthing, work spaces, and messing only.[215]

Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carriers Scheduling

As USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) prepared for crew move aboard, USS *John C. Stennis*' RCOH project was preparing to commence. USS *John C. Stennis* executed Ship Consolidated Offload Outfitting Plan in spring 2020, for a projected January 2021 start; however, due to USS *George Washington*'s occupancy of the Floating Accommodation Facility, which was the only barge available at HII-NNS for aircraft carriers in RCOH, USS *John C. Stennis* was unable to occupy the Floating Accommodation Facility until May 2021.[216]

Given the need to move off the Floating Accommodation Facility and out of Huntington Hall, and since there were no suitable barges as an alternative, nearly 400 USS *George Washington* Sailors, (namely, those in paygrades E-1 to E-3, and E-4 with less than 4 years of service, who are ineligible to receive BAH) moved onto USS *George Washington* between April and September 2021. This was in addition to approximately 250 duty section Sailors who were living aboard the ship at the time that crew move aboard was claimed in April 2021.[217]

The CNAL RCOH program manager, stated that it was forecasted in April 2021 that the more likely redelivery date would be August 2022. He said this was generally known by all parties prior to the decision being made to claim crew move aboard. He stated he thought this was communicated to (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*. (b)(6) RCOH program manager, CNAL, noted there was still a lot of work being conducted aft of frame 180 at the time crew move aboard was claimed, which is not usually the case for RCOH crew move aboard. He said, "It would have been better for young Sailors living aboard if we could have shifted the move aboard to the right."[218]

Figure 12 is a timeline of the sliding redelivery dates overlaid with crew move aboard.[219]

Date	Event
10 FEB 2021	JUN 2022 projected redelivery[220]
17 MAR 2021	AUG 2022 projected redelivery (commanding officer's agenda meeting)[221]
15 APR 2021	USS *George Washington* vacated the Floating Accommodation Facility[222]
16 APR 2021	Crew move aboard commenced[223]
28 APR 2021	AUG 2022 forecasted redelivery (PEO Carriers)[224]
4 MAY 2021	USS *John C. Stennis* takes over the Floating Accommodation Facility[225]
2–3 JUN 2021	CNAL crew move aboard Inspection results[226]
8 JUN 2021	First Sailors moved aboard[227]
24 JUN 2021	Change of Command (b)(6) took over from (b)(6) [228]
31 JUL 2021	Last Sailors moved out of Huntington Hall[229]
13 SEP 2021	24 AUG 2022 forecasted redelivery with 6–9 weeks of risk[230]
13 SEP 2021	"Ships Force fully moved aboard" mentioned on the PEO Drumbeat[231]
8 OCT 2021	Actual completion of crew move aboard (complete crew move aboard)[232]
7 FEB 2022	RCOH Contract Rev C redelivery date[233]
15 FEB 2022	29 NOV 2022 forecasted redelivery[234]
9 MAR 2022	23 DEC 2022 forecasted redelivery [235]
17 MAR 2022	30 DEC 2022 forecasted redelivery [236]
29 MAR 2022	2 JAN 2023 forecasted redelivery [237]
5 APR 2022	8 JAN 2023 forecasted redelivery [238]
31 MAY 2022	16 JAN 2023 forecasted redelivery [239]
2 MAY 2022	Sailors living aboard the ship commenced move off to off-site lodging[240]
MAR 2023	Redelivery forecasted as of the time of this writing[241]

Figure 12. Actual Crew Move Aboard/Complete Crew Move Aboard Dates and Reforecasted Delivery Dates

Several witnesses suggested that crew move aboard should be tied to redelivery in future RCOH projects. (b)(6) project supervisor, SUPSHIPNN, said that, while the RCOH project team was able to extend housing contracts to keep Sailors off the ship for as long as possible, limits in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funding affected the ability to extend these contracts further. He suggested that the window between crew move aboard and redelivery should be examined, and that the period of time Sailors should be required to live on a ship undergoing RCOH should not exceed 6 to 9 months prior to redelivery. For USS *George Washington*, given the schedule changes, he said that Sailors would have had to live aboard the ship for a period of 2 years before the redelivery date. From his perspective, problems were exacerbated when USS *George Washington* moved off the Floating Accommodation Facility earlier than desired to make room for USS *John C. Stennis*. He stated that although there is a priority for moving Sailors aboard to get the ship ready for sea trials, crew move aboard still should have been tied to the redelivery date. Complete crew move aboard, he said, should be updated following any schedule slips to the redelivery date. He said that an ideal solution would be a centralized barracks or contracted housing for the crew until the ship is ready for redelivery. He stated that, "NNS Shipyard is the worst place to live." In his view, it is crucial to tie crew move aboard to the redelivery date, versus an arbitrary selected crew move aboard date that might not account for the living conditions of the ship or the current status of the RCOH project.[242]

(b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington*, also suggested that crew move aboard should be tied to a realistic redelivery date. He acknowledged that while Sailors need to start using the ship's systems at a certain point, there was a "willful blindness to not see we [weren't] going to meet projected dates or milestones." He emphasized that there needs to be an "open and honest conversation about RCOH scheduling, [because] the way we do it now is not the best way."[243]

Figure 13 depicts the growing duration of the length of time crew would live aboard between crew move aboard and redelivery dates when compared to previous RCOH ships (e.g., 691 days).[244]

	Commence Crew Move Aboard	Complete Crew Move Aboard	Redelivery	Days Between Commence Crew Move Aboard And Redelivery
CVN 68	Not Available			
CVN 69	3/28/04	5/28/04	3/25/05	362
CVN 70	8/18/08	1/28/09	7/11/09	327
CVN 71	6/15/12	11/6/12	8/29/13	440
CVN 72	2/26/16	8/17/16	5/12/17	441
CVN 73	4/16/21	10/8/21	3/8/2023*	691
* Projected Redelivery Date				

Figure 13. Number of Days between Crew Move Aboard and Redelivery Dates

By April 2022, after the tragic loss of three Sailors, CNAL offered USS *George Washington* Sailors the option to move off the ship.[245] At that time, the forecasted redelivery date was 15 February 2023.[246] There were roughly 400 Sailors living on the ship as of April 2022, not including Sailors in duty sections who had to live on the ship. By mid-May, more than 300 Sailors had moved back off the ship.[247]

Opinion 78: No single stakeholder holistically examined the various elements of habitability and the broader implications of that decision.

Opinion 79: Stakeholders made decisions and recommendations about moving Sailors aboard the ship with incomplete information regarding the inherent risk of prematurely conducting a crew move aboard.

Opinion 80: The same formality and oversight applied to the declaration of "uninhabitability" should be applied to the declaration of habitability.

Recommendation 24 (Restated): USFFC and USPACFLT to develop and codify a process to make the determination of whether the ship is habitable or uninhabitable leading to a recommendation from the commanding officer and approval by the TYCOM.

2.4.2 Crew Lodging

Crew lodging is the living arrangements for accompanied and unaccompanied ship's crew while assigned to a ship. The ship is designed to fully accommodate a crew member while at sea, but in-port government furnished housing or alternatively housing allowances may be provided to allow crew members to claim accommodations ashore that support them or them and their family's (i.e., accompanied) needs. The government furnished housing or allowance is governed by the accompanied or unaccompanied status of the Sailor, the seniority of the Sailor, and the habitability of the assigned ship. As circumstances change relative to accompanied status, Sailor seniority, or ships habitability, the furnished housing or allowance changes to reflect the new circumstances of the Sailor.

Finding 28: Navy unaccompanied housing minimum adequacy standards fall below the DOD standard.

Discussion. In 1995, the DOD commissioned a report to study military quality of life and found housing was one of five key quality of life contributors for military personnel.[248] The "Marsh Report" identified common requests from enlisted personnel across military departments, including more privacy, space, and storage facilities; better maintenance; and better furnishings and amenities.[249] Recommendations included aggressively revitalizing bachelor housing (i.e., unaccompanied housing) to meet or exceed the standard.[250] That same year, the DOD adopted a new standard for future government-owned housing construction.[251] Under this new standard, most Service members would have private sleeping rooms, and a kitchenette and bath shared with no more than one other individual.[252]

Until 2000, all unaccompanied junior Sailors attached to ships were required to live aboard, even while in homeport.[253] In an effort to improve the quality of life for these individuals, the Navy initiated Homeport Ashore and set a goal to provide unaccompanied housing to all Sailors living on ships while in homeport.[254]

DOD Manual 4165.63 established the following standards for E-1 to E-4 Service members:

1. Shared unit with a living room: shared bedroom with not more than one other and with a minimum of 72 net square feet per occupant, bathroom shared with not more than one other occupant, and a kitchen; or

2. Shared unit without a living room: private bedroom with 90 net square feet, bathroom shared with not more than one other, and a kitchenette. [255]

The CNO assigned responsibility for the operations, policy, overall coordination, and execution of housing (family and bachelor) and lodging programs to the Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC).[256]

In 2011, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment approved a waiver to the DOD unaccompanied housing standard for unaccompanied housing that did not have a living room or full kitchen. Under this standard, no more than two Sailors in paygrades E-1 to E-3 would share a "sleeping room" and bathroom. A minimum of 90 net square feet of "sleeping area" would be provided per occupant.[257] No waivers have been issued by the Secretary of the Navy, and no subsequent waivers have been issued by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment.

In 2012, CNO issued NAVADMIN 072/12, which included a provision titled, "Homeport Ashore Interim Assignment Policy," which lowered the net square feet per occupant where Homeport Ashore unaccompanied housing was unavailable, allowing Sailors to be lodged in shared bedrooms with 55 net square feet per occupant, with a maximum of four Sailors to a bathroom.[258] The Interim Assignment Policy remains in effect today.[259] The governing OPNAVINST 5009.1 series has not been updated to reflect this change.[260]

DOD Manual 4165.63 states that "the minimum adequacy standards can be waived on a temporary basis (for no more than 1 year) due to military necessity" and "exceptions for longer periods of time can only be approved by the Secretary of a Military department."[261]

Opinion 81: Waivers and deviations from DOD minimum standards normalize inadequate provision of unaccompanied housing to our Sailors.

Opinion 82: The waivers authorized at various levels transfer risk to the Sailors who must occupy sub-standard accommodation, undermining quality of life.

Opinion 83: The continued waivers likely reflect the normalization of deviation.

Opinion 84: Current Navy policy deviates from DOD policy.

Opinion 85: Lowering accommodation standards instead of meeting the higher DoD-set standards should not be the norm within our Navy.

<u>Recommendation 30:</u> CNO/CNIC review root-causes for previous policy implementations and determine if deviations are still required.

<u>Recommendation 31:</u> CNO/CNIC submit formal waiver request to Secretary of the Navy to lower minimum accommodation standards if required.

Finding 29: HII-NNS-provided accommodation at Huntington Hall does not meet DOD and Department of the Navy standards for accommodation.

Discussion. As part of the RCOH contract, Sailors ineligible for BAH are lodged in facilities contracted from HII-NNS. The Navy's contract with HII-NNS does not prescribe minimum standards of lodging. The contract requires that the contractor provide berthing and messing facilities for ship's force personnel in accordance with a 1984 memorandum of agreement, subsequently updated in 2021.

Since 1984, SUPSHIPNN has executed a memorandum of agreement with HII-NNS to provide off-ship facilities to include Huntington Hall for berthing and messing.[262] Under the memorandum of agreement, SUPSHIPNN is the contract administrator and is responsible for the maintenance and repair of Huntington Hall. SUPSHIPNN also apportions the rooms at Huntington Hall to the ships located at HII-NNS.[263] Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Virginia is responsible for "the operation, assignment, and conduct of residents." Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Virginia operates the Huntington Hall "Unaccompanied Housing Office," the nearby MWR facility, and its liberty center.[264]

Huntington Hall is privately owned by HII-NNS.[265] Formally a school, it was constructed in the 1920s and later converted into a housing facility in 1982.[266] Funding for the use of Huntington Hall to house Sailors is not paid for by a Sailor's BAH.[267] The Navy pays HII-NNS roughly $4.36 million per year for use of Huntington Hall for Sailor housing, an average cost of $2,438 per month per room for 149 rooms.[268]

The Navy leases Huntington Hall to house unaccompanied E-1 to E-4 Sailors assigned to aircraft carriers in RCOH, pre-commissioning ships, and ships undergoing overhaul at HII-NNS.[269] Huntington Hall has 149 rooms, 139 of which have three beds and a shared bathroom per room.[270] Each room is 255 square feet, averaging 85 square feet per Sailor.[271] 15 rooms are provided to each submarine at HII-NNS. The remaining rooms are apportioned to the aircraft carriers at HII-NNS.

Huntington Hall contains a single communal kitchen. Huntington Hall has an MWR gym facility, and a small Navy Exchange with snack foods, frozen dinners, and some uniform items. There is also a barbershop and office spaces for Fleet and Family Support Center (FFSC) staff.[272]

In 2010, NAVSEA requested that Naval Facilities Engineering Command study housing and quality of life services for unaccompanied military personnel assigned to or associated with HII-NNS.[273] At that time, the study determined that Huntington Hall had already:

> *"… reached its useful economic life … the building shows signs of significant wear. The building contains asbestos and the presence of lead-based paint and PCBs is likely. There is no central air handling system and Huntington Hall is sub-optimal in meeting anti-terrorism force protection standards."*[274]

The study concluded the most promising option to balance Service member quality of life was to build a new building.[275] For a shared unit without a living room (e.g., the condition at Huntington Hall), the minimum DOD adequacy standard for E-1 to E-4 Service members is a private bedroom with 90 net square feet, bathroom shared with not more than one other, and a kitchenette.[276]

For a unit without living area (e.g., the condition at Huntington Hall), CNIC Manual 11103.2, Unaccompanied Housing Operations Manual, requires the following:

1. For E-4, a shared unit (without living area), private bedroom, and maximum two Sailors per bathroom. Minimum 90 net square feet per person in nonmarket unit.

2. For E-1 to E-3, a shared unit (without living area), shared bedroom, and maximum two Sailors per bathroom. Minimum 90 net square feet per person in nonmarket unit.[277]

Sailors assigned to Huntington Hall share a common bedroom with only 85 new square feet per person. They share a bathroom with three personnel and do not have a kitchen/kitchenette.

DOD Manual 4165.63 states that housing should not have any "**serious health-safety hazards**" and should "be furnished, have **food service options,** be structurally sound, and have adequate utility systems and services."[278] It also states that this housing "shall be operated and maintained to a standard that protects the facilities from deterioration and provides safe and comfortable living places for Service members."[279]

Opinion 86: Continued use of Huntington Hall is a normalization of deviation.

Opinion 87: The waivers authorized at various levels transfer risk to the Sailors who must occupy sub-standard accommodation, undermining quality of life.

Recommendation 32: PEO Carriers review RCOH contract language to establish the DOD standard for contractor supplied housing.

Recommendation 33: CNO review and update as appropriate NAVADMIN 072/12, "Homeport Ashore Interim Assignment Policy."

2.4.3 Destructive Behaviors

Department of the Navy conducts an integrated prevention approach to more effectively address and reduce the risk of destructive behaviors such as drug and alcohol related incidents, sexual assault, sexual harassment, suicide, domestic violence and other high-risk behaviors. Department of the Navy's cross-cutting prevention approach recognizes the benefits of addressing common risk and protective factors to promote healthy cultures and climates, increase offender accountability, maximize available resources, and set conditions for every Sailor, Marine, and civilian employee to thrive. This strategy focuses on the root causes of harmful behaviors and targets upstream prevention factors to build resilience and address emerging behaviors.

Finding 30: There appears to be a potential increased risk of suicide of Sailors on aircraft carriers in maintenance periods in general and a potential increased risk of suicide of Sailors on aircraft carriers in RCOH at HII-NNS.

Discussion. Suicides and suicide-related behaviors must be reported via message traffic to higher headquarters.[280] Commands must report suicides and suicide-related behaviors "immediately" (i.e., within 1 hour) using the Navy's official reporting system.[281] Under this reporting policy, suicide-related behaviors, a determination to be made by an appropriate competent authority,[282] are defined as follows:

1. Suicidal ideation—thinking about, considering, or planning for suicide.

2. Suicide attempt—a nonfatal, self-directed, potentially injurious behavior with any intent to die as a result of the behavior, which may or may not result in injury.

3. Suicide (death by suicide)—death caused by self-directed injurious behavior with any intent to die as a result of the behavior.

In addition to this immediate reporting requirement for all destructive behaviors, commands must also submit a DOD Suicide Event Report within 30 days for all suicides and suicide attempts.[283] DOD Suicide Event Reports track information for suicide events (both fatal and nonfatal) across multiple domains. DOD Suicide Event Reports standardize data collected on individual suicide events, and allow for detailed statistical reports on suicide events that can be aggregated across the Services.[284] The Navy Suicide Prevention executive agent (OPNAV N171) is required to "collect, report, and analyze suicide data" involving Active and Reserve Component Sailors, as well as "coordinate the development and maintenance of a database to monitor suicides."

Suicides Committed by Sailors in the Carrier Maintenance Phase

There are three phases in the rotation deployment of an aircraft carrier, a maintenance phase, followed by a training phase, then an operational or deployment phase where aircraft carriers conduct deployed operations in support of national objectives. The RCOH event occurs once in the life of an aircraft carrier during an OFRP maintenance phase. OPNAV N17 reviewed operational reporting data from the past 5 years to analyze whether there was an increased risk for suicide for Sailors assigned to aircraft carriers during the maintenance phase of the OFRP. Of the 42 Sailors who died by suicide while assigned to aircraft carriers during this time period, 24 (approximately 57 percent) Sailors were assigned to ships that were in some type of maintenance phase (to include RCOH) (Figure 14).[285]

Data showed that the majority of those Sailors who committed suicide were between 18 and 25 years of age, in the E-1 to E-4 paygrades, and male. Data showed the majority of those Sailors had used a personal firearm. More Sailors assigned to ships in maintenance (37 percent, or 9 of 24) than Sailors assigned to ships not in maintenance (six percent or one of 18 Sailors) who died by suicide had a mental health history known to the command. Approximately 30 percent of all Sailors who die by suicide received mental health treatment in the year prior to their death.[286]



Figure 14. Suicides that have taken place in Aircraft Carrier Maintenance Phase 2017–2022

Suicide related Behaviors of Sailors on East Coast Carriers

Figure 15 is a summary of suicide-related behaviors on aircraft carriers located on the east coast over the last 5 years. Suicide-related behaviors appeared relatively stable from 2017 to 2019. Suicide-related behaviors on aircraft carriers on the East Coast appeared to increase in 2020 and 2021, consistent with Navy-wide suicide-related behavior trends.[287]

USS *George Washington* had the highest number of suicide-related behaviors from 2017 to 2019 (the first half of RCOH) as compared to all aircraft carriers on the East Coast. Yet, in 2020 and 2021, USS *George Washington*'s suicide-related behaviors declined, and were the lowest of all when compared to the other six East Coast aircraft carriers in 2021.[288]



	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
CVN 69 DWIGHT D EISENHOWER	21	8	6	4	25
CVN 73 GEORGE WASHINGTON	28	31	33	23	11
CVN 74 JOHN C STENNIS	5	2	10	45	31
CVN 75 HARRY S TRUMAN	7	2	8	0	28
CVN 77 GEORGE H W BUSH	10	22	26	42	75
USS GERALD R FORD	22	27	22	43	50

Figure 15. Suicide-related Behaviors of aircraft carriers on the East Coast (2017–2021)

Opinion 88: While there appears to be an increased risk of suicide based on this data, it is unclear if this simply represents expected statistical variation given the low base rate of suicide, leading to a high statistical variability.

Destructive Behaviors as Identified through Disciplinary and Administrative Forums

Various tools are available to a commander to maintain good order and discipline of a ship's crew. These methods range from nonjudicial punishment to involuntary separation, and trial by court martial.

Nonjudicial punishment. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 15, authorizes a commander's use of nonjudicial punishment to maintain good order and discipline within the unit by punishing acts or omissions. Nonjudicial punishment is not a criminal proceeding and only applies to minor offenses. While imposition of nonjudicial punishment remains within a commander's discretion, the analysis of whether an offense is minor is driven by several factors, including the nature of the offense and the circumstances surrounding its commission, the offender's age, rank, duty assignment, record and experience, and the maximum sentence if the offense is tried by general court martial.[289]

Involuntary Separation. DOD Instruction 1332.14, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1920.6D, and the Navy Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) establish the policies and procedures for involuntary separation from military service. Involuntary separation procedures may be initiated for misconduct or for other reasons of convenience of the Government.[290]

Court Martial. A court martial is a military criminal proceeding. There are three types of courts martial: summary, special, and general. With the exception of a summary court martial, a finding of guilt at a court martial constitutes a criminal conviction.[291]

Finding 31: USS *George Washington* in RCOH was not an outlier in terms of adjudicated legal matters compared to USS *John C. Stennis* nor as compared to operational carriers USS *Abraham Lincoln* and USS *Theodore Roosevelt.*

Discussion. Using disciplinary and administrative forums to review the level and degree of destructive behavior for a CVN in RCOH, a comparison of occurrences of nonjudicial punishment, involuntary separations, and courts martial from aircraft carriers both in and out of maintenance phases is made.[292] The comparison of offenses, e.g., underage drinking, driving under the influence, drug-related offenses, assault, and sexual harassment, is highlighted in Figures 16 to 21.[293]



Figure 16. Nonjudicial Punishment Offenses (May 2020 to May 2022)

Type of Offenses	GEORGE WASHINGTON		ABRAHAM LINCOLN		JOHN C. STENNIS		THEODORE ROOSEVELT	
	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors
Underage Drinking	8	0 3	18	0 6	6	0 2	11	0 4
DUI	11	0 4	26	0 9	1	0 0	28	1 0
Controlled Substances	74	3 0	71	2 4	69	2 5	99	3 4
Assault	4	0 2	14	0 5	0	0 0	23	0 8
Sexual Harassment	5	0 2	7	0 2	3	0 1	8	0 3
Total # of Offenses	200		296		221		334	
Sailors Aboard	2460		2900		2725		2900	
Offenses/100 Sailors	8		10		8		11	

Figure 17. Nonjudicial Punishment Offenses (May 2020 to May 2022)



Figure 18. Administrative Separations (May 2020 to May 2022)

Bases for Separation	GEORGE WASHINGTON		ABRAHAM LINCOLN		JOHN C. STENNIS		THEODORE ROOSEVELT	
	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors
Underage Drinking	4	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	0.1
DUI	5	0.2	6	0.2	1	0.0	10	0.3
Controlled Substances	65	2.6	68	2.3	69	2.5	91	3.1
Assault	7	0.3	3	0.1	0	0.0	11	0.4
Sexual Harassment	1	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.1	4	0.1
Total # of Offenses	148		77		90		175	
Sailors Aboard	2460		2900		2725		2900	
ADSEPs / 100 Sailors	6		3		3		6	

Figure 19. Administrative Separations Supporting Data (May 2020 to May 2022)



Figure 20. Courts Martial (May 2020 to May 2022)

Offenses	GEORGE WASHINGTON		ABRAHAM LINCOLN		JOHN C. STENNIS		THEODORE ROOSEVELT	
	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors	# of Offenses	# of Offenses per 100 Sailors
Underage Drinking	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
DUI	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Controlled Substances	3	0.1	2	0.1	0	0.0	1	0.0
Assault	2	0.1	2	0.1	0	0.0	2	0.1
Sexual Harassment	2	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0
Sexual Assault	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total # of Offenses	7		15		0		4	
Sailors Aboard	2460		2900		2725		2900	
Courts Martial / 100 Sailors	0.3		0.5		0		0.1	

Figure 21. Courts-martial Supporting Data (May 2020 to May 2022)

Opinion 89: Based on the above data, there does not appear to be an increase in destructive behaviors during RCOH.

Opinion 90: Additional analysis of aircraft carrier data would be required for a more definitive reflection of the impact of RCOH on Sailor destructive behaviors.

Recommendation. None.

2.4.4 Culture of Excellence

Historically, the Navy has taken a programmatic approach to countering individual destructive behaviors.[294] The Navy's Culture of Excellence focuses on a holistic, cross-program approach to proactively build resilient Sailors and civilians in order to prevent destructive actions. The initiative is a "Navy-wide approach to achieve warfighting excellence by fostering mental, physical, spiritual and emotional toughness; promoting organizational trust and transparency; ensuring connectedness to every Sailor, civilian and family member throughout their Navy journey."[295] The Navy's Culture of Excellence programs proactively work to build resilient Sailors and civilians with intervention strategies to prevent destructive actions.

The cultural champions network is a cross-functional effort led by the command triad, designed to streamline conversation and care for Sailors and encourage them to stay connected to tools and resources to thrive in any condition—psychologically, spiritually, physically and emotionally—throughout their career.[296]



Figure 22. Example of a Command Cultural Champions Network

Several command and base resources make up the cultural champions network partners (Figure 22). Command resources include, but are not limited to, command climate specialists, sexual assault prevention and response (SAPR) officers, mental health specialists, chaplains, and command fitness leaders. Resources typically located at the TYCOM level include suicide prevention program managers, alcohol and drug control officers, and inclusion and diversity managers. Base resources include, but are not limited to, chaplains (when not assigned to the command), dietitians, FFSCs, the Naval Family Ombudsman Program, and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs.[297]

Command Resilience Team

CRT is led by the carrier's executive officer and comprised of command leadership, program managers, and other command members who provide the commanding officer with "a means to improve support programs" via "CRT collaboration, the CCA, and engaged deckplate leadership."[298] To achieve these goals, CRT members "must have a letter of designation signed by the commander," sign a nondisclosure agreement, and meet quarterly, at a minimum, to review behaviors, environmental factors, organizational influences, or supervisory concerns that may affect Sailor resiliency, morale, or the overall command climate. The CRT must consist of a cross-section of paygrades, sex, race, and departments representing command demographics, and the Navy's CRT Guide provides that "[i]t is a best practice for the command to hand select deckplate leaders who have demonstrated peer

leadership and model signature behaviors." The commanding officer has the discretion to increase the size or scope of the CRT, and final responsibility for CRT effectiveness remains with the commanding officer. Mandatory CRT members are listed in Figures 23 and 24.[299]

Mandatory Command Resilience Team Members	Mandatory Command Resilience Team Members (if assigned)
• Executive officer or equivalent • 1x Head of department • 1x Department leading chief petty officer • Deployed resiliency counselor • Command career counselor • Personnel officer • Legal officer • Sexual assault prevention and response victim advocate • Drug and alcohol program advisor • Command financial specialist • Suicide prevention coordinator • Command managed equal opportunity program manager • Command sponsor coordinator • Command indoctrination coordinator • Command fitness leader • Expanded operational stress control team lead	• Chaplain • Command diversity officer • Deployed Resiliency Counselor • Mental health specialist • Equal employment opportunity program manager

Figure 23. Mandatory Command Resilience Team members

CRT members participate in analyzing the CCA, and play a key role in aiding engaged deckplate leaders in the creation of prevention plans and strategies to assist commands in maintaining a high level of Sailor resilience through monitoring of positive and negative behaviors across the command. CRTs are required to receive training that equips them to provide instruction on primary prevention and strategies that reduce risk factors and increase protective factors associated with destructive behaviors. When appropriate, commands should make use of community resources and services for assistance. CRTs should leverage all partners within the broader cultural champions network to ensure the best support is provided to every Sailor, every day.[300] To assess a command's effectiveness, the Navy has developed a self-assessment for CRTs that can be accessed online.[301]

CRTs may use the optional quarterly and semiannual prevention scorecards, located at the OPNAV N17 culture of excellence SharePoint site. Each member of the CRT is accountable for gathering data related to their respective roles and responsibilities. Both scorecards track positive attributes and protective factors (e.g., number of awards, number of Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) trained Sailors, number of excellent score or higher physical fitness assessments, number of MWR events, and number of Sailors using USFFC) and destructive behaviors (e.g., alcohol incidents, sexual harassment, suicide-related behaviors, domestic violence, and fraternization), which can be utilized to inform the unit's cultural champions network. The quarterly prevention scorecards are needed to create the semiannual prevention scorecards, which are an automated roll-up (Excel document) of the Quarterly Prevention Scorecards, with highlights of key statistics. This product should be used to inform discussions at the ISIC level. Additionally, a write-up should accompany the semiannual prevention scorecard to inform best practices, new techniques, room for improvement, and lacking support and resources. The write-up and scorecard should be consolidated to develop the semiannual scorecard report, which should be no longer than two to four pages and should focus on the command's high-level concerns.[302]

Command Resilience Team Human Factors Council

While the Command Resilience Team Human Factors Council (CRTHFC) operates at a programmatic level to effect improvements for the benefit of the command, the CRTHFC focuses on helping individual Sailors who have been identified as needing more resources. The CRTHFC is a subset of the broader CRT with specific "need

to know" information about individual Sailor cases. The CRTHFC is chaired by the commanding officer, who should modify its membership to match the command's size and scope. CRTHFC meetings "must occur as soon as possible when an at-risk Sailor is identified, or monthly, at a minimum, to discuss Sailors who require additional resources." Once an at-risk Sailor's case has been discussed, the CRTHFC is tasked with creating an "effective, holistic risk management plan to mitigate adverse outcomes and improve individual and force readiness."[303]

Recent Naval Air Forces policy directs engaged deckplate leaders to conduct a human factors review for all newly reporting personnel and at least monthly for all individual Sailors. Engaged deckplate leaders are directed to use the Resilience Toolkit to conduct a human factors review to guide a verbal discussion with each Sailor to identify concerns. If the discussion identifies "at risk" criteria (decided case by case at the discretion of the chain of command), the case is to be forwarded to the CRTHFC for review. However, engaged deckplate leaders are not to wait for the CRTHFC to convene but rather are required to develop and execute an appropriate interim risk mitigation plan. If a Sailor has been referred to the CRTHFC, they will be reviewed monthly by their engaged deckplate leaders until they are deemed no longer at risk. Naval Air Forces policy directs the CRTHFC to convene quarterly or "more frequently as needed," to review all at risk sailors forwarded by their respective engaged deckplate leaders.[304]

Mandatory Command Resilience Team Human Factors Council Members (if assigned)	SME Support (as required)
• Commanding officer or officer in charge • Executive officer or equivalent • Command master chief or senior enlisted leader • Judge advocate general/legal officer • Medical officer or independent duty corpsman • Command climate specialist • Chaplain • Individual Sailor's respective head of department	• Drug and alcohol program advisor • Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocate • Deployed Resiliency Counselor • Fleet and Family Support Center • Suicide prevention coordinator • Command individual augmentee coordinator • Additional departmental leadership *This list is not an exhaustive list; commanders will add members at their discretion as the situation requires.*

Figure 24. Command Resilience Team Human Factors Council Membership

Regulatory Background

Finding 32: The CRT aboard USS *George Washington* did not include all required participants.

Discussion. The CRT includes command leadership, program managers, and other command members who provide the commanding officer with a means to improve support programs by reviewing behaviors, environmental factors, organizational influences, or supervisory concerns that may affect Sailor resiliency, morale, or the overall command climate.[305]

Mandatory CRT members are listed in Figure 24.[306]

The command career counselor, drug and alcohol program advisor (DAPA), command sponsor coordinator, Fit Boss, and Fun Boss reported involvement with USS *George Washington*'s CRT.[307] However, the SAPR victim advocate, command financial specialist, suicide prevention coordinator, deployed resiliency counselor, command indoctrination coordinator, expanded operational stress control (EOSC) team lead, and ship's clinical psychologist did not participate or were not involved in the CRT despite being mandated CRT members.[308]

Opinion 91: Incomplete participation in the CRT by required members creates stovepipes, preventing holistic examination of command issues.

Opinion 92: Without a holistic approach to understanding the problem, actions to improve command culture and the quality of life and quality of service of Sailors may be incomplete or ineffective.

<u>Recommendation 34:</u> TYCOM command climate specialist review and improve oversight to ensure overall program compliance.

Finding 33: USS *George Washington* command leadership did not have adequate level of knowledge to effectively implement the Navy's culture of excellence program.

Discussion. In February 2022, the current executive officer reported aboard USS *George Washington* said he was not aware of the command specifically targeting actions towards the Culture of Excellence and that he has not taken any specific actions himself in that area. He admitted that he had not attended any CRT meetings since arriving and that he did not realize he was the CRT lead. He indicated that there were many programs aboard USS *George Washington* that atrophied over the years and that many program mandates were not being met.[309] Through the Division in the Spotlight program, the executive officer attends divisional quarters, does physical training, conducts "Undercover executive officer" (where he works alongside the Sailors), and runs an executive officer "chat session." He said the training department sets the schedule for Division in the Spotlight. Simultaneously, leadership audits command programs in order to improve the programs that have atrophied.[310]

The current commanding officer of *USS George Washington* believes "toughness" and "resilience" are better fostered at the divisional or departmental level, and that it is not a program that should be advertised on a command level to Sailors.[311]

Opinion 93: USS *George Washington*'s leadership views indicate limited knowledge and awareness of the Culture of Excellence programs.

Opinion 94: While it is the responsibility of leaders to understand their assigned duties, it is also the duty of the Navy to effectively roll out new programs to ensure that leaders have sufficient knowledge and program exposure to execute on the command level.

<u>Recommendation 35:</u> NETC/TYCOM review pipeline training for senior leaders to ensure inclusion of prioritized Navy-wide programs and initiatives.

<u>Recommendation 36:</u> OPNAV N17 conduct assessment of COE program implementation to determine effectiveness and to identify lessons learned for future initiatives.

Finding 34: The CRTHFC aboard USS *George Washington* did not effectively review at-risk personnel as required.

Discussion. While the CRT operates at a programmatic level to improve the command, the CRTHFC focuses on helping individual Sailors who have been identified as needing more resources. The CRTHFC is a subset of the broader CRT with specific "need to know" information about individual Sailor cases. The CRTHFC is chaired by the commanding officer, who should modify its membership to match the command's size and scope. CRTHFC meetings must occur as soon as possible when an at-risk Sailor is identified, or monthly, at a minimum, to discuss Sailors who require additional resources. Once an at-risk Sailor's case has been discussed, the CRTHFC is tasked with creating an "effective, holistic risk management plan to mitigate adverse outcomes and improve individual and force readiness."[312]

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has been referred to the CRTHFC, they will be reviewed monthly by their engaged deckplate leaders until they are deemed no longer at risk. Naval Air Forces policy directs the CRTHFC to convene quarterly or "more frequently as needed," to review all at risk sailors forwarded by their respective engaged deckplate leaders.[313] Figure 24 provides the mandatory members of the CRTHFC.

The following issues were identified with USS *George Washington*'s CRTHFC:

1. **CRT and CRTHFC combined.** In early 2021, USS *George Washington* combined the CRT and CRTHFC into a single event by command climate supervisors. CMEO program leadership opposed this change; however, it continued.[314] In preparation, command climate specialists conducted departmental level focus groups on command climate.[315] In spring of 2022, the CRT and CRTHFC were split.[316]

2. **Limited Scope.** CRTHFC focused on a single department each month rather than the entire crew. Each respective head of department and departmental leading chief petty officer was tasked with identifying Sailors with issues and briefing each case. CRTHFC is supposed to meet as soon as possible when an at-risk Sailor is identified or monthly at a minimum to discuss resources and create holistic risk management plans. The combined CRT/CRTHFC program examined only one department per month aboard USS *George Washington*, a command with 20 departments.[317] In this construct, Sailors would be reviewed only once every 20 months.[318]

3. **Leadership Engagement and Involvement.** The current commanding officer and executive officer aboard USS *George Washington* did not initially participate in the CRT/CRTHFC despite being required members of each team. The current executive officer reported that he had not reviewed any CRTFHC minutes but he was familiar with the CRTHFC.[319] The prior executive officer aboard USS *George Washington* did participate in the CRTHFC. The executive officer is required to establish the CRTHFC and the commanding officer is a required participant.[320] In August 2021, the current commanding officer, following a meeting with CNAL, became aware that the CRTHFC was not operating correctly and tasked the command's chaplain to establish the program by the end of calendar year 2021.[321] The process of establishing an effective CRTHFC is ongoing.

4. **Changing Responsible Party.** Over the course of 2 years, the responsibility for running the CRTHFC shifted across multiple entities to include the medical department, chaplain, and operations department.[322]

5. **Awareness and Usability of Instructions.** Key members of the CMEO organization were unaware of the guidance provided by CNAF in September 2021 that provided guidance on implementation of the CRTHFC.[323]

   Opinion 95: The CRT and CRTHFC are separate and distinct programs focusing on the command environment and individual Sailors, respectively.

   Opinion 96: Effective oversight requires command level involvement. Neither the commanding officer nor the executive officer were aware of their central role in the CRTHFC and CRT, respectively. This may reflect inadequate pipeline training for command leadership.

   Opinion 97: USS *George Washington* created its own barriers to implementation of the CRTHFC by shifting leadership responsibilities across various entities over a short period of time.

   Opinion 98: The scope and scale of a CRTHFC aboard an aircraft carrier presents significant challenges. Responsible personnel aboard USS *George Washington* struggled to institutionalize the CRTHFC due to the magnitude of the task. Positive actions still allowed gaps and seams in the protective coverage afforded to our Sailors.

<u>Recommendation 37:</u> CNAP/CNAL conduct cross-carrier assessment of CRTHFC programs to identify best practices for implementation at scale and revise instruction as required to codify best practices.

Finding 35: USS *George Washington* experienced resistance in the activation and implementation of the CRTHFC.

Discussion. In August 2021, the commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, directed the command chaplain to stand up the CRTHFC by the end of 2021.[324] To begin implementation, the command chaplain met with each head of department to solicit their feedback on the best way to stand up the program. The chaplain assessed that only 50 percent of the heads of department supported the CRTHFC requirements. Primary resistance focused on the time required to execute the program, even on a quarterly basis. The chaplain reported this pushback to the commanding officer.[325] The commanding officer reported that senior leadership initially pushed back on the CRTHFC program due to concerns of being too involved in Sailors' lives, but he said he reiterated that leaders were authorized to be intrusive and identify risks and factors that can be lifesaving. [326]

In November 2021, the command chaplain began to implement the program by piloting quarterly CRTHFC meetings with two departments (weapons department and aircraft intermediate maintenance department). During departmental training with division officers and leading chief petty officers, he experienced "very stiff resistance." Deckplate leaders viewed the CRTHFC process as "intrusive" and believed that Sailors would lose trust in their leadership. In response to the resistance, the commanding officer intervened and provided forceful backup to overcome this resistance. [327]

Opinion 99: While human factors councils have been a robust part of the naval aviation community for generations, implementation aboard Navy ships is relatively new, creating initial inertia and resistance consistent with any organizational change.

Opinion 100: Additional program requirements, regardless of merit and value, increase the workload on front line leaders and may lead to resistance if all other duties and responsibilities remain unchanged.

Opinion 101: In order for deckplate leaders to "buy-in," they require leadership, guidance, and training to understand the significance and importance of any program.

Opinion 102: Human factor councils are only effective if both leaders and subordinates trust in the process. Building trust requires time and persistence.

<u>Recommendation 38:</u> CNAL/CNAP review cross-aircraft carrier rollout training for CRTHFC to identify best practices and products.

<u>Recommendation 39:</u> NETC review, assess, and modify, as necessary, leadership training continuum to include Navy cultural champions network that includes challenges to implementation as a leader.

Finding 36: USS *George Washington* did not effectively implement the CRT and cultural champions network as required.

Finding 37: Inspections and outside oversight of the cultural champions network aboard USS *George Washington*.

Discussion. NAVADMIN 318/20 required implementation of the cultural champions network to include the CRT by 1 March 2021. The NAVADMIN required command climate specialists and the Navy Inspector General to conduct command inspections to ensure all commands execute the requirements associated with the cultural champions network.[328]

According to the training departmental leading chief petty officer, the CRT began meeting in approximately May 2022 as a call to action from (b)(6) commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, to come up with a plan to better communicate and mitigate issues on the ship. As a result, the CRT began to meet routinely to brainstorm ideas to boost morale.[329]

Neither TYCOM command climate specialists nor the Navy Inspector General conducted cultural champions network program inspections.

Finding 38: USS *George Washington's* EOSC program is compliant with policy, available, and adequate.

Discussion. EOSC program is one of the primary individual Sailor resilience programs developed as a result of the culture of excellence. EOSC is a peer-to-peer, primary prevention program, which integrates combat and operational stress control practices with psychological resilience and mindfulness training to improve the psychological readiness and toughness of Sailors and units. EOSC program is designed to improve the way Service members think about and respond to challenging situations in their life such as relationships, career transitions, disciplinary and legal issues, performance issues, and financial strain.[330]

Each command must appoint an EOSC team lead (E-7 or above) and an EOSC assistant team lead (E-6 or above). Larger commands can appoint additional assistant team leads to meet the needs of their command. The EOSC team lead is a member of the CRT, and the EOSC team leads are responsible for training and implementing the EOSC program at the command level. Navy-wide virtual EOSC team lead and assistant team lead training was conducted from July through December 2021. Commands were required to have an established EOSC program no later than January 2022.[331]

In January 2022, the command chaplain, command climate specialist, and CMEO coordinator conducted a day-long planning session to develop an EOSC rollout plan, which was presented to the CRT in February 2022. Both the command climate specialist and command chaplain completed EOSC team lead training in August 2021 and February 2022, respectively. This training enabled them to conduct further on training for the command.

Based on the proposed plan, EOSC implementation would also include the following:

1. safeTALK to be presented at command indoctrination (a program to teach individuals how to recognize and interview with suicidal Sailors);

2. ARSENAL (a 2-hour resiliency-based training offered by CREDO Mid-Atlantic trained facilitators, described as "EOSC lite");

3. Rapid data collection; and

4. An improved command mentoring program that would match newly arrived Sailors with mentoring groups immediately after attending command indoctrination.[332]

Following the deaths by suicide aboard USS *George Washington* in April 2022, the commanding officer of USS *George Washington* established an "Ad-hoc Resilience Task Force." The task force conducted a resiliency fair and a safety stand-down. In addition, they adopted the above recommendations. Following this period, EOSC training began in earnest for each duty section and continues as of this report. Additionally, 22 E-7 and above personnel completed the train-the-trainer course.

Opinion 103: Effective program implementation takes time, effort, and manpower.

Opinion 104: The Navy-wide rollout of the EOSC program and subsequent command-level implementation occurred in close proximity to the deaths by suicide aboard USS *George Washington*, limiting the programs ability to serve as a protective factor for Sailors.

<u>Recommendation 40:</u> CNAL/CNAP continue to monitor training progress across the aircraft carrier force.

<u>Recommendation 41:</u> NETC implement EOSC into initial ascension training for officers and enlisted personnel.

Finding 39: The USS *George Washington* command sponsorship program was compliant with policy, available, adequate, and considered best practice.

Discussion. Command sponsor and indoctrination programs "are designed to facilitate the adaptation of Service members and their families into new working and living environments."[333] Command sponsor responsibilities begin when a Service member receives permanent change of station orders and continues through their integration into the new command. Sailors are integrated into a command when they are fully cognizant of all policies, programs, services and responsibilities. The command sponsor coordinator is responsible for assigning incoming military personnel a sponsor, who serves as the primary point of contact for the incoming Sailor to facilitate a smooth transition and integration into the new command.[334]

USS *George Washington* command sponsorship program tracked an average of over 300 Sailors are prospective gains to the command through the command sponsorship coordinator. To enable effective tracking, the coordinator utilized 18 departmental sponsorship coordinators to connect arriving Sailors to individual sponsors and to ensure continuous contact. In an effort to receive feedback on program effectiveness from arriving Sailors, the command sponsorship coordinator expanded his time slot in command indoctrination. This feedback enabled the program coordinator to identify high-performing sponsors for recognition and low-performing sponsors for removal from the program.[335]

Due to COVID-19, FFSC suspended sponsor training aboard ships. To close the training gap, USS *George Washington* utilized onboard training to satisfy the requirement. Command sponsors are required to be trained by FFSC.[336]

From 2019 until 2022, the USS *George Washington* Command Sponsorship program received no formal outside inspection. OPNAVINST 1740.3E, Command Sponsorship and Indoctrination Program instruction, does not require external program oversight; however, it is included in routine Inspector General inspections.[337] [338]

Opinion 105: Command sponsorship is a critical program that enables connectedness for new Sailors.

Opinion 106: External program reviews of the command sponsorship are key to ensure program effectiveness.

<u>Recommendation 42:</u> TYCOM review inspections process to ensure command sponsorship program is being adequately reviewed.

<u>Recommendation 43:</u> CNIC and TYCOM identify sponsorship training requirement gap and establish roll plan for commands.

Finding 40: USS *George Washington* command indoctrination program did not effectively ensure the timely execution of required training.

Finding 41: USS *George Washington* did not effectively track and monitor completion of command indoctrination.

Discussion. The command indoctrination coordinator is responsible for the timely delivery of indoctrination training for newly arrived Sailors, tailoring command indoctrination to command specific requirements such as location, mission, and vision. The following are examples of the content of command indoctrination that may be included if not already part of the command check-in process: housing options on home finding assistance, child care, schools, financial literacy education, introduction of the CRT and brief overview of Human Factors Councils, stress management as related to relocation, and tobacco product training.[339] Timely delivery of this

information ensures that new Sailors understand command policies, the services available on the ship, and homeport, and relevant resources. New arrivals are to be enrolled in command indoctrination within 30 days of reporting.[340]

The command master chief oversees the command sponsor and indoctrination programs. The commanding officer is responsible for soliciting feedback to ensure the effectiveness of the command sponsorship and indoctrination programs.[341]

USS *George Washington* conducted command indoctrination continuously without breaks between each convening. While initially conducted over 2 weeks, the course condensed to 1 week due to COVID-19 restrictions on the number of personnel per convening (20 personnel). New Sailors were expected to complete general military training requirements to include basic damage control on their own time to make up for this reduction. E-7 and above receive an abridged 1-day indoctrination given their experience.[342] [343] Following reduced COVID-19 mitigations, USS *George Washington* returned to 2-week command indoctrination.

Prior to crew move aboard and the pandemic, USS *George Washington* conducted command indoctrination at Huntington Hall, a government-contracted lodging facility in Newport News, Virginia. During this period, Sailors received command indoctrination training within 2 weeks of arrival. After the crew moved back aboard the ship and no longer had access to Huntington Hall, training continued in available shipboard classrooms, which were too small and often times impacted by ongoing RCOH work. The classrooms were often too hot and loud to effectively conduct classes.[344]

As of June 2022, over 100 USS *George Washington* Sailors required command indoctrination. On average, Sailors waited for 2 to 3 months before command indoctrination. During this period, they are not allowed to do in-rate (job specific) work.[345]

USS *George Washington* administration department is responsible for tracking command indoctrination completion and a list of personnel gains and losses.[346] Aboard the ship, the administrative department staff consists of E-4 personnel specialists with more than half of these personnel having no more than 6 months of experience.[347] The administration departmental leading chief petty officer is normally filled by a master chief personnel specialist, but that billet has been gapped for the last 4 years.[348] There are additional manning shortfalls at the E-6 and senior levels.[349]

Command indoctrination program managers reported inaccurate class rosters and difficulty communicating with Sailors directly, resulting in frequent no-shows for command indoctrination. For example, recently only 30 of 60 Sailors registered for command indoctrination attended.[350]

Upon course completion, each Sailor completes a training critique. These critiques are reviewed by the training officer and forwarded to the commanding officer, executive officer, and command master chief for review. In response to feedback, the current commanding officer of USS *George Washington* has ordered program reviews. The training officer retains these records in order to identify trends/patterns.[351]

Following the tragic loss of three USS *George Washington* Sailors, command indoctrination changed to include EOSC buddy care modules, suicide prevention training (i.e., ASSIST), and increased chaplain involvement.[352] Commands have the discretion to tailor command indoctrination.

> **Opinion 107:** Command indoctrination is a key component in building connectedness when a new Sailor arrives aboard a ship. Delays in execution create risk to force and impede Sailor's ability to adapt to a new command.
>
> **Opinion 108:** The combination of COVID-19 restrictions and inadequate space aboard USS *George Washington* created delays in the timely provision of indoctrination.

Opinion 109: The training environment directly impacts the effectiveness of classroom instruction. Adverse conditions undermine the value of any training. We must provide commands with adequate facilities to train the force.

Opinion 110: Ineffective administrative tracking is required in every program. Administrative manning likely created an oversight gap; however, it is the responsibility of the program manager to maintain rosters and attendance.

Opinion 111: When a Sailor is prohibited from working in their assigned rate due to an administrative backlog, quality of service for the service member degrades.

Recommendation 44: TYCOM identify cognizant authority for externally monitoring and assessing command indoctrination programs.

Recommendation 45: SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 identify and resource sufficient training spaces to enable ship's to conduct cross-program training throughout RCOH and new construction at HII-NNS.

Finding 42: USS George Washington Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program is self-assessed as compliant with policy, available, adequate, and considered best practice.

Discussion. The Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program is designed to "improve the ability of Sailors to achieve their professional goals and positively impact their desire to remain on active duty." Active involvement of the chain of command, "from the top down, is the key element to a successful career development program." This program provides Sailors the guidance needed to successfully manage their own careers and to meet personal and professional goals.[353]

The command career counselor manages all career development program matters on behalf of the commanding officer and reports to the executive officer on Sailor career development, including training records and inspections, and Sailor retention and advancement. All unit, department, and division career counselors must attend the career development training course and be designated in writing. There should be no greater than 30 Sailors for every trained career counselor. Career development team meetings must be conducted quarterly and include the commanding officer, executive officer, command master chief, senior enlisted leader, command career counselor, department career counselor(s), head of departments, and departmental leading chief petty officers. Command career counselors and unit career counselors shall conduct monthly career development training.[354]

USS *George Washington* command career counselor office has been manned at a 50 percent level since 2019.[355] Senior leadership attended quarterly retention meetings as required by instruction.[356] The command career counselor team also requested an assist visit from the Navy Personnel Command fleet engagement team resulting in classifying and rate selecting for approximately 100–120 Professional Apprenticeship Career Track (PACT) Sailors.[357] USS *George Washington* received the Retention Excellence Award each year from 2019 to 2022.[358]

Opinion 112: Based on the self-assessment of the USS *George Washington* command career counselor, the program is sufficient. A more thorough assessment of the program is required.

Recommendation 46: TYCOM conduct follow-on inspection and review of Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program aboard USS *George Washington* in accordance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D and NAVPERS 15878K, Bureau of Naval Personnel Career Counselor Handbook.

Finding 43: USS *George Washington* SAPR victim advocate program is partially compliant with policy. While accessible to Sailors, a further assessment of adequacy is required.

Discussion. SAPR victim advocates are "the primary means of ongoing support to the victim and the primary liaison between the victim and command leadership." SAPR victim advocates provide nonclinical crisis intervention and ongoing support, in addition to referrals for adult sexual assault victims. SAPR victim advocates are directly accountable to the installation sexual assault and response coordinator while carrying out sexual assault advocacy responsibilities. In collaboration with the sexual assault and response coordinator, SAPR victim advocates are responsible for facilitating quality awareness, prevention, and General Military Training to ensure all command members receive annual and periodic SAPR training. SAPR victim advocates are required to complete 40 hours of DOD-approved SAPR victim advocate training conducted by a Navy sexual assault and response coordinator or SAPR victim advocate within 90 days of being designated, and annual National Advocate Credentialing Program-approved refresher training every 12 months. As employees of FFSC, deployed resiliency counselors serve as an additional resource for sexual assault victims and command leadership.[359]

Commanding officers are required to designate, in writing, unit SAPR victim advocates, ensuring a sufficient number of SAPR victim advocates can provide 24/7 response following a report of sexual assault. At a minimum, two unit SAPR victim advocates must be designated. Commanding officers are also responsible for ensuring posting and wide dissemination (e.g., common areas of command facilities, living quarters, and command website) of information about resources available to report and respond to sexual assaults, including the DOD Safe Helpline contact information. COs are also responsible for participating in monthly sexual assault case management group meetings. This responsibility may not be delegated.[360] USS *George Washington* has approximately 10–11 SAPR victim advocate's assigned, enabling 24/7 response when sexual assaults occur. At minimum, two unit SAPR victim advocates must be designated.

The primary SAPR victim advocate/unit SAPR point of contact completed part of the training requirement to assume his duties. Each victim advocate is required to complete 40 hours of DOD-approved SAPR victim advocate training within 90 days. The SAPR victim advocate/unit SAPR point of contact believed the deadline for completion was 2 years for credentialing. At the time of interview, he had been assigned the collateral duty of SAPR victim advocate for over a year.[361] Training compliance for other USS *George Washington* SAPR victim advocates was not completed as part of this investigation.

The SAPR victim advocate/SAPR POC was unaware of SAPR victim advocate involvement in the CRT.[362] The SAPR victim advocate is a mandatory member of the CRT.[363]

As required by instruction, a sexual assault case management group is conducted monthly for the commanding officer, so the commanding officer can receive status updates on open unrestricted SAPR cases.[364]

USS *George Washington* conducts 1-hour long SAPR training for the crew during command indoctrination and provides this training at the departmental level.[365] The SAPR point of contact is responsible for ensuring all personnel complete SAPR training and that the completion is documented. The SAPR point of contact did not have the training rosters on hand, but he believed he could retrieve them from the training department or possibly out of the command's record management database Relational Administration System.[366]

The SAPR victim advocate/SAPR POC communicates SAPR events and services via the command's SharePoint, all-hands emails, and posters located throughout the ship. The plan of the day and plan of the week also list the command watch phone number for SAPR victim advocates.[367]

From February 2022 until June 2022, no sexual assaults were reported aboard USS *George Washington*.[368]

From 31 May through 3 June 2022, the Department of the Navy Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment and Suicide Prevention Response and Prevention Office and the Navy's 21st Century Sailor Office (OPNAV N17) conducted an assist visit with the Naval Air Force Atlantic (AIRLANT) investigation team and the leadership cadre of the USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis*. The visit found that some female Sailors experienced sexual harassment by HII-NNS employees. HII-NNS employees often make sexual comments or "catcalls" towards female Sailors, contributing to what is already perceived to be an unwelcoming environment. Leadership noted that they have engaged with HII-NNS managers to curtail the harassment towards Sailors to no avail.[369]

Opinion 113: Based on the self-assessment of a USS *George Washington* SAPR victim advocate, the program is sufficient. A more thorough assessment of the program is required.

Recommendation 47: TYCOM/Installation Commander conduct SAPR program assessment aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 44: The command drug and alcohol prevention program is compliant with policy, but only partially available and adequate due to facilities limitations and manning levels.

Discussion. The DAPA is "the command's primary advisor for alcohol and drug matters," reporting directly to the commanding officer. For alcohol problems, Sailors can self-refer to DAPA or be referred by the command. Upon referral, the DAPA will screen the Sailor prior to beginning treatment. Treatment levels include 0.5 (Early Intervention and Education Program), I (Outpatient Treatment), II (Intensive Outpatient or Partial Hospitalization), and III (Residential).[370] Larger commands with 300 or more Service members must assign in writing a full-time DAPA who should be E-7 or above, and are recommended to assign assistant DAPAs who are E-5 or above at a ratio of one per 100 personnel assigned. Within 90 days of assuming duty, DAPAs and assistant DAPAs are required to successfully complete the command DAPA course. The unit commanding officer must provide a means for self-referral or command-referral, without risk of disciplinary action, for all Service members who have not incurred an incident but are in need of screening or treatment for a substance-misuse disorder.[371]

To supplement DAPA services, each aircraft carrier is also billeted two Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Program (SARP) counselors "to prevent and treat alcohol abuse and dependence." SARP counselors are trained to conduct a comprehensive substance abuse evaluation, recommend an appropriate level of treatment, and then conduct treatment under the supervision of licensed mental health providers. These SARP counselors are assigned to the aircraft carrier's medical department and provide clinical reports to the ship's clinical psychologist; they also work closely with the DAPA.[372]

USS *George Washington* is billeted for two full-time DAPAs; however, since 2019, only one of two billets has been filled. The designated assistant DAPA holds the position as a collateral duty. No other DAPA or assistant DAPA are assigned. Based on the size of the crew (2100+), OPNAVINST 5350.4E recommends assignment of one assistant DAPA per 100 Sailors (e.g., 21 assistant DAPAs recommended for USS *George Washington*).[373]

DAPA services and alcohol education is communicated to USS *George Washington* Sailors several ways, such as commanding officer and executive officer announcements over the 1MC, plan of the week or plan of the day notes, Site TV when it is working, command indoctrination training, word of mouth by the Chief's Mess and Sailors, and posters scattered throughout the ship. Additionally, the safety department, via safety stand-downs, assists in reinforcing the message to drink responsibly. The DAPA office location, hours, and contact information are published in the plan of the week and/or plan of the day, and are reviewed during indoctrination. Sailors learn about substance abuse self-referrals through the DAPA, the medical department, their chain of command, or through the chaplains.[374]

The command DAPA does participate in the CRT as a mandatory member but is not designated in writing as required.[375]

COVID-19 created several challenges for the DAPA program:

1. Quarantine requirements delayed treatment. Based on suspected cases of COVID-19, individuals were required to quarantine, delaying screening and potential follow-on treatment. Substance abuse screening is only valid for 30 days. If COVID-19 quarantine delayed treatment beyond 30 days, a rescreening was required, restarting the process. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Sailors were delayed treatment aboard USS *George Washington* due to quarantine requirements.[376]

2. Reduced shipboard manning to mitigate the spread of transmission delayed initial screening and treatment. USS *George Washington* reduced the number of personnel aboard by executing Blue and Gold

manning, effectively reducing the number of Sailors aboard ship. As a consequence, scheduling screening and appointments became challenging.[377]

CNAL alcohol and drug control officer and the USS *George Washington* DAPA maintain contact. Neither an assist visit nor an inspection has been conducted since at least 2019.[378] The alcohol and drug control officer is responsible for all subordinate commands' compliance with policies and procedures. [379]At the time of the on-site investigation, one of two SARP billets were filled. Naval Medical Center Portsmouth was scheduled to send temporary support to fill the billet for about 6 months.[380]

COVID-19 mitigations forced the SARP program to reduce group counseling sessions, removing the fellowship and connectedness of group counseling. From the SARP perspective, COVID-19 restrictions led to a lack of "eyes-on leadership" that contributed to Sailors "falling into bad habits" (i.e., alcohol misuse and abuse).

Although COVID-19 restrictions are no longer impacting SARP services, the lack of computers in the shipyard environment means many Sailors miss group sessions because they were unaware of the schedule.[381] In addition, the average wait time for "Prime for Life" (Level 0.5) treatment was previously 2 months when it was an in-person class. However, the wait time increased to 3 months when the treatment shifted to virtual during the pandemic.[382]

For Level II (intensive outpatient) and Level III (residential inpatient) treatment, USS *George Washington* experienced an average wait time of about 1 to 2 months. The command DAPA requests "bed dates" (i.e., start dates) for Level II and Level III treatment, and the admission or enrollment wait time depends on Naval Medical Center Portsmouth capacity. Naval Medical Center Portsmouth provides referrals to out-of-network providers when they lack sufficient personnel or capacity to support treatment demand.[383]

After crew move aboard, SARP counselors eventually received a work space to conduct group counseling; however, industrial noise disrupted sessions.[384]

Preparation for Level II and Level III treatment requires Sailors to have blood testing and the lack of shipboard lab capabilities requires them to rely on and send samples to sister-service lab facilities, such as those at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia for off-ship testing, which takes time and results in treatment delays.[385]

Opinion 114: Excessive wait times for drug and alcohol treatment creates a risk to force.

Opinion 115: The requirement to conduct Level I training aboard an undermanned ship likely undermines effective treatment. Shore-based programs should alleviate the workload and demands on forces afloat.

Opinion 116: In RCOH, aircraft carriers are not conducive to the execution of effective drug and alcohol counseling.

<u>Recommendation 48:</u> Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) conduct capacity review to determine root cause of delays in drug and alcohol treatment.

<u>Recommendation 49:</u> NMCP review policy requiring Level I treatment aboard aircraft carriers when in homeport/shipyards.

Finding 45: USS *George Washington* command financial management program does not have a sufficient number of trained command financial specialists for the size of the crew.

Finding 46: USS *George Washington*'s ISIC did not conduct the command inspection program as required by instruction.

Finding 47: The commanding officer, USS *George Washington* did not routinely meet with command financial specialist to discuss financial management issues and trends.

Finding 48: The USS *George Washington* command financial specialist was not participating in the CRT as required by policy.

Discussion. Management of personal finances presents an increasing challenge to Sailors and their families. For some, the lack of basic consumer skills and training in how to prudently manage finances sets the stage for financial difficulty. In many cases, resultant financial problems have a serious negative impact on Sailors and their families, as well as a debilitating effect on operational readiness, morale, and retention.[386]

The command financial specialist provides Sailors group training on financial topics and individual financial counseling as needed. Command financial specialists must maintain individual records of counseling conducted and counseling referrals. Commands must maintain a ratio of one command financial specialist per 75 personnel assigned.[387]

The commanding officer is responsible for the following:

1. Designate a command financial specialist(s) in writing;

2. Meet with the lead command financial specialist or command special assistant for personal finances on a recurring, but not less than a yearly basis, to discuss personal financial management issues and trends;

3. Ensure command financial specialist identification and contact information appears on the masthead of the command plan of the week or plan of the day;

4. Ensure command financial specialist is included in command indoctrination program(s); and

5. Ensure consultation with the command financial specialist appears on the command check-in and check-out sheets.[388]

USS *George Washington*'s command financial management program appointed command financial specialists in writing; included contact information in the plan of the day; conducted financial training as part of command indoctrination; and included the command financial specialist as part of check-in and check-out.

USS *George Washington* assigned manning fluctuates between 2,100 and 2,400 personnel during periods of overhaul based on assignment priorities. USS *George Washington* has 22 command financial specialists assigned across each department. The command financial specialist position is a collateral duty and is voluntary. Finding volunteers to participate in the financial specialist program is difficult due to manning shortfalls and execution of the training requirements.[389] Despite the shortfall in command financial specialists, there was no evidence of Sailors expressing dissatisfaction with financial management services in DEOCSs.

The command financial specialist reported that RCOH created many financial challenges for Sailors. Junior Sailors paid out of pocket for expenses the Navy was not adequately providing to include parking and housing. Many Sailors chose to live out in town rather than on the ship. When the ship secured rooms at the Navy Gateway Inn and Suites, numerous Sailors shifted to these rooms instead of living out in town at their own expense.[390]

In accordance with OPNAVINST 1740.5D, the commanding officer is required to meet with command financial specialist at least yearly to discuss financial management issues and trends.[391] The primary command financial specialist does not brief the commanding officer on financial challenges facing the crew; however, the executive officer and command master chief are routinely briefed through the division in the spotlight program.[392]

The command financial program has not been inspected by a TYCOM or higher-level authority.[393] By instruction the immediate superior in command must inspect the command's financial management program; however, the periodicity is not specified.

The command financial specialist reported he is not part of the CRT and has never attended a meeting.[394] In accordance with Navy policy guidance, the command financial specialist is a required member of the CRT.[395]

Opinion 117: The command financial management program requires a thorough and recurring TYCOM inspection.

Opinion 118: The financial burden placed on Sailors due to the availability and suitability of parking and housing transfers risk from the Navy to the individual Sailor to manage.

Opinion 119: Command-wide manning shortfalls at the E-5 and above levels undermines the integrity of key programs that ensure Sailors are set-up for success.

Opinion 120: The financial security of our Sailors underpins their quality of life and their quality of service. As such, trends in financial issues due to expenditures on housing and parking should have resulted in root causal analysis by USS *George Washington*.

Opinion 121: ISIC and TYCOM inspections provide invaluable feedback not only on command performance but also a feedback loop on issues with Navy-wide policy. Execution of inspections provides forceful backup and enables change.

Recommendation 50: TYCOM conduct command financial management inspection on USS *George Washington* and other aircraft carriers as required.

Recommendation 51: OPNAV review instructions to clearly specify inspection periodicity and ensure inclusion in further programmatic instructions.

Recommendation 52: TYCOM direct review of CRT guidance and requirements by all commands to ensure forces align to policy.

Finding 49: USS *George Washington* suicide prevention program was not integrated into the CRT.

Finding 50: Echelon 3 (i.e., TYCOM) did not provide adequate oversight of the USS *George Washington* suicide prevention program.

Finding 51: During RCOH, USS *George Washington* had insufficient training space to conduct suicide prevention related training.

Finding 52: USS *George Washington* was not exercising her suicide crisis response plan as required.

Discussion. The suicide prevention coordinator ensures suicide prevention materials are accessible throughout the command, facilitates annual suicide prevention training to all members, and collaborates with other suicide prevention coordinators to tailor the suicide prevention program to their respective command's unique circumstances.[396]

The commanding officer must designate a suicide prevention coordinator in writing and this individual shall receive training within 90 days of appointment.[397]

Due to transfer of personnel, USS *George Washington* transitioned between suicide prevention coordinators in May 2022. Both suicide prevention coordinators were designated in writing and trained as required.

Neither the current nor former suicide prevention coordinators aboard USS *George Washington* participated in the CRT.[398] [399] The suicide prevention coordinator is a mandatory member of the CRT.

Echelon 3 suicide prevention program managers (i.e., most TYCOMs) are required to ensure each subordinate command has a trained suicide prevention coordinator; disseminates suicide prevention program information; assists subordinate command suicide prevention coordinators; and ensures subordinate suicide prevention coordinators meet all program requirements.[400] Both the current and former suicide prevention coordinators aboard USS *George Washington* reported limited contact with the CNAL suicide prevention program manager. Neither assistance nor inspection visits were conducted by CNAL/CNAP since at least June 2020.[401] [402] The current suicide prevention coordinator indicated uncertainty over who provided oversight of the program.[403]

Each command is required to develop a written crisis response plan and run drills, at least annually, to ensure readiness. Since at least June 2020, USS *George Washington* has not conducted a crisis response drill. The former USS *George Washington* suicide prevention coordinator indicated that drills may have been difficult to execute because he believed suicide prevention was given a lower training priority. From his perspective, the routine occurrence of suicide-related behaviors adequately exercised the crisis response plan.[404] ASIST is a commercial proprietary program consisting of a 2-day workshop targeting intervention providers. The program is designed to teach practical skills to provide a suicide first-aid intervention, work with someone to develop a personalized safety plan to keep safe-for-now, and connect with further help. Because it is a commercial program, ASIST is not a Navy requirement.[405] ASIST represents an optional training program that has been adopted by some commands.

USS *George Washington* ASIST team meets regularly and consists of 18 personnel who serve as suicide prevention advocates within the command at the departmental, divisional, and work center levels. As of June 2022, 3 hours of ASIST training was added to USS *George Washington* command indoctrination.[406] Additionally, USS *George Washington* recently received funding to send 10 Sailors to become safeTALK trainers. SafeTALK is a half-day training that teaches individuals to identify people with suicidal thoughts and connect them to resources for help and support.

RCOH and COVID-19 policies affected some suicide prevention training aboard USS *George Washington*. COVID-19 policies limited the number of classroom attendees on the Floating Accommodation Facility. As of June 2022, USS *George Washington* has partnered with a local church to host suicide prevention training.[407]

USS *George Washington* conducted face-to-face, general military training on suicide prevention annually as required. To generate awareness for suicide preventions, the command posted flyers around the ship and in Navy provided housing areas; conducted 1MC announcements; provided command-wide emails from the ship's psychologist; and included suicide prevention information and prevention resources in the plan of the week.[408]

Opinion 122: Integration of safeTALK and ASIST trained personnel within a unit adds an additional protective factor against destructive behaviors.

Opinion 123: Turnover of critical duties aboard a ship incurs risk as experience and knowledge of programs may be lost. TYCOMs play a critical role in providing assistance visits to ensure new program leadership is set up for success.

Opinion 124: Effective response to a death by suicide requires careful planning, detailed coordination, and rapid action. Drills provide a means to identify gaps and seams in the response plan.

Opinion 125: While community collaborations are important, it is the responsibility of the Navy to provide adequate facilities to train our force.

Recommendation 53: NETC/OPVAV (N171) review current Navy suicide prevention training and commercial suicide prevention programs to determine if commercial programs should be resourced across the Navy.

Recommendation 54: TYCOM conduct inspection of USS *George Washington* suicide prevention programs and other aircraft carriers as required by instruction.

Recommendation 55: **CNAL/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 provide adequate ashore facilities to support training for aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines at HII-NNS.**

Finding 53: The USS *George Washington* deployed resiliency counselor was not part of the CRT as required.

Discussion. The specific roles and responsibilities, adequacy, and availability of the deployed resiliency counselor are discussed in the context of mental health support in OPNAVINST 1752.1C. The deployed resiliency counselor is a required member of the CRT to provide information on observed trends in destructive behaviors and stress levels.

Administratively, deployed resiliency counselors are FFSC employees funded by CNIC. When assigned to a naval vessel, deployed resiliency counselors fall under the operational supervision of the vessel's commanding officer. When not aboard a naval vessel, deployed resiliency counselors fall under operational supervision of the homeport FFSC or deployed resiliency counselor supervisor.[409]

The current deployed resiliency counselor reported to USS *George Washington* in April 2022 and provides short-duration counseling to help Sailors deal with life stressors on the ship. The current deployed resiliency counselor heard of the CRT but was uncertain of its membership and purpose.[410]

Based on the CNIC-provided position description, the deployed resiliency counselor is required to participate in "Command Resiliency Team (CRT) initiatives, aiding and providing insight into active duty wellness programs."[411]

Opinion 126: The integration of outside support elements into a crew is challenging, yet in the case of the deployed resiliency counselor is essential.

Opinion 127: The Navy expects every individual whether active duty, reserve, civilian, or contractor to understand the roles and responsibilities within the organization.

Opinion 128: The lack of awareness of the CRT indicates insufficient integration and indoctrination of the deployed resiliency counselor by USS *George Washington*.

Opinion 129: The lack of awareness of the CRT indicates insufficient training of the deployed resiliency counselor on current Navy programs, potentially limiting their integration and effectiveness.

Recommendation 56: **CNIC/FFSC review deployed resiliency counselor training to ensure it adequately covers Navy-wide programs as well as positional roles and responsibilities.**

Finding 54: During shipyard availabilities and new construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News, fitness facilities are inadequate to support Navy physical fitness requirements.

Finding 55: Current inspection standards for the physical fitness program do not account for adequacy and availability.

Finding 56: Navy instruction does not specify responsibility for physical fitness facilities at commercial shipyards.

Discussion. The command fitness leader is responsible for administering the Navy physical fitness assessment to the command's personnel, running the fitness enhancement program for those who have failed the physical fitness assessment, and administrative tracking of physical readiness test scores and Navy fitness directives.[412] Command fitness leaders are required to complete the command fitness leader certification course and are designated in writing prior to assuming the duties as command fitness leader. Commands are required to maintain one certified command fitness leader to administer the requirements and one assistant command fitness leader per 25 command members.[413]

The commanding officer is responsible and accountable for the physical fitness of their personnel and must establish and maintain an effective year-round physical readiness program. As part of this requirement, physical fitness must be integrated into the workweek, consistent with mission and operational requirements.[414]

Aboard USS *George Washington*, each department has their own qualified assistant command fitness leader who conducts the departmental-level fitness enhancement program and physical training, as well as assists with the command physical fitness assessment. The designated command fitness leader provides oversight of each departmental assistant command fitness leader.[415]

Physical training is neither allowed nor possible onboard the ship during RCOH. Furthermore, there are no workout facilities (e.g., gym or track) for Sailors at HII-NNS. During RCOH, the nearest workout facilities are located at Huntington Hall, a contracted lodging facility for Sailors. Huntington Hall is approximately 2 miles from the ship. Hall could use more internal space, as well as an "overhaul" of the exterior. MWR program management at Huntington Hall reported a high demand for the use of its track for command physical training and exercise; however, parking is insufficient in the area to accommodate large groups.[416]

During COVID-19, command and departmental physical training was secured. Physical training remains limited due to the shortage of facilities in the area and the high demand created by USS *George Washington,* USS *John C. Stennis,* and USS *John F. Kennedy*. Parking at fitness facilities remains limited. Transport to off-site locations such as Langley Air Force Base or Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia with adequate fitness facilities is not provided.[417]

Echelon 3 commands (e.g. most TYCOMs) are to conduct immediate superior in command (ISIC) inspections on subordinate command physical fitness programs as necessary.[418] Neither CNAL nor CNAP has conducted an inspection of assist visit since at least 2021.[419] The physical fitness inspection and self-assessment guide does not provide criteria to assess adequacy and accessibility of physical fitness facilities.[420]

CNIC is required to provide fitness staff and facilities for physical fitness training at CNIC installations.[421] The OPNAVINST 6110.1K, Navy's Physical Readiness Program, does not specify who is responsible for fitness facilities outside the scope of CNIC installations.

Opinion 130: Physical fitness directly supports our warfighting readiness and serves as a vital stress relief for our Sailors when both ashore and afloat.

Opinion 131: The physical fitness facilities at HII-NNS are likely indicative of broader problem with other commercial shipyards utilized by the Navy.

Opinion 132: It is the responsibility of Navy leadership to provided adequate time and facilities to execute physical fitness activities.

Opinion 133: Inspections of the command fitness program provides an opportunity to solicit feedback from Sailors on the adequacy and accessibility of physical fitness facilities.

Recommendation 57: SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 provide physical fitness facilities sufficient to support personnel associated with three aircraft carriers.

Recommendation 58: CNIC/TYCOMs review physical fitness facilities at Navy and commercial shipyards to determine adequacy.

Recommendation 59: CNAP/CNAL conduct TYCOM inspection of USS *George Washington*'s physical fitness program and other aircraft carriers as required.

Recommendation 60: OPNAV N1/Chief of Naval Personnel/OPNAV N17 review current physical fitness program self-assessment and inspection checklist and revise to include assessment of availability and adequacy of physical fitness facilities.

Finding 57: CNIC-maintained, MWR facilities at Huntington Hall, Newport News utilize active duty Sailors to support MWR operations.

Finding 58: CNIC-maintained, MWR facilities at Huntington Hall, Newport News conduct two to three events per month.

Finding 59: Parking at Huntington Hall is inadequate to support demand for MWR liberty center, fitness center, and track.

Discussion. As the Navy's MWR program manager, CNIC is required to provide MWR mission support services and produce programs that effectively contribute to the morale, well-being, and quality of life of Sailors.[422] Ashore, MWR meets this policy by providing a variety of group activities for entertainment and recreation, as well as liberty centers for junior-enlisted Sailors.[423]

Afloat MWR provides shipboard services for the crew. All aircraft carriers have two billets for the civilian afloat recreation (i.e., "Fun Boss") and fitness (i.e., "Fit Boss") specialists to manage recreation, sports, and fitness programs. These personnel are operationally responsible to the ship's commanding officer, but centrally funded by CNIC. Afloat MWR programs receive supplemental funding from the ship's store and vending machines. During shipyard availabilities, CNIC provides a $100,000 grant at the end of each year when an aircraft carrier's store remains closed.[424]

The civilian afloat recreation specialist and fitness specialist aboard aircraft carriers conduct programs to maintain quality of life at sea. When in port, these specialists facilitate the relationship between the ship and CNIC MWR programming ashore, ensuring awareness and access to MWR events and activities.[425]

Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Virginia MWR oversees the combined liberty and fitness center for E-1 to E-6 Sailors at Huntington Hall, a contracted lodging facility. MWR provides events two to three times a month for Sailors typically assigned to ships and submarines at Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News. Information of events is provided to each command master chief, posted in the facility, and distributed by the civilian afloat recreation specialist and the fitness specialist.[426]

While fully staffed with CNIC personnel, Huntington Hall relies heavily on 10 temporarily assigned Sailors from ship's undergoing maintenance or construction at the shipyard. This staffing arrangement offsets the issue of filling lower-level, flexible, front-line positions. These Sailors provide direct engagement and feedback to MWR staff.[427]

Because the combined liberty and fitness center at Huntington Hall is collocated with lodging and the number of personnel assigned to the shipyard, usage of MWR services are higher relative to other locations. During peak hours, the combined liberty and fitness center is at or near maximum capacity when fully supporting two aircraft carriers in RCOH as well as a pre-commissioning unit aircraft carrier.[428] Because of this demand, the hours of operation at the Huntington Hall facility are longer to support the demand. During high demand periods, the parking lot is full and individuals are unable to park.[429]

Because of the two-mile distance between the ships and the MWR facility at Huntington Hall, transportation is required at night and in inclement weather. Ships are required to provide transportation and/or request transportation from MWR.[430]

Before 2022, CNIC designated MWR facilities at Huntington Hall as a "medium" facility. In 2022, CNIC redesignated MWR facilities at Huntington Hall as a "small" facility and decreased funding. Based on the number of personnel assigned to Huntington Hall (400+), the MWR facility service population is classified as "small." However, this designation does not reflect the total number of Sailors assigned to USS *George Washington*, USS *John F. Kennedy*, and USS *John C. Stennis*, and other ships and submarines at HII-NNS.[431]

In May 2022, an MWR survey was conducted aboard USS *George Washington* to evaluate MWR services. In addition to surveys, MWR is also conducting focus groups to identify what Sailors like and dislike about MWR; how MWR can improve beyond more Wi-Fi and video games; and why Sailors use or do not use certain services. Fleet Readiness, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, identified that budget constraints and receipt of critical feedback from Sailors prevent MWR from adapting to the current times and needs.[432]

Opinion 134: Employing active duty personnel in functions outside their professional rating (job position) must be done by exception.

Opinion 135: Quality of service is driven by the conduct of meaningful, rewarding work by our Sailors.

Opinion 136: Supporting MWR activities may be appropriate for individuals on limited duty.

Opinion 137: Extended hours for shore facilities should not be enabled by Sailors from afloat units.

Opinion 138: Reductions in funds provided to the MWR facility at Huntington Hall necessitates reductions in services provided.

Opinion 139: Based on overall demand for services, the MWR facility and associated parking at Huntington Hall may be too small to meet Sailor demand.

Recommendation 61: CNIC conduct manning review of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) facilities at HII-NNS to identify appropriate manning levels to support robust accessibility for the projected number of Sailors assigned.

Recommendation 62: CNIC review funding criteria for MWR facilities at Huntington Hall to ensure it adequately accounts for total volume of Sailors assigned to Newport News, Virginia.

Recommendation 63: CNIC/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 review Sailor usage of Huntington Hall MWR facilities and develop plan to increase capacity to meet Sailor demand.

Recommendation 64: CNIC/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 review parking shortfall at Huntington Hall and develop plan to enhance parking availability.

Finding 60: The MWR fitness specialist assigned to USS *George Washington* provides adequate programming and support to Sailors; however, overall program effectiveness is reduced by appropriate facility access, resources, and re-assignment of personnel to fill gaps aboard other aircraft carriers.

Discussion. The mission of the command's fitness specialist is to ensure Sailors are combat fit and ready through a comprehensive training program.[433]

The assigned fitness specialist is a participant in both the Planning Board for Training (PB4T) and CRT meetings.[434]

During RCOH, USS *George Washington* fitness activities have primarily been conducted at Huntington Hall's MWR fitness facility and track. Because of the distance from the ships and lack of parking for Sailors, participation rates remained lower than other activities. Since crew move aboard, the assigned fitness specialist attempted to conduct fitness activities on the ship. However, fitness activities are often cancelled due to ongoing maintenance. Gym overhauls continued past crew move aboard, limiting space available for fitness activities.[435]

The assigned fitness specialist was also deployed on a different aircraft carrier, creating a gap in coverage aboard USS *George Washington*.[436]

In addition, the assigned fitness specialist reported issues with funding programing. In 2021, CNIC denied USS *George Washington* grant money. Without supplemental revenue from the ship's store and vending machines due to RCOH, the fitness specialist was unable to purchase t-shirts for participation and trophies for winning competitions. These small items intend to incentivize participation and competition, and boost morale.[437]

Opinion 140: Ships undergoing major overhaul should be afforded adequate access to resources and facilities.

Opinion 141: Reducing MWR resources transfers risk from the budget line to our Sailors.

Recommendation 65: CNIC/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 review parking shortfall at Huntington Hall and develop plan to enhance parking availability.

Recommendation 66: CNIC review USS *George Washington* MWR Fiscal Year-21 grant denial to determine causal factors and re-evaluate policy connecting grant funding to the status of vending machines and ship's store during RCOH.

Finding 61: The civilian afloat recreation specialist is available and adequately supporting Sailors.

Discussion. The purpose of the civilian afloat recreation specialist is to ensure the crew's morale through outings and fun gatherings. The civilian afloat recreation specialist provided examples that included video game tournaments, hiking trips, mall trips, and board games.[438]

The civilian afloat recreation specialist actively participates in the CRT. Events are well advertised to include announcements over the 1MC, weekly emails to the crew, distributed fliers, and posts on the ship's bulletin board. During COVID-19, MWR programming continued to include activities such as pumpkin carving, video game tournaments, and scavenger hunts.[439]

Event participation is tracked via a muster sheet, input into an electronic system, and retained for 5 years. Fun Boss and Sailor participation in some MWR events onboard the ship have increased after the crew moved back on the ship. For example, most recently, 1,500 crewmembers attended a Norfolk Tides baseball game.[440]

The MWR program is audited annually by CNIC. Additionally, CNIC-deployed forces team conducts an assist visit semi-annually to help the civilian afloat recreation specialist increase the effectiveness of the MWR program. The MWR program received high scores on its most recent CNIC audit (85/100, February 2022) and assist visit (90/100, May 2022).[441]

The civilian afloat recreation specialist reported issues with MWR funding due to the absence of revenue from the ship's store and vending machines and the denial of grant funding in 2021. The budget for the civilian afloat recreation specialist supports sporting and movie ticket vouchers; t-shirts for various events; gas for transportation; maintenance for van transportation; the command holiday party; and the annual Navy birthday ball.[442]

RCOH impacted USS *George Washington*'s MWR program in several ways. First, the civilian recreation specialist worked from Huntington Hall, creating access issues due to the distance from the ship and limited parking at the facility. Following crew move aboard, the MWR program relocated to the ship. However, shipboard MWR activities remain challenging due to the continued industrial activity that restrict access to large common areas and to the command's Site TV network. Consequently, participation in shipboard MWR activities remains low. Additionally, Sailors desire to leave the ship after work instead of staying for activities.[443]

Due to the lack of space to conduct activities, USS *George Washington* partnered with Yorktown, Virginia MWR to allow Sailors to join softball and football leagues. However, Yorktown, Virginia MWR facilities are a 28-minute drive from the gate HII-NNS. Command and MWR-provided van transportation remains limited to

support transport. MWR program data indicates that junior Sailors participate in MWR programs and events at a higher rate than others, yet these same junior Sailors often lack personal cars.[444]

Opinion 142: MWR activities provide valuable stress relief to our Sailors. Readily available access to events and programs is important to the well-being of our personnel.

Opinion 143: When a command is disaggregated across numerous facilities during RCOH, unity of effort across its many programs is challenged.

Opinion 144: Funding and supporting Sailor-centered programming during RCOH is of critical importance in creating a good work environment.

Recommendation 67: SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312/CNIC provide centralized facilities for support programming for each ship assigned to HII-NNS, ensuring either walkability and/or reliable, continuous transport.

Recommendation 68: CNIC review USS *George Washington* MWR Fiscal Year-21 grant denial to determine causal factors and re-evaluate policy connecting grant funding to the status of vending machines and ship's store during RCOH.

2.4.5 Medical Availability

Each aircraft carrier has its own medical department.[445] The primary mission of the medical department is to "maintain the health, safety, and well-being of the crew by means of a comprehensive program for the prevention and treatment of illness and injury."[446] A medical department typically consists of the senior medical officer, medical and mental health providers, drug and alcohol counselors, and enlisted corpsmen.

Mental health staff within the medical department include a uniformed clinical psychologist, a uniformed enlisted behavioral health technician, and two uniformed SARP counselors. They are supported ashore by military treatment facilities and augmented onboard by CNIC-funded deployed resiliency counselors. Deployed resiliency counselors offer confidential, short-term, nonmedical counseling and psychoeducational training. In addition, shore-based CNIC FFSCs provide Sailors with counseling, advocacy, and prevention services to include mental health, family counseling and advocacy, sexual assault prevention and response (SAPR), suicide intervention and support, and educational services such as financial counseling, transition services, and life skills.[447]

COMNAVAIRFORINST 6000.1B stipulates that "active duty personnel stationed aboard naval vessels are assigned to their ship as their primary care site."[448] The primary care manager will provide all routine care. Medical department providers (primary care managers) will direct active duty members to a military, or, in rare instances a civilian, hospital or clinic when specialty care is needed.[449]

During maintenance periods, the medical department will "[c]ontinue to provide the full range of healthcare for ship's company, except for inpatient care. Medical sick call, routine appointments, and physical examinations continue, and may increase, due to the stress of the shipyard environment."[450] During a maintenance availability, "the incidence of psychiatric patients with suicidal ideation, stress, and occupational problems tend to increase significantly."[451]

"Consultations to [military treatment facilities (MTFs)] continue to require management and may be more difficult, since shipyards may be far from the supporting MTF." Medical departments are expected to keep medical care "close to the ship." While local military treatment facilities may be able to accommodate referrals from the ship, "such a practice would waste work hours by ship's force members. The commanding officer will be concerned about the work accomplished by the ship's force and every additional hour of work counts."[452]

As provided in USS *George Washington*'s Psychology and Mental Health Standard Operating Procedures, the ship's clinical psychologist "may direct referrals for hospital admission, pharmacotherapy, limited duty boards,

disability medical boards, psychological testing, and consultation." Further, "the ship's psychologist should first evaluate any patient referred to a military treatment facility for mental health services unless there is an emergency and the psychologist is not available."[453]

Finding 62: USS *George Washington* after-hours emergent mental health resource availability enabled persistent access for Sailors in crisis.

Discussion. According to USS *George Washington*'s Psychology and Mental Health Standard Operating Procedures if a Sailor presents to the medical department outside posted working hours or on weekends, he or she completes a screening form that includes basic demographic information, the reason for their visit, questions about suicidality, and questions regarding some common mental health issues (e.g., depression, anxiety, and substance use). All duty Corpsmen are trained to review this paperwork. If the Sailor indicates any suicidality, the duty Corpsman will call the ship's clinical psychologist, who reported that he is available "24/7/365." The clinical psychologist will then conduct a brief evaluation of the Sailor over the phone to determine appropriate follow-up care. If there are no safety concerns, the clinical psychologist will direct the Sailor to return to the medical department in the morning of the next business day to complete a full screening and follow-on scheduling. If the clinical psychologist has any concerns after speaking with the Sailor that they are at an elevated risk of harm to themselves or others, the clinical psychologist will direct the Sailor's chain of command to escort the Sailor to the emergency department at Naval Medical Center Portsmouth for further evaluation. The command escort must be the same rank or higher to the Sailor requiring services. When patients are discharged from an inpatient psychiatric unit, an escort from the Sailor's chain of command will pick up the Sailor and ensure that they report to the medical department the next business day for a follow-up with shipboard mental health.[454] USS *John C. Stennis* defined a similar process for off-hour mental health support.

Opinion 145: The process for off-hour access to mental health support aboard USS *George Washington* is consistent with the carrier fleet standard.

Opinion 146: The effectiveness of off-hour mental health resource access is conditional on **trust** and the willingness of individual Sailors to access it.

Recommendation: None.

Finding 63: USS *George Washington* has the correct "fit" or right type of mental health professionals but in insufficient quantity to meet demand aboard the ship.

Finding 64: USS *George Washington*'s psychologist encountered a significantly higher number of patients per month than the Defense Health Agency (DHA) standard, indicating demand beyond what is acceptable for a single provider.

Finding 65: Across active aircraft carriers, ship's psychologists exceeded the DHA standard for patient encounters by 100 percent, indicating a force wide mental health capacity issue.

Discussion. The mental health staff aboard USS *George Washington* included a psychologist (O-4), a behavioral health technician (E-5), and two SARP counselors. In 2021, mental health related patient encounters aboard USS *George Washington* increased significantly. In January 2021, the ship's psychologist and behavioral health technician saw five to eight patients per day. By fall of 2021, this volume increased to approximately 20 patients per day.[455]

From October 2021 through May 2022, the average number of total patient encounters per month for USS *George Washington*'s psychologist was 205. This average total was the third-highest average for aircraft carrier psychologists and three times the average for local military treatment facilities.[456] From April 2021 through April 2022, the average monthly encounters for full-time equivalent active duty military psychologist at Naval Medical Center Portsmouth was 70 patient encounters per month.[457]

The DHA standard for a full-time equivalent psychologist is 87 encounters per month. Because of additional responsibilities, active duty military psychologists ashore are staffed to provide 78 encounters per month (90 percent of a full-time equivalent). To effectively meet this DHA standard for patient encounters per month by a psychologist, USS *George Washington* would have required 2.62 full-time equivalent psychologists. Based on demand for mental health treatment and the DHA standard for optimum caseload, an average of 2.02 full-time equivalent psychologists is required on the average aircraft carrier. Only one psychologist is billeted per aircraft.

CARRIER MONTHLY TOTAL MENTAL HEALTH PATIENT ENCOUNTERS										
	OCT 2021	NOV 2021	DEC 2021	JAN 2022	FEB 2022	MAR 2022	APR 2022	MAY 2022	Average	Number Psychologists Required per DHA Standard
USS *Nimitz*										
Number patient encounters	101	201	198	185	272	253	204	233	206	2.64
USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower*										
Number patient encounters	66	134	105	65	90	167	127	79	104	1.33
USS *Carl Vinson*										
Number patient encounters	270	242	210	246	123	92	124	93	175	2.24
USS *Theodore Roosevelt*										
Number patient encounters	56	61	62	87	85	81	77	68	72	0.92
USS *Abraham Lincoln*										
Number patient encounters	70	223	56	135	141	106	111	117	120	1.53
USS *George Washington*										
Number patient encounters	200	157	157	167	179	262	243	272	205	2.62
USS *John C. Stennis*										
Number patient encounters	97	116	126	93	243	269	260	254	182	2.33
USS *Harry S. Truman*										
Number patient encounters	282	50	228	147	237	257	269	267	217	2.78
USS *Ronald Reagan*										
Number patient encounters	176	112	106	110	155	187	207	320	172	2.21
USS *George H.W. Bush*										
Number patient encounters	132	93	183	183	255	204	218	158	178	2.28
USS *Gerald R. Ford*										
Number patient encounters	99	67	71	79	102	136	144	82	98	1.25
Fleet Average										
Average number of total patient encounters	**141**	**132**	**137**	**136**	**171**	**183**	**180**	**177**	**157**	**2.02**

Figure 25. Nuclear-powered Aircraft Carrier Monthly Total Mental Health Patient Encounters, October 2021–May 2022

Since spring 2022, CNAL provided USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis* each with an additional clinical psychologist to assist with the increased workload.[458] Commander, Naval Air Forces has also added a second mental health provider (Licensed Clinical Social Worker) and second behavioral health technician billet to each CVN as part of the POM-25 budget submission process.

Finding 66: FFSC has insufficient capacity to support nonmedical counseling in Hampton Roads, which includes Newport News, Virginia.

Discussion. Most FFSCs offer clinical counseling services, which are confidential counseling sessions provided by professional licensed clinicians. Clinical counseling services are free of charge to active duty personnel and their dependents. Clinical counselors hold an advanced degree in counseling, social work, marriage and family counseling, or psychology. Clinical counseling services offered at FFSCs are provided on a walk-in basis—no

prior authorization or appointment is needed. There is no limit to the number of counseling sessions, but most counseling is short-term and solution-focused.[459]

In June 2022, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic maintained 100 billets for licensed mental health counselors across all FFSCs in Hampton Roads. However, the average vacancy rate was 46 percent. Root causal factors identified by FFSC leaders included a nationwide shortage in mental health providers, recruitment competition with local civilian hospitals, and high demand for social workers due to increased need for mental health services due to the aggregate effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, FFSC attributed increased demand for its mental health services to younger Sailors, who are more open to receiving mental health and support services.[460]

When FFSC lacks sufficient providers, active duty Service members take priority, and dependents are seen on an "as available" basis. When FFSC Norfolk, Virginia was accepting clients for nonmedical counseling, the average wait time was four to 6 weeks. However, as of September 2022, FFSC Norfolk, Virginia was no longer accepting any new clients for nonmedical counseling due to a vacancy rate that had worsened to 67 percent. All clients, including active duty, are being referred to the Tricare network or Military One Source.[461]

> **Opinion 147:** The overall lack of additional nonmedical counseling resources such as FFSC increased the demand for services and care placed upon USS *George Washington*'s mental health staff.
>
> **Opinion 148:** The reduction in services across Hampton Roads impacts every command across the area that depends on FFSC for specialized support.
>
> **Opinion 149:** Reduction in counseling and support services ashore conveys risk to our afloat forces.
>
> **<u>Recommendation 69:</u> CNIC review incentive structure to recruit and retain counselors at FFSCs in Hampton Roads, Virginia.**

Finding 67: USS *George Washington* mental health staff experienced a significant increase in case load, increasing patient wait times for non-emergent issues.

Finding 68: USS *George Washington* maintained Defense Health Agency standards for specialty care appointment duration despite increased demand, but it did not maintain Defense Health Agency access standards for specialty care appointments due to increased demand.

Discussion. The DHA standard allows 28 days from referral to a patient's first nonurgent specialty care appointment (e.g., behavioral health services). The DHA standard for follow-up care/appointment is 7 days.[462] Military treatment facility clinics, including mental health clinics, use a standardized computer-based appointment scheduling system and can therefore precisely track average appointment wait times of their providers. Due to the unique practice environment, as well as information technology system constraints on a Navy warship, shipboard providers do not use the same official appointment system, and therefore wait times are estimated. From April 2021 until May 2022, the estimated average wait time for an initial intake evaluation aboard USS *George Washington* was 32 days, nearly double the carrier average, and the second-longest average wait time of all carriers. The estimated average wait time for follow-up care was 18 days. Both wait times exceeded the DHA standard of care.

Figure 26 compares average wait times aboard USS *George Washington* to other treatment facilities, the TRICARE network, and the average aircraft carrier.

Facility or Network	Average Wait Time for Initial Intake Evaluation	Average Wait Time for Follow-up
Local Hampton Roads Tricare Network (June 2022)	34.9 days	-
All Tricare East Network Providers	34.8 days	-
USS *George Washington* Average (April 2021–May 2022)	32 days	18 days
Defense Health Agency Standard	28 days	7 days
All Aircraft Carriers (April 2021–May 2022)	17.5 days	16.1 days
All East Coast Navy Military Treatment Facilities (June 2022)	15.5 days	-
Navy Medical Center Portsmouth (June 2022)	12.7 days	-

Figure 26. Average Mental Health Appointment Wait Times

Both the USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis* psychologists' appointment lengths were consistent with Navy medicine standard that allocates approximately 90 minutes for a new initial intake evaluation and 45 minutes for follow-up psychotherapy appointments.[463]

Opinion 150: Based upon maintenance of required treatment times, Sailors who received mental health treatment aboard USS *George Washington* received the same level of care despite the increase in demand.

Opinion 151: Matching the supply of mental health providers to support high-demand, low-density providers requires careful monitoring and appropriate response.

Opinion 152: Excessive mental health demand creates potential risk to force due to burnout and fatigue of mental health providers.

Opinion 153: Excessive loading of mental health providers aboard USS *George Washington* could have been identified and mitigated with appropriate real-time data collection.

Opinion 154: USS *George Washington* had insufficient mental health manning to meet the overwhelming demand for mental health services.

Recommendation 70: DOD, Department of the Navy, and CNO prioritize mental health clinician recruitment and retention to ensure adequate clinical services for all Sailors, particularly those assigned to aircraft carriers.

Recommendation 71: CNAF add additional mental health providers and behavioral health technicians to each aircraft carrier through the program objective memorandum and addition to the activity manning document.

Finding 69: Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life (SAIL) program referral and intake process aboard USS *George Washington* were ineffective.

Discussion. SAIL is a voluntary program under the Counseling, Advocacy and Prevention function of the FFSC. It is available to active duty Sailors who have experienced a suicidal ideation or attempt (i.e., suicide-related behavior). The program is an evidence-based intervention that provides case management services consisting of ongoing risk assessment, care coordination, and reintegration assistance.

Commands are required to refer Sailors to SAIL if they exhibit suicidal behavior or ideation; however, participation in the program after the initial contact is voluntary. Through 2020, SAIL had an enterprise-wide 50 percent Sailor participation rate with case managers struggling to establish contact with those referred to the program. New SAIL procedures released in 2021 require commanding officers to "instruct and verify that the

Sailors who have experienced a suicide-related behavior contact the SAIL case manager at the nearest" FFSC. This policy change was intended to "help strengthen communication between Sailors and SAIL case managers by involving both in the initial contact process." Although a Sailor's participation in SAIL is still voluntary after contact has been made, "leadership should take an active role" in seeing their Sailor gets the help they need.[464]

Aboard aircraft carriers, the deployed resiliency counselor serves as the command's SAIL case manager.[465]

The USS *George Washington* deployed resiliency counselor estimated that she was only able to successfully contact 25 percent of Sailors referred to the program. The deployed resiliency counselor attributed this low contact rate to incorrect or missing contact information; her recent arrival at the command; and the need to build relationships within the command. Of the 25 percent contacted, approximately 25 percent elected to participate in SAIL services.[466] Based on these estimates, only 6.25 percent of individuals experiencing suicide-related behavior aboard USS *George Washington* participated in SAIL since April 2022. The deployed resiliency counselor periodically notifies the triad and provides updates on Sailors who have accepted, declined, or are still receiving SAIL services.[467]

> **Opinion 155:** Under-utilization of the SAIL program creates risk to force and may increase the likelihood that an individual does not effectively re-integrate into the unit following a suicide-related behavior.
>
> **Opinion 156:** The ineffectiveness of the referral program requires further evaluation to determine root cause of communication breakdown.
>
> **<u>Recommendation 72:</u> CNIC evaluate effectiveness of referral system and barriers to program participation.**

Finding 70: The investigation found limited examples of reprisal and penalties for seeking medical help aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 71: The investigation found indications of a stigma regarding mental and physical health treatment aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 72: Sailors aboard USS *George Washington* do not trust military health providers.

Discussion. Following the death by suicide of three USS *George Washington* Sailors in April 2022, Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) conducted a rapid response surveillance survey. In the survey many Sailors reported discouragement, shame, and stigma for seeking both mental and physical health care aboard USS *George Washington*.[468]

While participation was limited, the July 2021 DEOCS provided one comment indicating penalties and reprisal:

> *I have developed mental issues that I feel I cannot resolve because I KNOW [original emphasis] my chain of command does not care and production is what must be pushed every day to the maximum. I feel unsafe asking my leadership for help or even telling them I am going to see the psych boss, or chaplain or whatever because in return they will make me stay late to complete the work I was unable to do when I was at said appointment.*[469]

Senior medical personnel reported that they were unaware of any complaints that Sailors feared reprisal for seeking medical services.[470] [471] However, junior Sailors reported to the ship's behavioral health technician that some of their leaders would not allow Sailors to go to their appointments.[472] The NHRC rapid response surveillance survey indicated that 56 percent of respondents found it difficult to get time off work.

In addition, 58 percent of survey respondents aboard USS *George Washington* reported that they do not trust military mental health providers. In contrasts, only 23 percent of respondents reported that they do not trust mental health providers in general.

No formal complaints or reports were documented.

The current command master chief acknowledged the existence of a stigma among senior personnel about getting mental health care, and that Sailors still have concerns about possible reprisal for seeking mental health care despite the command's consistent messaging stating otherwise. To counter this perception, command leadership began small group engagements so that Sailors could ask questions.[473]

Opinion 157: Countering the stigma to mental health treatment is a society-wide issue that is not necessarily unique to the Navy and USS *George Washington*.

Opinion 158: While senior leaders may encourage Sailors to seek medical and mental health treatment, it is deckplate leaders that must create a work environment that fosters help seeking.

Opinion 159: A mismatch between what is said at senior levels and what is done on the work center, divisional, and departmental levels erodes trust and confidence in the entire chain of command.

Opinion 160: Creating barriers to medical and mental health treatment undermines trust and confidence in the entire chain of command.

Opinion 161: It is the right of every Sailor to seek and receive medical and mental health treatment and it is the duty of every naval leader to enable access.

Opinion 162: Medical and mental health treatment directly supports our ability to retain Sailors capable of fighting and winning future wars.

Opinion 163: Reporting barriers to seeking medical and mental health treatment is fundamental to closing the say-do gap.

Opinion 164: Trust in military mental health providers is required in order for individuals to seek treatment and to **engage** fully in the treatment process. Without trust, the effectiveness of mental health treatment is reduced.

Recommendation 73: BUMED/Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) evaluate sufficiency of medical and mental health components in leadership development curriculums (all paygrades) to ensure it effectively provides training on how to mitigate reprisal and stigmas regarding medical and mental health services.

Recommendation 74: TYCOMs/Commands proactively leverage DEOCS results to support higher risk units in identifying, mitigating, and monitoring challenges. Focus on "Leadership Support—Ratings by Paygrade of Immediate Supervisor" and provide focused training to commands and departments scoring low in this category.

Finding 73: USS *George Washington* and aircraft carriers across the force experienced a significant increase in the average number of Sailors recommended for administrative separation for behavioral health-related conditions.

Finding 74: The average number of Sailors recommended for administrative separation for behavioral health-related conditions did not significantly change aboard USS *George Washington*.

Discussion. Separation based on a mental health condition not constituting a physical disability (including personality disorders) is only authorized if a diagnosis by an authorized mental health provide concludes that the disorder does not constitute a disability, and is so severe that the member's ability to function effectively in the military environment is significantly impaired.[474] Administrative separation can be initiated involuntarily by the

command or voluntarily by the Sailor. In either case, a letter from a medical officer recommending administrative separation is required to document the diagnosis and rationale for separation.[475] The request and recommendation must be reviewed and endorsed by a medical evaluation board prior to separating a Sailor. In specific instances (e.g. personality disorders), board results must be reviewed and endorsed by a flag-grade medical officer.[476]

99.7 percent of all recommended administrative separations of carrier Sailors over the past 5 years relate to a behavioral health issue.[477]

Across the aircraft carrier force, the average number of Sailors recommended for administrative separation for a behavioral health condition increased by 146 percent during the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the initial vaccination rollout and lessening of COVID-19 restrictions, the average number of Sailors recommended for administrative separation for a behavioral health condition increased by 120 percent over the prevaccination average.[478]

Before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, USS *George Washington*, on average, recommended fewer Sailors for administrative separation for behavioral health conditions than an average aircraft carrier. USS *George Washington* increased the number of recommendations for administrative separation for behavioral health conditions following crew move aboard; however, this increase (45 percent) was significantly smaller than the aircraft carrier-wide average during the same period (120 percent).[479] Figure 27 provides a comparison between the aircraft carrier force and USS *George Washington* across the COVID-19 pandemic.

COVID Period	CVN	Average Number of Sailors Recommended for ADSEP per Month per CVN	Average Total of Sailors Recommended for ADSEP across 11 active Aircraft Carriers
Pre-COVID (Pre-March 2020)	All CVNs	0.90 Sailors	9.9 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	0.61 Sailors (-)	-
Pre-COVID Vaccination (March 2020–March 2021)	All CVNs	1.48 Sailors	16.28 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	1.07 Sailors (-)	-
Post-COVID Vaccination (April 2021–December 2021)	All CVNs	3.26 Sailors	35.86 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	1.55 Sailors (-)	-
Full Pandemic (March 2020–December 2021)	All CVNs	2.21 Sailors	24.31 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	1.27 Sailors (-)	-

Figure 27. Administrative Separations for Behavioral Health Conditions During COVID-19

Opinion 165: There appears to be a force-wide increase in behavioral health-related administrative separations that warrants further investigation.

Opinion 166: While USS *George Washington* referred fewer Sailors for administrative separation, it is not possible to discern the root cause. Saturation of medical staff and facilities may have precluded the identification of behavioral health issues that warranted administrative separation.

Recommendation 75: BUMED analyze the effects of COVID-19 on Sailor mental health. An understanding of the negative social impact should be acknowledged and understood so the Navy cannot only better prepare for the next pandemic, but also better help impacted Sailors maintain mission readiness.

<u>Recommendation 76:</u> BUMED collect and analyze 2017–2022 administrative separation data for behavioral health conditions to determine ongoing trends. Analysis should include specific behavioral health conditions leading to administrative separation; method of identifying specific behavior health conditions; and methods to identify these conditions earlier before individuals enter the Service and/or the Fleet.

Finding 75: Throughout RCOH, USS *George Washington* maintained a high level of individual Sailor medical readiness.

Finding 76: During the COVID-19 pandemic, individual medical readiness levels fell across CNAL-tracked aircraft carriers.

Discussion. A key indicator of shipboard medical readiness is the individual medical readiness of each Service member.[480] Individual medical readiness is ensured primarily via a DOD periodic health assessment conducted during each Sailor's birth month.[481] The periodic health assessment consists of a self-report evaluation, a review of each Sailor's medical record, and an interview with a health care provider.[482] Embedded within the periodic health assessment is a mental health assessment consisting of a self-assessment of major life stressors, alcohol use, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, recent mental health conditions or medications, and interest in follow-up mental health services. A trained health care provider reviews the Service member's responses to the self-report mental health assessment items, and then assesses any suicidal or violence risks during a "person-to-person" interview. The health care provider refers the Service member to specialty mental health care as requested or required.[483]

CNAF requires 90 percent or more of every crew to be fully medically ready at all times.[484]

Since 2017, USS *George Washington* averaged 93.8 percent individual medical readiness, recording medical readiness below 90 percent in just two quarters. From the emergence of COVID-19 in the second quarter of Fiscal Year-20, USS *George Washington* was the only CNAL-tracked aircraft carrier to maintain average medical readiness above 90 percent.

Since 2017, USS *John C. Stennis* averaged 90.1 percent medical readiness. From the emergence of COVID-19 in the second quarter of Fiscal Year-20, USS *John C. Stennis* medical readiness consistently fell below the 90 percent standard. This downward trend occurred across all CNAL-tracked aircraft carriers except USS *George Washington*.

Opinion 167: The impact of COVID-19 on general medical treatment likely reduced medical readiness across the east coast carrier force.

Opinion 168: Aggregation of individual medical readiness data provides a measure of command performance and process effectiveness.

Opinion 169: Effective periodic health assessment/mental health assessment screening requires critical self-assessment and transparency by the Sailor in order to ensure issues are identified and appropriate care is received.

Opinion 170: Notifying a medical provider of an issue requires Sailors to trust that the chain of command will support intervention and treatment.

<u>Recommendation 77:</u> BUMED review and identify measures of effectiveness to evaluate periodic health assessment screening process.

Finding 77: Before crew move aboard, the average number of limited duty personnel from USS *George Washington* remained below the aircraft carrier average. After crew move aboard, the average number of limited duty personnel increased to the aircraft carrier average.

Discussion. To maximize the lethality and readiness of the joint force, all Service members are expected to be physically and mentally fit to carry out their full duties and deployable. Service members who are considered nondeployable for more than 12 consecutive months will be evaluated for [a] retention determination by their respective military departments.[485]

Limited duty is defined as "the assignment of a Service member in a duty status for a specified time, with certain medical limitations or restrictions concerning the duties the Service member may perform." Limited duty assignment assumes that an individual will either return to full duty or will require further treatment and medical stabilization to make a retention determination. Service members may be placed in limited duty status based on a mental health diagnosis, following a mental health evaluation, confirmation by a mental health provider, and review by a medical evaluation board.[486]

Between 2017 and 2021, the percentage of USS *George Washington* Sailors placed on limited duty for behavioral health issues remained below the Navy-wide, aircraft carrier average and the shipyard aircraft carrier average. Figure 28 provides this data.[487]

CVN by Activity (2017–2021)	Total Number of Limited Duty Personnel	Total Number of Limited Duty Personnel (Behavioral Health)	Percentage of Limited Duty Personnel with Behavioral Health Issues
All CVNs	3,528 Sailors	1,233 Sailors	34.9 percent
CVN in Shipyard	1,316 Sailors	400 Sailors	30.3 percent
USS *George Washington* in Shipyard	**242 Sailors**	**64 Sailors**	**26.4 percent**

Figure 28. Limited Duty for Behavioral Health Issue

Between 2017 and 2021 (53 months in RCOH), the number of USS *George Washington* Sailors placed on limited duty per month remained below the Navy-wide, aircraft carrier average and the shipyard aircraft carrier average.[488] Before Crew Move Aboard (43 months), the number of USS *George Washington* Sailors placed on limited duty remained well below the aircraft carrier average. Figure 29 compares average number of individuals placed on limited duty on USS *George Washington* per month to the aircraft carrier average by activity (i.e., port, shipyard, and deployment).[489]

CVN by Activity (2017–2021)	Average Number of Limited Duty Assignments per Month	Average Number of Limited Duty Assignments for Behavior Health Issues per Month
CVNs in Port	6.43 Sailors	2.43 Sailors
All CVNs (60 months)	5.38 Sailors	1.88 Sailors
CVNs in Shipyard	5.16 Sailors	1.56 Sailors
CVNs on Deployment	3.87 Sailors	1.46 Sailors
USS *George Washington* in Shipyard (53 months)	**4.57 Sailors**	**1.21 Sailors**

Figure 29. Limited Duty Assignment by CVN Activity 2017–2021

From crew move aboard in April 2021 until December 2021 (9 months), the average number of USS *George Washington* Sailors placed on limited duty increased by 90 percent. During the same period, the aircraft carrier average increased by 54 percent.[490] USS *George Washington* limited duty numbers did not converge on the aircraft carrier average until this point. From crew move aboard in April 2021 until December 2021 (9 months), the average number of USS *George Washington* Sailors placed on limited duty for behavioral health conditions

decreased by 59 percent. During the same period, the aircraft carrier average for Sailors placed on limited duty for behavioral health issues increased by 44 percent.[491] Figure 30 compares the average number of limited duty personnel assigned per month before and after crew move aboard in April 2021.

Stage		Average Number of Limited Duty Assignments per Month per CVN	Average Number of Limited Duty Assignments for Behavior Health Issues per Month per CVN
Pre-crew move aboard (August 2017–March 2021)	USS *George Washington*	3.97 Sailors (-)	1.34 Sailors (-)
	All CVNs	4.97 Sailors	1.76 Sailors
Post-crew move aboard (April 2021–December 2021)	USS *George Washington*	7.55 Sailors (-)	0.55 Sailors (-)
	All CVNs	7.67 Sailors	2.56 Sailors
January 2017–December 2021	USS *George Washington* in Shipyard (53 months)	4.57 Sailors (-)	1.21 Sailors (-)
	All CVNs	5.38 Sailors	1.88 Sailors

Figure 30. USS *George Washington* Limited Duty Assignments Before and After Crew Move Aboard

COVID Period	CVN	Average Number of Limited Duty Assignments per Month per CVN	Average Number of Limited Duty Assignments for Behavior Health Issues per Month per CVN
Pre-COVID (Pre-March 2020)	All CVNs	4.79 Sailors	1.55 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	3.71 Sailors (-)	1.07 Sailors (-)
Pre-COVID Vaccination (March 2020–March 2021)	All CVNs	5.86 Sailors	2.38 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	4.23 Sailors (-)	1.53 Sailors (-)
Post-COVID Vaccination (April 2021–December 2021)	All CVNs	7.67 Sailors	2.55 Sailors
	USS *George Washington*	7.55 Sailors (-)	0.55 Sailors (-)

Figure 31. USS *George Washington* Limited Duty Assignments and COVID-19

Crew move aboard coincided with completion of initial COVID-19 vaccination series (January to March 2021) and reduced COVID mitigations across the force. Before the COVID-19 pandemic and before the release of the vaccination, USS *George Washington* assigned less Sailors to limited duty per month than the carrier average. After the release of the vaccine and crew move aboard, the average number of limited duty cases aboard USS *George Washington* converged on the aircraft carrier average. At the same time, the number of personnel assigned limited duty for behavioral health conditions decreased.[492] Figure 31 compares the average number of limited duty personnel assigned per month throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

Opinion 171: The increased number of aircraft carrier Sailors placed on limited duty may have resulted from broader COVID-19 issues to include access to medical treatment and mental health issues.

Opinion 172: While USS *George Washington* saw an increase in limited duty assignments, it did not see the same carrier force-wide increase in limited duty cases for behavioral health conditions. It is not possible to determine if this was due to effective mental health treatment or ineffective screening of personnel with mental health issues.

Opinion 173: The increased number of limited duty assignments following crew move aboard provides indication of a possible change in conditions aboard USS *George Washington*.

Opinion 174: Sailors may serve with a limiting medical condition for sustained periods of time before seeking care out of a sense of duty or out of concern for career opportunities.

Opinion 175: Poor quality of life and quality of service conditions on a ship may create a condition whereby individuals seek limited duty as a response.

Opinion 176: Limited duty data may serve as an indicator of changes to quality of life and quality of service conditions aboard a ship or submarine.

Recommendation 78: TYCOMs monitor number of limited duty personnel assigned on a month-to-month basis to provide indications and warnings of changes in the work environment in comparison to historical norms.

2.5.6 Pay and Entitlements

Title 37 U.S.C. § 201-212 is the statutory authority for military basic pay.[493] Military pay tables are prescribed by law. The amount of Service members' basic pay is determined by their rank and years of service if they are on active duty in a pay status and not prohibited by law from receiving pay.[494] Service members may also receive additional "special pay," like career sea pay, in addition to basic pay.[495] A Sailor may also be eligible for basic entitlements in addition to their basic pay based on specific circumstances of the Sailor such as BAS.

BAS is a monthly allowance that is intended to offset a portion of the cost of meals and food for military members. This allowance is based in the historic origins of the military in which the military provided room and board (or rations) as part of a member's pay. This allowance is not intended to offset the costs of meals for family members. Beginning in January 2002, all enlisted members get full BAS, but then must pay for their meals including those provided by the government such as when the Sailor is onboard a ship.

BAS II is a separate and additional monthly allowance payable to Sailors on duty at a permanent station, such as a ship, and assigned to single (i.e., unaccompanied) Government quarters, such as a ship where adequate food storage and preparation facilities are not available, Government mess is not available, and the Government cannot otherwise make meals available.[496]

BAS is intended to provide meals for the service member; its level is linked to the price of food. Therefore, each year it is adjusted based upon the increase of the price of food as measured by the United States Department of Agriculture food cost index and will not necessarily be the same percentage as that applied to the increase in the pay table, as annual pay raises are linked to the increase of private sector wages.

Officers are entitled to BAS at all times on a monthly basis while enlisted Service members are entitled to BAS based on the specific circumstances of the Sailor.

There are two policies governing Navy BAS entitlement, one that addresses BAS generally, and the other for sea duty specifically. The general Navy BAS policy, outlined in MILPERSMAN 7220-160, delineates the circumstances in which an enlisted Sailor would receive full BAS (i.e., subsistence in kind is not available, utilization of a Government mess is determined to be impracticable, permission to ration separately (RATSSEP) is granted, or the Sailor is assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no messing facilities are available).[497] This policy places limitation on the authority of the ship's commanding officers to grant BAS and may not automatically grant BAS when shipboard facilities become unusable or uninhabitable due to overhaul or maintenance availability, and refers to another policy, MILPERSMAN 7220-180.

The Navy BAS policy for Sailors on sea duty, MILPERSMAN 7220-180, states "*it is the responsibility of the commanding officer … **to plan for and provide messing and berthing pertinent when shipboard facilities are expected to become unusable or uninhabitable.** This pertains to all private and public shipyard availabilities."*

The policy provides commanding officer's a decision criteria which hinges on the location of the ship and if that location has a Government mess available. If the location has no government mess, the commanding officer has the authority to grant BAS; however, if the location does have a government mess, approval for BAS rests above the commanding officer with his superior.[498]

Even in the circumstances where messing is available and BAS is not normally authorized, there are circumstances governed by policy in MILPERSMAN 1746-020, Procedures, when authorized to mess separately (i.e., RATSSEP), Service members assigned to a ship who are temporarily required to subsist ashore may be authorized BAS. Factors governing that determination is the consistently and routinely missing two or more available general mess meals per day due to the duties assigned based on circumstances such as distance to the dining hall, dining hall capacity, working hours, or specialized duties assigned.

For enlisted Service members to be eligible for BAS II, the Navy's policy requires that they be entitled to BAS, permanently assigned to single (i.e., unaccompanied) Government quarters without adequate food storage or preparation facilities, Government messing facility is not available, and Government cannot otherwise make meals available.[499] OPNAV, Military Compensation Policy Branch, is the approval authority for BAS II requests. The requests must include the number of Sailors impacted, statement that Government messing is not available (including those located on a vessel), and estimated duration of BAS II.[500]

Under DOD Financial Management Regulations, a naval vessel is considered a "tactical disbursing activity," with authority to receive and disburse public funds and issue checks on behalf of the United States Treasury.[501]

Finding 78: The policy on the granting of BAS during RCOH and maintenance availabilities is convoluted, confusing, and generally disadvantages the most junior and at risk enlisted Sailors.

Discussion. Members receiving BAS must pay for all of their meals, including those provided by Government messing facilities. Enlisted members on sea duty, where their unit has an operable galley, are technically paid BAS, but then their unit automatically deducts that amount in a process called "mandatory pay account collection" to pay for the meals provided by the ship's galley. The DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) specifically delineates "sea duty" as a circumstance in which mandatory pay account collection may be imposed, and defined as "service performed in a self-propelled vessel with berthing and messing facilities that is in an active status, in commission, or in service." Except those assigned to private messes, Sailors on sea duty will be charged for all meals made available, whether eaten or not, subject to the approval of missed meals, explained below.[502]

The Navy BAS policy for Sailors on sea duty, MILPERSMAN 7220-180, generally prohibits a BAS entitlement for enlisted Sailors, (there is an exception for messes); however, if the ship's galley is inoperable "due to repair work," and the ship is located where no Government mess is available, the policy authorizes commanding officers to "grant basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) at the 'messing not available' rate."[503]

For enlisted Service members to be eligible for BAS II, the Navy's policy requires that they be entitled to BAS, permanently assigned to single (i.e., unaccompanied) Government quarters without adequate food storage or preparation facilities, Government messing facility is not available, and the Government cannot otherwise make meals available.[504]

In normal circumstances for an enlisted Service member on sea duty, where the unit receives an amount equal to their BAS to provide meals via the ship's galley is generally advantageous for the enlisted Sailor. A ship operationally underway on deployment means that Sailor is subsisting in an "all you can eat" environment, for three meals per day, for slightly over $15 per day (enlisted BAS is $453/30 days approximately $15 per day). This normally advantageous circumstance changes while the ship is in RCOH. Even if the CVN is able to provide the messing as policy directs during maintenance, the nature of the widely dispersed workforce means that not all Sailors are able to partake of this provided meal. Without a centralized off-ship location, the CVN's workforce may find itself many miles apart (i.e., the "Bank Building," which provides personnel and administrative support services for Sailors,[505] General Electric Warehouse, which provides for the storage of shipboard equipment and

mail deliveries,[506] the Light Industrial Facilities, which refurbishes and calibrates shipboard equipment,[507] Huntington Hall, which offers off-ship berthing, and the technical library), thus challenging the Sailor's ability to eat in the galley. This requires that each Sailor's individual circumstance is evaluated and addressed through appropriate pay documents to account for location of the Sailor, issues precluding them from attending to meals, the number of missed meals, the decision for prorated or supplemental subsistence etc. These pay documents must be individually processed and approved through the ship as a tactical disbursing activity, changing and updating as a Sailor's circumstances and duties change. Delays in processing paperwork can lead to a Sailor not receiving entitled funds or receiving overpayments because pay was not stopped appropriately.

USS *George Washington* administrative department suffered leadership shortfalls within the personnel section. Every pay document must be entered by a clerk, and approved by a supervisor.[508] The administrative process coupled with the individualized nature of Sailor pay actions, resulted in multiple incidents of underpayment or overpayment directly impacting the Sailors. During an audit in 2021, 76 instances were identified where meal deductions were not restarted when the ship's galley became operational. This amounted to an overpayment of over $106,000, or about $1,395 per Sailor, that now had to be repaid to the Treasury. Additionally, the ship did not credit members for missed meals while assigned temporary assignments ashore, which affected 31 Sailors and an underpayment of about $426 per Sailor.

USS *George Washington* audit further revealed that the commanding officer was incorrectly advised that he was not authorized to reimburse Sailors for missed meals.[509] The audit team advised an incorrect workaround to put Sailors who work off-site (e.g., at General Electric Warehouse or Light Industrial Facilities) on no-cost temporarily assigned duty orders, despite the fact that they periodically rotationally stand duty on the ship, in order to compensate them with missed meals since they lacked access to the ship's galley. This workaround would allow for compensation for meals but would result in those Sailors losing Career Sea Pay because the orders would have to be for longer than 30 days.[510] As a result, USS *George Washington* requested an exception to policy MILPERSMAN 1746-020 from OPNAV N130 for "separate mess authorization" (i.e., RATSSEP) for personnel whose designated place of duty was off ship.[511] The letter was endorsed by CNAL.[512] OPNAV advised that while the policy states that RATSSEP is authorized while Sailors are off ship performing travel, no-cost temporary duty orders locally was not the correct option for Sailors working off-site despite the audit recommendation; however, OPNAV confirmed the commanding officer has authority to approve missed meals for individual Sailors whose duties prevent them from obtaining meals.

Opinion 177: The multiple MILPERSMAN policy on BAS is inadequate to address the unique circumstances of a CVN in RCOH in comparison to every other maintenance availability.

Opinion 178: The volume and administrative burden of the individualized nature of the pay documents within the RCOH results in errors that disadvantage Sailors in either late pay or having to repay overpayments that they weren't initially aware of.

Opinion 179: Pay issues have a disproportional impact and burden on our most junior Sailors.

Opinion 180: Having predictable pay is a quality of life issue to allow for the necessary good order of a Sailor's personal finance.

<u>Recommendation 79:</u> OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change BAS policy to allow BAS for enlisted Sailors during RCOH during the period of entering of drydock to redelivery.

<u>Recommendation 80:</u> OPNAV N9 provide funding for crew meals, at no cost to the Sailor, during RCOH for the periods when the food service is allowable regardless of the BAS status of the crew to allow for duty section and onboard crew meals to improve quality of life in the shipyard environment.

CHAPTER 3 Refueling and Complex Overhaul Broader Implications

3.1 Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) describes a military superior and subordinate relationship and resulting authority among and by various units. C2 is formally defined as "*the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.*"[513] Military commanders and units fall within two parallel chains of command, separated by role and function. Administrative control (ADCON) and operational control (OPCON). Ships undergoing RCOH are not operationally deployed, and their C2 is governed by the ADCON chain of command. ADCON is defined as "*Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.*"[514] Federal law governs the administrative and operational chains of command for all military Services. United States law states "None of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be obligated to modify command and control relationships to give Fleet Forces Command operational and administrative control of United States Navy forces assigned to the Pacific fleet" but allows for a modification of that relationship provided written modification has been proposed to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the modification does not preclude commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command to meet operational requirements.[515] ADCON responsibilities include the organizing, training, and equipping of forces for operational employment. In broad terms, Service chiefs (i.e., CNO) perform the administrative duties required to prepare forces for military missions, and combatant commanders (e.g., Commander, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM), Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), etc.) perform the operational duties required to employ forces for military missions.[516] The CNO delegates his ADCON authorities by region and echelon. Figure 32 shows the ADCON relationships for aircraft carriers.[517]

Echelon 1	CNO	CNO
Echelon 2	COMPACFLT	COMUSFLTFORCOM
Echelon 3	COMNAVAIRPAC (CNAP)	COMNAVAIRLANT (CNAL)
Echelon 4 (CVNs)	USS *Nimitz* (CVN-68) USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN-70) USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN-71) USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN-72) USS *George Washington* (CVN-73) USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN-74) USS *Ronald Reagan* (CVN-76)	USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CVN-69) USS *Harry S. Truman* (CVN-75) USS *George H.W. Bush* (CVN-77) USS *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN-78) USS *John F. Kennedy* (CVN-79)

Figure 32. Administrative Control over CVNs

Unity of command is the "*direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces.*"[518] Simply put, it means one mission, one boss.

Finding 79: The oversight by the Navy administrative chain of command of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) was overly complex, confused, and not fully understood by key program managers within the type or fleet commander's staffs.

Discussion. ADCON is defined as the "*direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.*"[519] CNAL and CNAP are the Navy TYCOMs who have ADCON authority and are responsible for readiness, including manning, training, and equipping of CVNs.[520] Their responsibilities are divided regionally as east coast or west coast, with west coast assigned CVNs responsible to CNAP, and east coast assigned CVNs responsible to CNAL. Since there was no shift of ADCON from COMPACFLT to COMUSFLTFORCOM while in RCOH, USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) and USS *John C Stennis* (CVN74) remain the responsibility of CNAP while on the east coast.

Located on the east coast in Virginia, HII-NNS is the only facility in the country capable of executing an RCOH. Therefore, COMPACFLT directed CNAP and CNAL by message in December 2016 to enter into a memorandum of understanding, codified in a joint instruction, in cases where west coast aircraft carriers are temporarily relocated into USFFC's area of operations.[521] Additionally, in the joint TYCOM instruction delineating missions, functions, and tasks of CNAP and CNAL, CNAL is charged with oversight and management of the carrier RCOH program.[522]

Under the CNAP-CNAL RCOH Instruction, CNAL is responsible for the support necessary in the execution of "maintenance, outfitting, and certification of West Coast carriers undergoing RCOH in Newport News, Virginia." Under the instruction, CNAL is also responsible for oversight of carrier religious ministries, medical (i.e., inspections, certifications, and assessments), logistics support, public affairs, force retention, training, and enlisted matters, among other things.[523] The instruction also outlines:

- *Fiscal Matters*. CNAP "will continue to be responsible for all fiscal liabilities and authorities as they pertain to the ship in RCOH."[524]

- *Manning and Manpower*. During RCOH, USFFC remains the manning control authority and COMPACFLT retains fleet ADCON. CNAP N1 retains "full authority and responsibility for all manpower and manning," while CNAL N1 has "no formal responsibility, but will continue to provide assistance" on a "case-by-case basis" as directed by the CNAP N1. CNAL N13, however, "takes ADCON for manning readiness issues."[525]

- *Inspector General*. The CNAP-CNAL RCOH Instruction specifies that Inspector General responsibilities remain under CNAP.[526]

- *Legal*. The CNAP-CNAL RCOH instruction delegates to CNAL separation authority for administrative separations, and all other matters requiring General Court-Martial Convening Authority review, but states Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic will act as the General Court-Martial Convening Authority for military justice issues.[527]

- *Matters Not Specifically Identified*. The CNAP-CNAL RCOH Instruction provides for responsibilities not covered under the instruction: "Unless otherwise specified, the [carrier] will remain under the administrative control (ADCON) of [CNAP]."[528] Programs such as Military Equal Opportunity, which establishes command climate specialist and DEOCS, CVN commanding officer fitness reports, and Sailor Readiness Program, which includes the command indoctrination and sponsorship programs, were not covered under the joint TYCOM instruction.[529]

Type Commander Refueling and Complex Overhaul Oversight in Practice

- *Fiscal Matters.* CNAP was to continue to be responsible for all fiscal liabilities and authorities as they pertain to the ship in RCOH. After the tragic loss of three Sailors, and the question of ship's habitability was raised in April 2022, CNAL offered USS *George Washington* Sailors the option to move off of the ship. CNAP provided funding for USS *George Washington* Sailors to move off the ship into Navy Gateway Inns and Suites, among other off-ship housing locations.

- *Manning and Manpower*. CNAL N1 has "no formal responsibility," other than "case-by-case basis" as directed by the CNAP N1; in reality, for aircraft carriers in RCOH, CNAL N1 performs all required actions for manning and readiness. CNAL N1 submits the MyNavy Assignment billet advertisement requisitions, directs temporary additional duty assistance from other CNAL units in the geographical location, and initiates TYCOM manning actions from CNAL assets for emergent needs. This includes Senior Enlisted Optimization manning actions as well as replacements for unplanned losses. Enlisted manning inquiry reports from RCOH ships are submitted to CNAL N1 for review and action.[530]

- *Inspector General*. IG responsibilities remain under CNAP. (b)(6) former Chief of Staff, CNAL, reported that CNAP Inspector General personnel experienced logistical challenges when conducting investigations involving west coast carriers in RCOH. He explained, "It's hard to do an investigation 3,000 miles away."[531] Deputy Force Inspector General, CNAP, said that it would be more efficient to assign CNAL Inspector General responsibilities for west coast carriers in RCOH to CNAL. As an example, he recounted an investigation into an incident that occurred at HII-NNS, which he conducted remotely. He observed that getting the details of the investigation was challenging because RCOH circumstances and the shipyard was completely foreign to him.[532] CNAL Force Inspector General noted that legal and Inspector General issues are intrinsically related, and therefore it would be more practical if both were assigned to the same TYCOM, given the delegated legal authorities to CNAL.

- *Legal*. Per joint instruction, CNAP forwards USS *George Washington* cases to the east coast Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic with a commitment to fund a court martial should the region commander decide to refer charges. To date, Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic has not received any funding from CNAP for USS *George Washington* courts martial, despite having convened multiple cases.

- *Matters Not Specifically Identified*. (Responsibility remains with CNAP.)

    - Military Equal Opportunity. CNAL has been providing oversight of Military Equal Opportunity programs for the aircraft carriers in RCOH, specifically USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis*.[533] Commanding officer, USS *John C. Stennis*, briefed CNAL on his first CCA after commencing RCOH vice CNAP per instruction. While USS *George Washington* forwarded its CCA results to CNAP via CNAL, neither the current nor former commanding officer could confirm they debriefed CNAL or CNAP.[534]

    - Commanding Officer Fitness Reports. In practice, CNAL is the reporting senior on commanding officer fitness reports for all RCOH carriers, regardless of the east or west coast status of the ship.[535] There is no instruction that delegated the reporting senior authority for these carriers to CNAL.

    - Sailor Readiness Program Oversight. In practice, CNAP was not carrying out oversight of Sailor readiness programs on board USS *George Washington*, and CNAL was only performing oversight of some, but not all.

Type Commander Refueling and Complex Overhaul Administrative Control Awareness.

Several key witnesses interviewed thought that ADCON had transferred to CNAL. Former program manager, PMS-312, was under the belief that when a CNAP carrier executes a "homeport shift in support of their RCOH, the ship's ADCON shifts to CNAL."[536] (b)(6) former commanding officer, SUPSHIPNN, noted that CNAP is the responsible ADCON for west coast carriers in RCOH. However, CNAP allows CNAL to manage since CNAL is on the east coast.[537] Commanding officer, SUPSHIPNN, and former CNAL N43 director, believed that ADCON is transferred to CNAL for RCOH.[538] The RCOH Handbook states, "CNAL is the TYCOM responsible for Pacific Fleet Aircraft Carriers during a Refueling Complex Overhaul RCOH."[539] Three current and former commanding officers of aircraft carriers in RCOH also held the view that there is a clear chain of command directly to CNAL, regardless of east or west coast affiliation.[540]

Opinion 181: Memorandum of understanding roles and responsibilities were not executed as written. CNAL executed duties implicitly designated and reserved for CNAP.

Opinion 182: Creating a hybrid ADCON relationship via a joint TYCOM instruction for CVNs is unnecessarily complex and poorly understood by those in execution.

Opinion 183: Without a clear line of responsibility of oversight, actual oversight becomes subjective among the responsible parties.

Opinion 184: The confusion on who had oversight responsibility for CVNs in RCOH would suggest that there was no clear unity of command to allow staffs to engage and provide the necessary oversight functions, or from subordinates on who to seek assistance.

Opinion 185: Pacific CVNs in RCOH at HII-NNS should conduct an ADCON shift from CNAP to CNAL, instead of operating by joint TYCOM instruction.

Recommendation 81: CNO direct west coast CVNs entering RCOH to conduct an ADCON shift from COMPACFLT to COMUSFLTFORCOM and their respective TYCOMs to clarify C2 and ensure unity of command and effort.

Finding 80: The absence of transparency in shipyard schedule changes for USS *George Washington* undermined trust in the chain of command and adversely impacted both Sailor quality of life and quality of service.

Discussion. USS *George Washington* experienced a number of formal schedule changes during its ongoing RCOH. Each schedule change impacted follow-on milestones to include both industrial production and crew move aboard. Figure 22 draws information from the three schedule revisions agreed upon in USS *George Washington*'s RCOH as well as current status of key events at the time of this writing. Changes in the revisions are noted in green or blue.[541] [542] Changes in industrial production schedule milestones did not lead to changes in key elements that impact Sailor quality of life and quality of service such as crew move aboard. Despite significant and ongoing changes in the redelivery of USS *George Washington* to the fleet, the last formal schedule revision occurred nearly 3 years ago.

Key Event	Original Contract	Contract Rev A 4 October 2017	Contract Rev B 23 Jul 18	Contract Rev C 20 Mar 20	Execution Date Actual (A) *(Estimate)*
SCOOP	April 2017	**April 2017 (A)**			**April 2017** (A)
Enter Drydock	August 2017	**August 2017 (A)**			**August 2017** (A)
Undock	April 2019	April 2019	**May 2019**	**September 2019 (A)**	**September 2019** (A)
Shore Steam Plant 2	October 2019–April 2020	October 2019–April 2020	January 2020–**July 2020**	**September 2020 (A)–January 2021**	**September 2020** (A)–**June 2021** (A)
Shore Steam Plant 1	February 2020–July 2020	February 2020–July 2020	February 2020–**October 2020**	**November 2020–March 2021**	**July 2021** (A)–**December 2021** (A)
Propulsion Production Completion	March 2021	March 2021	March 2021	**August 2021**	*(October 2022)*
CMA	August 2020	August 2020	August 2020	August 2020	**April 2021** (A)
CCMA	January 2021	January 2021	January 2021	January 2021	**October 2021** (A)
Fast Cruise	August 2021	August 2021	August 2021	**January 2022**	*(March 2023)*
Sea Trials	August 2021	August 2021	August 2021	**February 2022**	*(March 2023)*
Redelivery	August 2021	August 2021	August 2021	**February 2022**	*(March 2023)*

Figure 33. Refueling and Complex Overhaul Key Events for USS *George Washington* (original schedule, revisions, and actual completion)

Although most of the Revision C schedule dates have passed, the RCOH project team (PMS-312) elected not to release any subsequent schedule revisions due to the lack of schedule stability. The former program manager assessed that since the RCOH schedule was largely finished with the propulsion plant test program, there would not be a lot of value in republishing a new schedule since HII-NNS work had tapered off by that point.[543]

The SUPSHIPNN project supervisors reported that HII-NNS was operating on a "path to delivery"-type schedule called a "Monte Carlo simulation" to forecast a redelivery date. This simulation took into account past RCOH projects, HII-NNS, and ship's force manhours and work data, and provided a schedule and a level of confidence with a corresponding anticipated redelivery date. The March 2023 redelivery date forecasted at the time of this writing is based on this simulation.[544]

USS *George Washington* leadership identified several issues with this project management approach and related these issues to Sailor morale and performance. The former executive officer perceived a shipyard culture that required a "willful blindness to not see we [weren't] going to meet projected dates or milestones."[545] As a result, schedule delays and changes undermined Sailors' ability to prioritize. The absence of an integrated schedule "fatigues the Sailors."[546]

The absence of transparent project management and schedule delays impacted command-level decision-making. When the crew move aboard decision was made, the redelivery date predicted by Revision C was February 2022. Based on his own self-assessment, both the former commanding officer and executive officer of USS *George Washington* assessed that the redelivery deadline would not be met, creating risk to executing crew move aboard on time.

The former commanding officer identified the following issues with RCOH scheduling and its impact on the crew:

1. Lack of schedule adherence and a clearly defined and realistic RCOH timeline adversely impact leadership's ability to honestly communicate to Sailors the real project timeline.

2. The inability to communicate a realistic schedule negatively impacts the credibility of leaders, as Sailors know RCOH timeline is in flux or delayed.

3. The lack of clear and realistic timeline for RCOH negatively impacts Sailor morale and performance.

4. The lack of a clear, coherent, and executable schedule negatively impacts Sailors' mission, purpose, focus, and effort.[547]

Opinion 186: The absence of transparency in scheduling constrains a command's ability to proactively manage quality of life and quality of service.

Opinion 187: Predictability in schedules reduces overall uncertainty for our Sailors and enables effective personal and professional planning.

Opinion 188: Integrity is the foundation of our warfighting effectiveness. Exclusion of key stakeholders in decisions that impact our mission and personnel readiness undermines command integrity.

Opinion 189: Schedule delays undermine our warfighting readiness, undermining our ability to man, train, and equip the right personnel on the right platforms at the right place and time. Delays to the schedule have consequential impacts on every key event and the ship's force requirements tied to those key events. Significant planning for upcoming training and certification requirements cannot begin in earnest until the command can be sure of the date of redelivery.

Opinion 190: Schedule delays have become the cost of doing business in our shipyards; and the acceptance that nothing can be done has become an example of normalization of deviation.

Opinion 191: Formal, transparent processes must be adhered to in order minimize the impact to our Sailors.

Opinion 192: Overly optimistic projections drove premature decisions, pressurized the crew, and unnecessarily increased risk.

Recommendation 82: PEO Carriers identify the current barriers to publishing timely, realistic schedule updates and analyze where the resulting risk is held.

Recommendation 83: PEO Carriers evaluate, assess, and modify the current process for development and execution of integrated maintenance schedules in RCOH.

3.2 Budgetary

Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress exercises the "power of the purse." This power is expressed through the application of several provisions, particularly Article I, Section 9, which states that funds may be drawn from the Treasury only pursuant to appropriations made by law. In practice, it means that when Congress enacts an appropriation it is providing an agency with "budget authority" that can be used to finance federal programs and activities. This budget authority allows agencies to enter into various financial obligations and for the Treasury to subsequently outlay the funds to meet those obligations. Agencies can enter into financial obligations through such things as employing personnel, entering into contracts, submitting purchase orders, or other activities that establish a financial liability.[548]

Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy

Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) is a budgetary line item in the approved federal budget that gives Navy authority to finance the construction of new ships and conversion of existing ships, including service life extensions and nuclear refueling overhauls. SCN is multiyear procurement funding (5 years), which allows the Government to establish multiyear contracts, thereby bringing stability to the acquisition process.[549] RCOH funding is an SCN line item appropriated by Congress that can only be used for the specific RCOH project to which it is assigned.[550] SCN funding is used to pay for all costs associated with RCOH, including items impacting Sailor quality of life, such as berthing, messing, barge operations, towing, and crew transportation.[551]

For aircraft carriers in RCOH, SUPSHIPNN is the Naval Supervising Activity and administers contracts with HII-NNS for entirety of RCOH to include housing, lodging, parking, transportation, using SCN funding through NAVSEA (Budget Submitting Office-24), via PMS-312.[552] The quality of life items account for approximately 1.5 percent, or roughly $75 million, of the multi-billion dollar RCOH contract.[553] The ship's commanding officer and the TYCOMs roles are to advocate for Sailors quality of life, which must be balanced against the totality of the RCOH effort by SUPSHIPNN and NAVSEA.

Operation and Maintenance, Navy Funds

Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) is a budgetary line item in the approved federal budget that gives Navy authority to finance expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the operation and maintenance of the Navy and Marine Corps, as authorized by law. Examples of OMN funding is fuel for ships and airplanes, repair parts, training ranges etc. OMN funds are used to fund all ship maintenance availabilities, excluding RCOH and new ship construction, as well as day-to-day costs of operating naval forces.[554] OMN funds are appropriated on an annual basis and are available for use for one fiscal year.[555]

CNAP and CNAL, as the TYCOMs, are the primary managers of OMN.[556] CNAP and CNAL have financial responsibility for sustainment of ship's operations and maintenance (e.g., Ship Operations 1B/1B OMN and Ship

Depot Maintenance 1B/4B OMN) pre- and post-RCOH, but cannot use OMN funds for purposes that would affect the bottom line of the RCOH execution contract. OMN funds received by CNAL are not line-item appropriated, and funds flow to CNAL via the Budget Submitting Office-60, Fleet Forces Command, separate and distinct from NAVSEA and SUPSHIPNN.[557]

Although lodging has historically been paid by SUPSHIPNN and NAVSEA using SCN funds as part of the RCOH contract, it has also been funded by the TYCOMs and fleet commanders by reprioritizing fleet operations to make OMN funds available to ensure quality of life support to the Sailor.[558]

Finding 81: Combining maintenance funding with Sailor quality of life funding within RCOH, SCN funding results in quality of life programs becoming bill payers for contract maintenance shortfalls in RCOH.

Finding 82: RCOH for USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) was underfunded by $322 million dollars.

Finding 83: USS *George Washington* leadership requested an extension of the enlisted housing contract due to delays before crew move aboard but was denied by PEO Carriers PMS-312 due to overall funding limitations and prioritization by PMS-312.

Discussion. President's Budget 2017 (PB17) funding for USS *George Washington*'s RCOH was $4.719 million, which was approximately $322 million less than required to cover all proposed modernization per Participating Acquisition Resource Manager fielding plans. At the USS *George Washington* RCOH Resources and Requirements Review Board in 2016, the delta between requirements and resources was identified and the board "deferred the final decision on prioritization of unfunded requirements to the fleet." It directed PMS-312 to "pursue cost savings with all suppliers—government and contractors—in order to complete the full scope of RCOH modernization within the current CNV-73 RCOH budget."[559]

In early 2021 when concern was mounting among the USS *George Washington* leadership on the approaching crew move aboard date, (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, said that he tried to delay moving Sailors onto the ship, but was told that funding for housing would be completely exhausted by the end of summer 2021. He also said he thought that because funding issues were causing problems with material readiness, moving the crew aboard could both facilitate ship's force to complete their work package and facilitate the shipyard to complete their milestones.[560] At the time of the March 2021 request to extend housing contracts past July 2021, based on the financial projections the PMS-312 former program manager, was showing the RCOH project becoming antideficient on existing contracts, and he could not knowingly authorize an obligation for which funds were not available. He explained that PMS-312, by Title 10 authority, is responsible for the overall execution of RCOH. When asked about the request to extend USS *George Washington* Sailor off-ship housing contracts, the former program manager said that per the direction of PEO Carriers, his priority at the time was to maintain overall project solvency. He never indicated whether he sought to reprioritize Sailor off-ship housing contracts with PEO Carriers, and since (b)(6) did not contact him directly and articulate the crew move aboard plan timeline was unexecutable and required Sailor off-ship housing to be extended, the former program manager believed the issue was not a requirement. Normally, the assistant program manager within PMS-312 assigned to a specific carrier undergoing RCOH would be the decision-making authority regarding ship requests for additional funding. However, because of the delayed timelines and associated costs for USS *George Washington*'s RCOH project, decision-making for additional funding requests had to be "tightly controlled" by the~~,~~ former program manager, PMS-312. The program manager provided biweekly updates to PEO Carriers on the USS *George Washington* RCOH to include the funding constraints preceding the March 2021 housing extension request and was given "direct orders" not to take any additional financial obligations. The former program manager of PMS-312 did not explicitly brief PEO Carriers on the housing extension request either prior to or after rejecting the request.[561]

The former commanding officer, SUPSHIPNN, assumed that as long as PMS-312 is funded properly for Sailor quality of life, there should not be any issues; however, he stated that if the TYCOM had control of these funds, there would be some benefit due to the TYCOM's direct, vested interest in the crew.[562]

The project supervisor, SUPSHIPNN, said he can see how there might be a conflict that would put Sailors into a position where they are moved onto a ship and into an environment that is not yet ready for them. He noted that Sailor housing should be funded for the amount of time the ship is in the shipyard, which would help ensure Sailor quality of life.[563]

The former program manager, PEO Aircraft Carriers PMS-312, said there is a requirement to house Sailors off ship when the ship is declared uninhabitable, but there is no requirement to fund Sailor off-ship billeting with ship maintenance funds (1B4B OMN or RCOH SCN) under other circumstances. He added that a ship is deemed habitable after the crew move aboard event milestone is claimed. He reported that the term "quality of life" is not part of any habitability standard; instead, habitability includes specific conditions that must exist onboard such as the "ability to feed and mess the crew," and acceptable berthing and environmental conditions.[564]

A 2002 RAND Corporation study noted that PMS program office controls RCOH funding and has not traditionally been focused on "waterfront issues." The authors added, the "TYCOM is the ship's 'owner' and has the biggest stake in seeing that it emerges from the RCOH able to accomplish its missions."[565]

(b)(6) former Chief of Staff, CNAL, expressed concern that funding RCOH with SCN funds, controlled by NAVSEA and the program office, results in competing priorities between Sailor quality of life items and ship repair.[566] (b)(6) Chief of Staff, CNAP, stated that funding is the biggest barrier to addressing Sailor quality of life issues in RCOH, and that those exercising control of SCN (i.e., PEO Aircraft Carriers) should have some controls to prioritize where the money is spent with regard to quality of life.[567]

Opinion 193: PMS-312 never viewed USS *George Washington*'s request to extend housing contract to allow off-ship housing as a requirement and continued prioritizing overall project solvency of RCOH work, and believed the ship would execute crew move aboard to the planned timeline commencing at crew move aboard.

Opinion 194: PEO Carriers was not briefed on the refusal of the ship's request for continuation of the off-ship housing.

Opinion 195: Combining procurement authority for both quality of life services and maintenance activities creates the perception of potential opportunity costs between two core missions.

Opinion 196: Combining procurement authority under a single entity for both quality of life services and maintenance activities creates potential risk that overall funding shortfalls may be passed onto our Sailors in the form of reduced quality of life services.

Opinion 197: Continuing to combine habitability requirements into the funding line for RCOH is a necessary function to ensure cross-fiscal year stability and avoid the impacts of single-year funding.

Opinion 198: Naval Supervising Activity Control of RCOH quality of life SCN contracts and funding should fall under the cognizance of the TYCOM, who maintains a vested interest and oversight of quality of life of RCOH Sailors.

<u>Recommendation 84:</u> USFFC and USPACFLT comptrollers in concert with OPNAV and SECNAV Office of Budget should review the feasibility of assigning CNAL as Naval Supervising Activity Control for the Sailor quality of life portion of RCOH SCN funding.

3.3 COVID-19

COVID-19 is a contagious disease caused by an airborne virus, which causes severe acute respiratory syndrome. The first known case was identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. The disease quickly spread worldwide, resulting in the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 transmits when air contaminated by droplets and small airborne particles containing the virus is transmitted human to human. The risk of breathing these is highest when people are in close proximity, particularly indoors in confined environment.

From March 2020 to August 2022, 15 Secretary of Defense memoranda, 14 All Navy (ALNAV) messages, 99 Navy Administration (NAVADMIN) messages, 36 Under Secretary of Defense Force Health Protection Guidance memoranda, and 39 Commander, USFFC/Naval Forces North Fragmentary Orders were released providing commands with COVID-19 policies and reporting requirements.[568] The policies and reporting requirements compounded onto existing command tasks and structures in a challenging shipyard environment.

Finding 84: Center for Disease Control, Department of Defense, and Navy COVID-19 policies and restrictions exacerbated an environment where systemic quality of life issues were already present within RCOH and onboard USS *George Washington*.

Discussion. Department of Defense Public Health Emergency Management policy assigns health protection condition (HPCON) levels to disease outbreaks, such as the spread of COVID-19, based on the severity of the disease and the level of transmission occurring in the local community. HPCON levels outline specific actions in response to a health threat such as measures for social distancing (limit or cancel in-person meetings, gatherings, temporary duty assignments), requirements to shelter in-place indoors or residence (ROM), use of masks, and mass distribution of medical countermeasures such as vaccines. The most restrictive HPCON level reached in Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, where HII-NNS and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia are located, was HPCON C.[569] Sailors attached to USS *George Washington* were in HPCON C for 13 months, from March 2020 to April 2021.[570] While HPCON C was in effect, the following specific policies impacted Sailor freedom of movement and quality of life:

1. Requirement to maintain a distance of at least 6 feet from others when in close contact for 15 or more minutes, and, to the maximum extent practical, wear cloth face coverings when in close contact with others for 15 or more minutes and unable to maintain 6 feet of physical distance;

2. To the maximum extent possible, prohibition on gathering in groups of over 10 people; and

3. Limitation on travel only to and from place of residence or work with stops only for essential business (food, medical, pharmacy, gas, and child care services).[571]

From 23 June 2020 to 30 April 2021, Service members located in the continental United States were specifically prohibited from visiting or engaging in the following off-installation facilities/activities:[572]

1. Recreational swimming pools, gyms, fitness facilities, exercise classes, saunas, spas, and salons;

2. Tattoo, body art, or piercing parlors;

3. Barber shops, hair or nail salons, and massage parlors;

4. Cinemas or theaters;

5. Participation in team or organized sports;

6. Dine-in restaurants (take-out was authorized), bars, night clubs, casinos, conferences, sporting events, concerts, public celebrations, parades, public beaches, amusement parks or other events designed to promote large gatherings, to include indoor religious services (as of 8 July 2020, Service members could attend indoor religious services if the Service member complied with appropriate COVID-19 mitigation measures);[573]

7. Outdoor recreation where common use facilities were used and if a minimum of 6-feet physical distancing could not be maintained; and

8. Non-essential commercial retail establishments and shopping malls.

Additionally, to the maximum extent practical, Sailors were required to minimize unnecessary in-person use of the following services and activities, but if the services had to have been utilized, Service members were directed to take prudent precautions of social distancing and cloth face coverings:

1. Mass transit (bus, rail or ferry);
2. Auto repair, maintenance, and annual inspection;
3. Curb-side and drive through services;
4. In-home domestic services (home maintenance or repair and lawn services);
5. Drive-in spiritual services;
6. Banking services;
7. Pet care and veterinary services;
8. Post offices;
9. Laundry services; and
10. In-residence social gatherings with more than 10 guests (i.e., nonresidents of the home).[574]

Overburden and Suboptimal Execution of Key Quality of Life Systems

USS *George Washington* Medical Services. Senior USS *George Washington* leadership stated that the administration of COVID-19 case testing, processing, and contact tracing burdened ship's medical department, thereby putting a strain on the ship's entire medical care system.[575] Medical personnel being placed into a ROM status due to COVID-19 positive test result or exposure further exacerbated medical resources.[576] These added burdens from COVID-19 hampered the medical department's ability to focus on other programs typically managed by the ship's medical department (e.g., monitoring heavy metal exposure, monitoring silica, and respirator fittings).[577]

USS *George Washington* Mental Health Services. USS *George Washington* Psych Boss attempted to mitigate COVID impacts by continuing face-to-face appointments during the pandemic, unless his patients were in a ROM status and in those cases, he would conduct telehealth appointments. He explained that the inability to view a patient's body language during telehealth appointments served as a barrier to delivering mental health services and felt more like a wellness check-in rather than a therapy treatment. He was unable to provide cognitive therapy over remote appointments, as this type of therapy is designed to be practiced face-to-face.[578]

Fleet and Family Support Center. FFSC provides Sailors and their families quality of life support including life skills education, ombudsman support, relocation assistance, counseling, personal financial management, and transition assistance as well as education services in the form of deployment fairs and General Military Training all of which are typically conducted in large group settings, in person.[579] Because of HPCON limitations on group gatherings, FFSC had to shift to virtual services.[580] Mid-Atlantic Regional FFSC reported that FFSC services are not conducive to the virtual environment because Sailors are not nearly as open over the phone as they are when they can see their counselor's face.[581] She also noted that face-to-face appointments allow a clinician to observe body language and assess an individual's wellbeing based on whether they are on time, how they appear, and how they are dressed, among other similar factors which cannot be made over the phone.[582] While the demand for most services slowed during the pandemic, the demand for FFSC's mental health and financial services did not.[583] At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic between March 2020 and fall 2021, vacancy rate for billets of licensed clinical workers, licensed social workers, psychologists, and other mental health providers throughout the Mid-Atlantic region varied between 40 and 50 percent. Although FFSC attempted to continue providing services

through virtual means, FFSC staff manning and equipage did not always have the platforms necessary to facilitate virtual services, resulting in mostly telephonic counseling and appointments.[584]

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Services. MWR delivers high-quality, customer-focused programs and services that contribute to resiliency, retention, readiness, and quality of life such as indoor and outdoor recreational activities, fitness centers, movie theaters, and libraries. Social distancing requirements, limitations on social gatherings, and HPCON limitations gathering sizes impacted available MWR services. USS *George Washington* MWR personnel tried to come up with creative virtual MWR events to comply with these new requirements and still carry out their mission such as video game tournaments, outdoor hiking trips, mall trips, and board games.[585] Since the ship's mess decks had gathering or social distancing limitations, MWR personnel substituted virtual activities that could be done from Sailors' rooms (e.g., pumpkin carving, scavenger hunts, video game tournaments, weight loss challenges, run challenges, exercise with a selfie, and scavenger hunts).[586] Participation in outdoor command activities was also hindered; as an example, the MWR van holds 15 passengers but could only transport six due to COVID-19 mitigation policies.[587]

MWR personnel observed that Sailors' self-worth and mental health were negatively impacted by the reduction in self-care and socialization that followed the limited access to gyms and exercise during HPCON C.[588] Command fitness leader, USS *George Washington*, observed that many ship's Sailors were out of shape as a result of limited access to physical fitness facilities in the shipyard (e.g., Huntington Hall's gym was located two miles away from the ship one way, with very limited parking), which were further impacted by COVID-19 mitigation policies.[589]

Indoctrination and Sponsor Programs. Ships indoctrination and sponsor programs are designed to facilitate the adaptation of Service members and their families into new ship's working and living environments. USS *George Washington* had to stop holding command indoctrination at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, and indoctrination remained on pause for several months.[590] When indoctrination resumed, the class sizes were limited to just 20 Sailors due to available classroom sizes and social distancing requirements. The 6-month pause and limited classroom size led to a backlog of Sailors needing to complete. The backlog was reportedly as high as 140 personnel, and some Sailors said they had to wait up to a year after reporting to USS *George Washington* to attend indoctrination.[591] In the summer 2020, indoctrination was held in the Huntington Hall gym. The gym was able to accommodate about 80 personnel sitting on folding chairs spaced 6-feet apart; however, the air conditioning did not work well in the gym limiting the quality of indoctrination program.[592] The command's sponsor program was also impacting with last minute changes of incoming Sailors' sponsors because the sponsors were subject to ROM requirements (i.e., they had either tested positive for COVID-19, or were a close contact). One Sailor reported that the command had to reassign them a new sponsor two times because the previously-assigned sponsor was subject to ROM requirements which resulted in miscommunications and missed important command information.[593]

FFSC provided sponsor trainings, covering topics ranging from mental health services to financial management support, devolved from in-person trainings to a disseminated PowerPoint slide deck.[594] It was reported as difficult to determine whether Sailors were actually receiving and reading messages covering trainings and other resources.[595]

Substance Abuse Programs. The Navy's Substance Abuse Program is designed to promote readiness, health, and wellness through the prevention and the treatment of substance abuse. The program provides drug and/or alcohol abuse assessment, consultation, education, outpatient treatment, intensive outpatient treatment, and continuing care services of Sailors. USS *George Washington* DAPA described multiple COVID-19 policy-related challenges with the DAPA program. For example, ROM requirements delayed their ability to meet with and screen Sailors who were referred for screening and subsequently found appropriate for SARP screening. These screenings assess and assign the appropriate level of treatment but are only valid for 30 days. If a Sailor could not begin substance abuse treatment within 30 days from the initial screening date due to ROM or quarantine requirements, then the Sailor had to be rescreened, placing a further administrative burden on the DAPA.[596] Substance abuse treatment sessions are conducted face to face in a counseling-type of atmosphere; however, social distancing limited the maximum capacity of classes and delayed treatment. Mask-wearing requirements made it difficult to visualize the Sailors' nonverbal facial expressions when they were being screening and while undergoing treatment.[597] At the

height of the pandemic, when only duty section or mission essential personnel were required to be at work, it was difficult to execute SARP services. Neither councilors nor leadership were able to have "eyes on the Sailors" and some Sailors fell through the cracks and regressed into bad habits.[598] Counselors had to increase the frequency of calls and emails with patients to overcome the COVID-19 restrictions to in-person services.[599] Due to limits on meeting sizes, SARP group therapy sessions were converted to one-on-one sessions with face masks, resulting in loss of throughput. According to USS *George Washington* SARP Counselor, one-on-one sessions allowed for deeper discussions, but the member lost the benefit of the shared experience with others. Group therapy sessions restarted in October 2021.[600]

Suicide Prevention Training. USS *George Washington* suicide prevention coordinator highlighted that COVID-19 policies limited the number of attendees at mandatory suicide prevention trainings. He said it was already difficult to disseminate information in the shipyard environment, and it was difficult to ascertain whether information regarding suicide prevention training and resources was actually being received by the crew. As a means to combat the communication challenges, the command employed ship-wide broadcasts and announcements, emails from the Psych Boss, and dedicated portions of the plan of the week as additional communication paths to educate and inform Sailors on suicide prevention and resources.[601]

Medical Department. Beginning 30 September 2020, Navy guidance required commands to stand up contact tracing units. Commands with more than 500 personnel were required to have a minimum of 10 trained personnel in their contact tracing unit. Once vaccinations were mandated, the Navy modified this requirement to an "appropriate number of personnel," but no less than two, based on the command's immunization level.[602] In 2020 and throughout much of 2021, USS *George Washington*'s medical department was solely responsible for all COVID-19 case processing. The medical department was also responsible for notifying the triad and personnel on the command's COVID-19 Response Network of positive COVID-19 cases. The COVID-19 Response Network was an internal command network comprised of at least one representative from each department whose purpose was to help establish a streamlined command response. The Senior Medical Officer highlighted the largest impact to the medical department was the sheer volume of COVID-19 positive patients, which he said was overwhelming at times. He also said the added administrative work for the medical department resulting from COVID-19 and corresponding testing requirements impacted the medical department's ability to carry out non-COVID-19 tasks and medical care.[603]

Command Leadership. Navy guidance consistently identified commanding officer and command engagement as the most successful tool for preventing and mitigating COVID-19.[604] USS *George Washington* leadership devoted a large portion of their available day to COVID. (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington,* stated that the command's COVID-19 response took a great portion of his day during 2020. He stated that it was his duty to keep oversight, but that the policy monitoring and overall reporting took up a long time. He highlighted the impact across the ships with the time-consuming restrictions such as temperature checks. He recalled that ship's force personnel were conducting between 2,000 and 4,000 manual temperature checks for individuals entering the ship each day.[605] (b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington*, said that when COVID-19 cases spiked, personnel who were COVID-19-positive and their close contacts were placed in a ROM status, which negatively impacted duty section and project management team manning, including some key leadership members. This led to some personnel having to work more hours to cover for those who were absent. He said that managing COVID-19 quickly rose to the top of the command's priority list, overtaking even their focus on RCOH. He also said that because ROM had to take place off-ship, managing those logistics was a challenging feat.[606]

Lingering COVID Effects on Key Quality of Life Systems. (b)(6) commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, said that even after HPCON C restrictions were lifted, it was challenging to hold all hands meetings and other command events due to the number of Sailors in a ROM status. The command had to cancel the 2021 holiday party because too many members of the command contracted COVID-19.[607] (b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington,* stated that no command events were held (e.g., all hands meetings, picnics, hail and farewells) during the height of COVID-19, which "meant no opportunity to connect."[608] Moreover, while the command used to regularly hold physical training sessions together and engage in other fun events, such events stopped once COVID-19 became widespread.[609] Program director, Mid-Atlantic Regional

FFSC, observed that one of the lingering impacts of COVID-19 social distancing policies is that a lot of clients are still hesitant to come together in large groups.[610] USS *George Washington* Psych Boss stated that COVID-19 policies have affected Sailor behavior, including continued seclusion and drinking.[611] (b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington*, thought the "isolated, dystopian environment" created by COVID-19 mitigation policies and lack of enlisted leadership (E-6 and E-7 manning) also had an impact on Sailor working conditions.[612]

As of June 2022, USS *George Washington* had begun organizing large group events again, such as a group outing to a Norfolk Tides baseball game and other large activities.

> **Opinion 199:** From March 2020 to April 2021, COVID policy and restrictions had a detrimental effect on the ability of the USS *George Washington* to effectively provide functioning quality of life services to the crew. With finite hours in the day and COVID diminished workforce, quality of life program management, training, awareness, will logically atrophy reducing effectiveness and raising risk to mission.
>
> **Opinion 200:** While the most onerous COVID restrictions and policy have been relaxed, the impact on USS *George Washington* crew is still being felt today with suboptimal trained personnel on key quality of life services.
>
> **Recommendation. None.**

3.4 Navy Lessons Learned

The Navy's Lessons Learned Program is a fleet-focused program intended to systematically refine and improve fleet operations while integrating lessons and best practices. The Navy program aligns and is in accordance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive which developed the Joint Lessons Learned Program to consolidate and disseminate lessons gained from joint operations, training events, exercises, experiments, wargames, and other activities, as well as historic data.[613] As a consequence, the Navy Lessons Learned Information System (NLLIS), used to document and share Navy lessons learned, is a subset of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS), which is a web-based tool to consolidate and disseminate lessons gained from joint operations, training events, exercises, experiments, wargames, and other activities, as well as historic data.[614] NILLS is the "singular Navy program" for collecting and sharing lessons learned derived from fleet operations, training events, and fleet activities across all levels of war, including lessons from the maintenance phases of the Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan.[615] Navy organizations are to incorporate the lessons from the NLLIS database into their planning and operations to the maximum extent possible in order to enhance fleet learning, change behavior, and improve readiness.[616] The OPNAVINST on lesson learned assigns responsibilities to operational fleets units not to shore establishments such as bases or shipyards.[617]

> **Finding 85: The collection of lessons learned does not in and of itself translate to effective dissemination and incorporation of lessons learned into planning and operations.**
>
> **Finding 86: The current focus of the overall Navy Lessons Learned Program is fleet-focused, tasking the numbered fleet commanders, TYCOMs, training organizations (e.g., warfighting development centers, Carrier Strike Group Four and Fifteen), operational staffs, and unit commanding officers with designated command lesson mangers to collect and incorporate lessons, but neither shore commands nor system commands (e.g., Carrier Team 1, NAVSEA, PEO Aircraft Carriers) are adequately addressed.**

Discussion. Carrier Team 1 (CT1) is a collaborative team sponsored by NAVSEA PEO aircraft carriers and NAVSEA 08, with representatives of CVN ship's company, HII-NNS, NAVSEA, TYCOMs, SUPSHIPNN, and others, responsible for improving the performance of aircraft carrier availabilities by driving collaboration and providing the best available knowledge to the entire shipbuilding military community.[618] CT1 maintains a "knowledge market" to serve as a repository of lessons learned for all aircraft carrier maintenance.[619] RCOH information sharing and collection requirements are codified within the RCOH contract, and include after-action

reviews and peer assists.[620] All carrier maintenance stakeholders and RCOH personnel are able to utilize the information collected and stored within the knowledge market.[621]

The knowledge market includes more than 4,000 lessons learned from past RCOH projects.[622] Many of these lessons learned regarding RCOH key events were captured in post-RCOH survey responses from CVN ship's company. As an example, previous experience relating to crew move aboard and complete crew move aboard yielded 234 observations with an additional, 257 observations tied to USS *Abraham Lincoln* ship's force overarching lessons learned survey at the conclusion of RCOH.[623] Some of these crew move aboard and complete crew move aboard observations from USS *Theodore Roosevelt* and USS *Abraham Lincoln* which could have help shaped USS *George Washington* include:

- When major shifts occur in the schedule—which preclude production work in the mess decks area—do not expect to leave crew move aboard in its current scheduled date. The ship, NNS, and contractors went to herculean efforts to make it happen. 7 weeks later and the ship aft of 180 still has a long ways to go.

- Set a crew move aboard 'target' and do not go firm on a date until it is confirmed all needed services are 99 percent complete, at least 30 days out. This would eliminate the need for Sailors to work 24/7 the week before crew move aboard due to shipyard and contractor work not being completed on schedule. The 30-day lead time would allow Sailors to properly plan their move out of barracks rooms and the loss of BAS.

- Complete all of the items that are normally considered complete crew move aboard prior to crew move aboard. Moving the crew [aboard] with the minimum ship capabilities that we had for crew move aboard is a decision driven by senior officers, i.e., people that are not [affected] by the still poor condition of the ship and its inability to provide essential human services.

- There was still a lot of production work left frame 180 and aft when we moved the crew [aboard].This is not good having personnel live in an industrial environment. Recommend that all production work 180 and aft be completed before moving Sailors aboard.

- Keeping barracks/PPV available for a longer period. Crew move aboard was done at a time when the ship in general was unsuitable, cold showers, A/C heating issue, grinding/hotwork, electrical outlets, TV installs etc. . . . all heavily effect quality of life and [morale], which are the basis of good behavior, motivation and work production of junior Sailors.

The CT1 knowledge market also features a "knowledge need" function, where ship's force and other stakeholders can submit requests for information. Upon receiving such a request, CT1 searches its records in consultation with subject matter experts, and provides a response.[624] Of note, NLLIS contained eight RCOH observations, none of which addressed RCOH planning or execution, for the benefit the broader Navy combatants.[625]

Lessons Learned Incorporation

USS *George Washington* ship's manager and habitability coordinator reported that they were not aware of a lessons-learned database or related information from prior RCOH projects.[626] (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *George Washington*, reported that informal lessons learned were shared, primarily by engineering duty officers, including the chief engineer and reactor officer at weekly commanding officer's agenda meetings.[627] A majority of CVN leadership, including both the current and former commanding officers of USS *George Washington*, stated they were not provided formal lessons learned leading up to key RCOH events.[628]

(b)(6) former executive officer, USS *George Washington,* was aware of and in receipt of USS *Abraham Lincoln* RCOH lessons learned, but did not perceive that those lessons learned were being applied in USS *George Washington*'s RCOH and experienced much the same issues the USS *George Washington* RCOH project team encountered.[629]

USS *George Washington* Shipboard Habitability and Crew Move Aboard Council met weekly in the months leading up to crew move aboard. Although this council reviewed some lessons learned, the habitability coordinator, USS *George Washington*, reported that lessons learned were not specific to habitability, and suggested that greater participation by knowledge management stakeholders would have improved support and preparations for crew move aboard.[630]

The RCOH Handbook recommends that CVNs designate a knowledge manager to lead the ship's force lessons learned team, consisting of two other personnel responsible for gathering, reviewing, and submitting lessons with a plan for the dissemination of the information at the right time. The RCOH Handbook recommends that the ship's Intelligence officer serve as the ship's knowledge manager, with personnel from the intelligence department forming the ship's force lessons learned team with recommendation that each department provide a liaison to the team.[631] [632] RCOH knowledge manager, USS *George Washington*, assumed these duties as a collateral with little to no turnover or training about the requirements. USS *George Washington* did not have any other personnel on the lessons learned team or active departmental knowledge sharing focal points.[633] The knowledge manager acknowledged that her duties primarily consisted of distributing to the ship the monthly newsletters generated by SUPSHIPNN knowledge managers since she was the only person on the ship receiving them, but also acknowledged that in balancing all of her other responsibilities, "the flow of information to other ship's force may not be as proactive as it could or should be."[634]

SUPSHIPNN's RCOH knowledge management strategy recognizes the importance of information-sharing throughout RCOH and directs SUPSHIPNN, HII-NNS, and ship's force to collaborate.[635] Specifically, HII-NNS is tasked with passing appropriate lessons learned to SUPSHIPNN for incorporation into the CT1; SUPSHIPNN is tasked with passing appropriate lessons learned from ship's force to CT1 and HII-NNS for incorporation into the HII-NNS-specific lessons learned database; and Ship's force is tasked with passing appropriate lessons learned to SUPSHIPNN.[636]

SUPSHIPNN employed two contractors as full-time RCOH knowledge managers to extract, collect, maintain, and archive RCOH-related lessons learned on CT1's knowledge market.[637]

USS *George Washington* actively collected after-action reviews and ship's force feedback upon completion of RCOH milestone events and forwarded those to SUPSHIPNN knowledge managers.[638]

Starting in 2022, SUPSHIPNN knowledge managers started collaborating with SUPSHIPNN representatives to proactively identify and provide relevant lessons learned to the USS *John C. Stennis* RCOH project team ahead of key event planning and execution. The SUPSHIPNN knowledge managers proactively followed up with the project team on whether the lessons learned were incorporated into the planning and execution of the respective key events. Those lessons learned are formally tracked for incorporation into the CT1 Knowledge Market.[639]

USS *John C. Stennis* RCOH knowledge manager has been a regular participant in Shipboard Habitability and Crew Move aboard Council meetings to support habitability discussions and linkage to previous RCOH lessons learned.[640] He regularly receives help from the ship's assistant navigator in updating the ship's RCOH website with lessons learned and reported a "surprising difference" in his ship's website and information-sharing efforts as compared to those of USS *George Washington*.[641]

USS *John C. Stennis* Lesson Learned Approach to Refueling and Complex Overhaul

Defense Acquisition University, at the request of USS *John C. Stennis* leadership, provided a team in April 2021 to assist leadership in the planning for a timely, efficient, and cost effective RCOH. The study objectives for the team were to assess USS *John C. Stennis*' start in executing Ship's Force Work Package, assess potential risks to RCOH on-time completion, advise leadership regarding top challenges/watch items, and provide recommendations to address challenges and how best to team with RCOH partners/stakeholders. As part of this study on RCOH, the team included an appendix on RCOH lessons learned. While only slightly over one page in length, the key item was the utilization of lessons learned from previous RCOHs. The study was unsure who possessed those RCOH lessons learned, but it highlighted a demand signal to gather those lessons learned. The

DAU team possessed team members with past RCOH experience, specifically (b)(6) former commanding officer, USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN 71). He said "When I arrived on CVN 71, I had no access on lessons learned from CVN 70. While on CVN 71, I had my team draft a comprehensive lesson learned at year 3.5 into RCOH to turnover to CVN 72 and gave it directly to (b)(6) CVN 72 commanding officer and his team. When I asked (b)(6) USS *George Washington* commanding officer CVN 73, if he had those or lessons learned from CVN 72 it did not appear that is the case. These lesson learned could be invaluable and should be our standard."

Opinion 201: Successful lessons learned have key components which include collection, and dissemination. Carrier Team 1 appears to be too biased to the collection of lessons learned while lacking an effective dissemination strategy, relying on inexperienced crew to passively search or ask for key information.

Opinion 202: Key timely knowledge was, in theory, available to USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) across the chain of command prior to key decision points but without an active pull from lesson learned databases was not presented to ship's leadership for incorporation into decision-making.

Opinion 203: Without RCOH continuity to guide future CVN RCOH, lessons from past RCOH will continue to be relearned as new and inexperienced RCOH leaders are presented with similar and predictable challenges.

<u>Recommendation 85:</u> Assign Commander, Air Force Atlantic as TYCOM for future RCOH to provide continuity across coast for CVNs and monitor RCOH execution across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

<u>Recommendation 86:</u> Require all RCOH stakeholders to report during every major milestone, planning event, and execution brief upfront on the title brief or slide the number of RCOH lesson-learned items identified relating to the subject and the number of lessons learned that were incorporated in the briefing, as a forcing function to drive active query of lesson learned databases.

<u>Recommendation 87:</u> PEO Carriers submit into NLLIS the CT1 lesson learned database on RCOH lessons learned to ensure the widest possible audience of those seeking information on common issues, to include quality of life, relating to long duration maintenance.

CHAPTER 4 Findings

4.1 Summary List of Investigation Findings

Finding 1: CVNs undergoing maintenance at HII-NNS experience disjointed and dispersed parking; episodic shuttle transportation; and a distant walk across the shipyard to the aircraft carrier in all weather conditions.

Finding 2: Aircraft carrier leadership invested significant ship's personnel resources in both manpower and command attention to alleviate transportation challenges, providing incremental benefit but costing significant manhours and impacting Sailor's in-rate training and experience.

Finding 3: The disbursed nature of RCOH support buildings compounded a complex and dysfunctional parking and transportation situation.

Finding 4: There are no identified minimum manning levels for aircraft carriers in RCOH or extended maintenance availabilities.

Finding 5: During RCOH, USS *George Washington* had insufficient supervisory manning to effectively provide training, mentorship, quality of life oversight, and overall development of assigned Sailors.

Finding 6: The current method of managing ship's manning through Fit and Fill, with insufficient available supply of senior leadership, leads to a competition for scarce personnel, which further impacts those ships with insufficient prioritization such as CVNs undergoing RCOH.

Finding 7 (Noncompliance/Deficiency): USS *George Washington* CRT functioned poorly and did not execute its duties and responsibilities effectively.

Finding 8 (Deficiency): Command climate specialist program level of knowledge was insufficient to provide effective program oversight.

Finding 9 (Noncompliance): USS *George Washington* leadership did not provide effective oversight of the CRT.

Finding 10: Internal and external assessments of the CMEO program were inadequate.

Finding 11 (Noncompliance/Deficiency): USS *George Washington* failed to meet established timelines for CCA completion and reporting

Finding 12 (Deficiency): From 2019, USS *George Washington* DEOCS participation remained low.

Finding 13 (Deficiency): Varying DEOCS report formats and changes in key climate measurements make year-over-year and long-term, data-driven CCAs challenging.

Finding 14: USS *George Washington* did not comply with the requirements of the CCA.

Finding 15: CNAP/CNAL RCOH instruction inadequately assigns oversight of Sailor focused programming.

Finding 16 (Deficiency): USS *George Washington*'s CCA corrective POA&Ms were ineffective in improving measurements of command climate.

Finding 17 (Compliance): USS *George Washington* and USS *John C. Stennis* effectively process, track, and report formal, CMEO complaints.

Finding 18 (Deficiency): USS *George Washington*'s virtual commanding officer suggestion box compromised Sailor anonymity in reporting issues.

Finding 19: Instructions, policy, and guidance governing RCOH habitability do NOT:

- Define conditions and criteria for ship habitability.
- Assign responsibilities to the chain of command for deeming a ship habitable.
- Require a determination of habitability as a prerequisite for the crew moving and living aboard.[642]

Finding 20: Instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing RCOH do not specify the criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections.

Finding 21: CNAL habitability inspections of USS *George Washington* were inadequate due to the absence of a formal inspection requirement, standard, and process.

Finding 22: CNAL habitability and Enhanced Quality of Life (EQOL) inspections treat RCOH ships differently from other maintenance availabilities.

Finding 23: Instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing RCOH do not specify the standard of ship habitability that must be maintained following crew move aboard.

Finding 24: USS *George Washington* maintenance team experienced difficulty managing shipboard habitability outages.

Finding 25: Industrial hygiene surveys inform commanders on workplace conditions, yet were waived until the conclusion of RCOH.

Finding 26: USS *George Washington* industrial hygiene and monitoring and survey program could not be evaluated due to apparent inadequacies in record keeping.

Finding 27: The USS *George Washington* Crew Move Aboard was premature.

Finding 28: Navy unaccompanied housing minimum adequacy standards fall below the DOD standard.

Finding 29: HII-NNS-provided accommodation at Huntington Hall does not meet DOD and Department of the Navy standards for accommodation.

Finding 30: There appears to be a potential increased risk of suicide of Sailors on aircraft carriers in maintenance periods in general and a potential increased risk of suicide of Sailors on aircraft carriers in RCOH at HII-NNS.

Finding 31: USS *George Washington* in RCOH was not an outlier in terms of adjudicated legal matters compared to USS *John C. Stennis* nor as compared to operational carriers USS *Abraham Lincoln* and USS *Theodore Roosevelt*.

Finding 32: The CRT aboard USS *George Washington* did not include all required participants.

Finding 33: USS *George Washington* command leadership did not have adequate level of knowledge to effectively implement the Navy's culture of excellence program.

Finding 34: The CRTHFC aboard USS *George Washington* did not effectively review at-risk personnel as required.

Finding 35: USS *George Washington* experienced resistance in the activation and implementation of the CRTHFC.

Finding 36: USS *George Washington* did not effectively implement the CRT and cultural champions network as required.

Finding 37: Inspections and outside oversight of the cultural champions network aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 38: USS *George Washington's* EOSC program is compliant with policy, available, and adequate.

Finding 39: The USS *George Washington* command sponsorship program was compliant with policy, available, adequate, and considered best practice.

Finding 40: USS *George Washington* command indoctrination program did not effectively ensure the timely execution of required training.

Finding 41: USS *George Washington* did not effectively track and monitor completion of command indoctrination.

Finding 42: USS *George Washington* Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program is self-assessed as compliant with policy, available, adequate, and considered best practice.

Finding 43: USS *George Washington* SAPR victim advocate program is partially compliant with policy. While accessible to Sailors, a further assessment of adequacy is required.

Finding 44: The command drug and alcohol prevention program is compliant with policy, but only partially available and adequate due to facilities limitations and manning levels.

Finding 45: USS *George Washington* command financial management program does not have a sufficient number of trained command financial specialists for the size of the crew.

Finding 46: USS *George Washington*'s ISIC did not conduct the command inspection program as required by instruction.

Finding 47: The commanding officer, USS *George Washington* did not routinely meet with command financial specialist to discuss financial management issues and trends.

Finding 48: The USS *George Washington* command financial specialist was not participating in the CRT as required by policy.

Finding 49: USS *George Washington* suicide prevention program was not integrated into the CRT.

Finding 50: Echelon 3 (i.e., TYCOM) did not provide adequate oversight of the USS *George Washington* suicide prevention program.

Finding 51: During RCOH, USS *George Washington* had insufficient training space to conduct suicide prevention related training.

Finding 52: USS *George Washington* was not exercising her suicide crisis response plan as required.

Finding 53: The USS *George Washington* deployed resiliency counselor was not part of the CRT as required.

Finding 54: During shipyard availabilities and new construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News, fitness facilities are inadequate to support Navy physical fitness requirements.

Finding 55: Current inspection standards for the physical fitness program do not account for adequacy and availability.

Finding 56: Navy instruction does not specify responsibility for physical fitness facilities at commercial shipyards.

Finding 57: CNIC-maintained, MWR facilities at Huntington Hall, Newport News utilize active duty Sailors to support MWR operations.

Finding 58: CNIC-maintained, MWR facilities at Huntington Hall, Newport News conduct two to three events per month.

Finding 59: Parking at Huntington Hall is inadequate to support demand for MWR liberty center, fitness center, and track.

Finding 60: The MWR fitness specialist assigned to USS *George Washington* provides adequate programming and support to Sailors; however, overall program effectiveness is reduced by appropriate facility access, resources, and re-assignment of personnel to fill gaps aboard other aircraft carriers.

Finding 61: The civilian afloat recreation specialist is available and adequately supporting Sailors.

Finding 62: USS *George Washington* after-hours emergent mental health resource availability enabled persistent access for Sailors in crisis.

Finding 63: USS *George Washington* has the correct “fit” or right type of mental health professionals but in insufficient quantity to meet demand aboard the ship.

Finding 64: USS *George Washington*’s psychologist encountered a significantly higher number of patients per month than the Defense Health Agency (DHA) standard, indicating demand beyond what is acceptable for a single provider.

Finding 65: Across active aircraft carriers, ship’s psychologists exceeded the DHA standard for patient encounters by 100 percent, indicating a force wide mental health capacity issue.

Finding 66: FFSC has insufficient capacity to support nonmedical counseling in Hampton Roads, which includes Newport News, Virginia.

Finding 67: USS *George Washington* mental health staff experienced a significant increase in case load, increasing patient wait times for non-emergent issues.

Finding 68: USS *George Washington* maintained Defense Health Agency standards for specialty care appointment duration despite increased demand, but it did not maintain Defense Health Agency access standards for specialty care appointments due to increased demand.

Finding 69: Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life (SAIL) program referral and intake process aboard USS *George Washington* were ineffective.

Finding 70: The investigation found limited examples of reprisal and penalties for seeking medical help aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 71: The investigation found indications of a stigma regarding mental and physical health treatment aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 72. Sailors aboard USS *George Washington* do not trust military health providers.

Finding 73: USS *George Washington* and aircraft carriers across the force experienced a significant increase in the average number of Sailors recommended for administrative separation for behavioral health-related conditions.

Finding 74: The average number of Sailors recommended for administrative separation for behavioral health-related conditions did not significantly change aboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 75: Throughout RCOH, USS *George Washington* maintained a high level of individual Sailor medical readiness.

Finding 76: During the COVID-19 pandemic, individual medical readiness levels fell across CNAL-tracked aircraft carriers.

Finding 77: Before crew move aboard, the average number of limited duty personnel from USS *George Washington* remained below the aircraft carrier average. After crew move aboard, the average number of limited duty personnel increased to the aircraft carrier average.

Finding 78: The policy on the granting of BAS during RCOH and maintenance availabilities is convoluted, confusing, and generally disadvantages the most junior and at risk enlisted Sailors.

Finding 79: The oversight by the Navy administrative chain of command of USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) was overly complex, confused, and not fully understood by key program managers within the type or fleet commander's staffs.

Finding 80: The absence of transparency in shipyard schedule changes for USS *George Washington* undermined trust in the chain of command and adversely impacted both Sailor quality of life and quality of service.

Finding 81: Combining maintenance funding with Sailor quality of life funding within RCOH, SCN funding results in quality of life programs becoming bill payers for contract maintenance shortfalls in RCOH.

Finding 82: RCOH for USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) was underfunded by $322 million dollars.

Finding 83: USS *George Washington* leadership requested an extension of the enlisted housing contract due to delays before crew move aboard but was denied by PEO Carriers PMS-312 due to overall funding limitations and prioritization by PMS-312.

Finding 84: Center for Disease Control, Department of Defense, and Navy COVID-19 policies and restrictions exacerbated an environment where systemic quality of life issues were already present within RCOH and onboard USS *George Washington*.

Finding 85: The collection of lessons learned does not in and of itself translate to effective dissemination and incorporation of lessons learned into planning and operations.

Finding 86: The current focus of the overall Navy Lessons Learned Program is fleet-focused, tasking the numbered fleet commanders, TYCOMs, training organizations (e.g., warfighting development centers, Carrier Strike Group Four and Fifteen), operational staffs, and unit commanding officers with designated command lesson mangers to collect and incorporate lessons, but neither shore commands nor system commands (e.g., Carrier Team 1, NAVSEA, PEO Aircraft Carriers) are adequately addressed.

CHAPTER 5 Recommendations

5.1 Summary List of Investigation Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Prohibit first-term Sailor assignments to aircraft carrier within 1 year of entering RCOH until after RCOH redelivery to reduce the most exposed and at-risk Sailors to quality of life challenges, reducing both risk to junior Sailors and the training, mentoring, and administrative burden to the chain of command.

Recommendation 2: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center study to identify RCOH "essential" manning, to include ship's leadership and support services (i.e., admin, supply, transportation) across all skill levels, in an effort to focus solely on RCOH and minimize crew size and the resultant RCOH impact to training, out of rate workload, admin support, medical support, support services (e.g., commute transportation), and onboard housing of crew.

Recommendation 3: PEO Carriers conduct an analysis of alternatives of Sailor parking for ships at HII-NNS to a single centralized installation, with security and quality shuttle buses of reliable frequency directly to the ships' piers. Cease contracting with HII-NNS to provide parking for Sailors assigned to ships in the shipyard and RCOH, making this a core Navy quality of life priority with clear Navy ownership.

Recommendation 4: PEO Carriers conduct an analysis of alternatives to centralize off-ship support locations, ideally near centralized parking, improving efficiency and reducing the transportation burden, while providing more access to Sailor services.

Recommendation 5: OPNAV N1 direct a Navy Manpower Analysis Center manpower study to identify RCOH "essential" manning, to include ship's leadership and support services (i.e., admin, supply, transportation) across all skill levels, in an effort to focus solely on RCOH and minimize crew size and the RCOH impact to training, out of rate workload, admin support, medical support, and onboard housing of crew.

Recommendation 6: CNAL/CNAP review periodicity and currency of CMEO inspections across U.S. aircraft carriers.

Recommendation 7: USFFC/USPACFLT provide guidance on requesting extensions for CCA completion.

Recommendation 8: TYCOMs review existing policy to ensure adequate tracking of commencement and completion of subordinate CCA.

Recommendation 9: TYCOMS ensure commands with low participation rates for CCAs effectively identify root causes and identify methodologies to increase participation in follow-on CCAs.

Recommendation 10: TYCOMs track, monitor, and assess participation rates through Enhanced Commander Accountability process.

Recommendation 11: Chief of Naval Personnel provide training on interpreting DEOCS 5.0 for all CMEOs/command climate specialists.

Recommendation 12: Chief of Naval Personnel require all DEOCSs to include a survey question regarding awareness of suicidal ideations and suicide-related behavior.

Recommendation 13: Chief of Naval Personnel explicitly define what records and/or reports must be included in a CCA and include this requirement in the associated command climate specialist checklist.

Recommendation 14: CNAL/CNAP revise instruction to include oversight of Sailor programs for CVNs during RCOH as a CNAL function.

Recommendation 15: CNO shift administrative control (ADCON) of Pacific-based CVNs to USFFC/CNAL for RCOH.

Recommendation 16: OPNAV N1 revise the Enhanced Commander Accountability requirement to include a required endorsement by the ISIC and concurrence/nonconcurrence on findings, assessment, and way ahead.

Recommendation 17: CNAL and CNAP publish guidance on Enhanced Commander Accountability scheduling and completion.

Recommendation 18: TYCOMs review methodology of tracking and monitoring CCA POA&M actions and effectiveness.

Recommendation 19: OPNAV N170C review CCA POA&M process to ensure it provides the framework for the development of result oriented performance improvement.

Recommendation 20: TYCOM continue to provide oversight of the Military Equal Opportunity program as required.

Recommendation 21: OPNAV N2N6 evaluate implementation of a shipboard variant of the Interactive Customer Evaluation system or equivalent system.

Recommendation 22: USS *George Washington* redesign the virtual submission tool to make personally identifiable information optional.

Recommendation 23: USFFC and USPACFLT to develop a universal definition for habitability and uninhabitability for all ships, assigning responsibility, authority, and accountability at all levels of the chain of command, specifying how the decision about whether a ship is uninhabitable or restored to a habitable condition will be made and by whom with continuing review as ship or shipyard conditions evolve.

Recommendation 24: USFFC and USPACFLT to develop and codify a process to make the determination of whether the ship is habitable or uninhabitable, leading to a recommendation from the commanding officer and approval by the TYCOM.

Recommendation 25: USFFC and USPACFLT align or establish instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections of RCOH to those of pre-commissioned ships.

Recommendation 26: USFFC and USPACFLT align instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing criteria or process for pre-crew move aboard habitability inspections of RCOH to those of pre-commissioned ships.

Recommendation 27: CNAL align or establish instructions, guidance, and manuals addressing EQOL inspections of RCOH ships to that of other maintenance availabilities.

Recommendation 28: USFFC and USPACFLT examine the timing and sequencing of industrial hygiene surveys for both new construction and overhaul to ensure Sailors are adequately protected from potential health risks.

Recommendation 29: USFFC and USPACFLT require commands to conduct industrial hygiene survey assist visits before crew move aboard to ensure living and working spaces do not present undue risk to Sailors.

Recommendation 30: CNO/CNIC review root-causes for previous policy implementations and determine if deviations are still required.

Recommendation 31: CNO/CNIC submit formal waiver request to Secretary of the Navy to lower minimum accommodation standards if required.

Recommendation 32: PEO Carriers review RCOH contract language to establish the DOD standard for contractor supplied housing.

Recommendation 33: CNO review and update as appropriate NAVADMIN 072/12, "Homeport Ashore Interim Assignment Policy."

Recommendation 34: TYCOM command climate specialist review and improve oversight to ensure overall program compliance.

Recommendation 35: NETC/TYCOM review pipeline training for senior leaders to ensure inclusion of prioritized Navy-wide programs and initiatives.

Recommendation 36: OPNAV N17 conduct assessment of COE program implementation to determine effectiveness and to identify lessons learned for future initiative

Recommendation 37: CNAP/CNAL conduct cross-carrier assessment of CRTHFC programs to identify best practices for implementation at scale and revise instruction as required to codify best practices.

Recommendation 38: CNAL/CNAP review cross-aircraft carrier rollout training for CRTHFC to identify best practices and products.

Recommendation 39: NETC review, assess, and modify, as necessary, leadership training continuum to include Navy cultural champions network that includes challenges to implementation as a leader.

Recommendation 40: CNAL/CNAP continue to monitor training progress across the aircraft carrier force.

Recommendation 41: NETC implement EOSC into initial ascension training for officers and enlisted personnel.

Recommendation 42: TYCOM review inspections process to ensure command sponsorship program is being adequately reviewed.

Recommendation 43: CNIC and TYCOM identify sponsorship training requirement gap and establish roll plan for commands.

Recommendation 44: TYCOM identify cognizant authority for externally monitoring and assessing command indoctrination programs.

Recommendation 45: SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 identify and resource sufficient training spaces to enable ship's to conduct cross-program training throughout RCOH and new construction at HII-NNS.

Recommendation 46: TYCOM conduct follow-on inspection and review of Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program aboard USS *George Washington* in accordance with OPNAVINST 1040.11D and NAVPERS 15878K, Bureau of Naval Personnel Career Counselor Handbook.

Recommendation 47: TYCOM/Installation Commander conduct SAPR program assessment aboard USS *George Washington*.

Recommendation 48: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) conduct capacity review to determine root cause of delays in drug and alcohol treatment.

Recommendation 49: NMCP review policy requiring Level I treatment aboard aircraft carriers when in homeport/shipyards.

Recommendation 50: TYCOM conduct command financial management inspection on USS *George Washington* and other aircraft carriers as required.

Recommendation 51: OPNAV review instructions to clearly specify inspection periodicity and ensure inclusion in further programmatic instructions.

Recommendation 52: TYCOM direct review of CRT guidance and requirements by all commands to ensure forces align to policy.

Recommendation 53: NETC/OPVAV (N171) review current Navy suicide prevention training and commercial suicide prevention programs to determine if commercial programs should be resourced across the Navy.

Recommendation 54: TYCOM conduct inspection of USS *George Washington* suicide prevention programs and other aircraft carriers as required by instruction.

Recommendation 55: CNAL/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 provide adequate ashore facilities to support training for aircraft carriers, ships, and submarines at HII-NNS.

Recommendation 56: CNIC/FFSC review deployed resiliency counselor training to ensure it adequately covers Navy-wide programs as well as positional roles and responsibilities.

Recommendation 57: SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 provide physical fitness facilities sufficient to support personnel associated with three aircraft carriers.

Recommendation 58: CNIC/TYCOMs review physical fitness facilities at Navy and commercial shipyards to determine adequacy.

Recommendation 59: CNAP/CNAL conduct TYCOM inspection of USS *George Washington*'s physical fitness program and other aircraft carriers as required.

Recommendation 60: OPNAV N1/Chief of Naval Personnel/OPNAV N17 review current physical fitness program self-assessment and inspection checklist and revise to include assessment of availability and adequacy of physical fitness facilities.

Recommendation 61: CNIC conduct manning review of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) facilities at HII-NNS to identify appropriate manning levels to support robust accessibility for the projected number of Sailors assigned

Recommendation 62: CNIC review funding criteria for MWR facilities at Huntington Hall to ensure it adequately accounts for total volume of Sailors assigned to Newport News, Virginia.

Recommendation 63: CNIC/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 review Sailor usage of Huntington Hall MWR facilities and develop plan to increase capacity to meet Sailor demand.

Recommendation 64: CNIC/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 review parking shortfall at Huntington Hall and develop plan to enhance parking availability.

Recommendation 65: CNIC/SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312 review parking shortfall at Huntington Hall and develop plan to enhance parking availability.

Recommendation 66: CNIC review USS *George Washington* MWR Fiscal Year-21 grant denial to determine causal factors and re-evaluate policy connecting grant funding to the status of vending machines and ship's store during RCOH.

Recommendation 67: SUPSHIPNN/PMS-312/CNIC provide centralized facilities for support programming for each ship assigned to HII-NNS, ensuring either walkability and/or reliable, continuous transport.

Recommendation 68: CNIC review USS *George Washington* MWR Fiscal Year-21 grant denial to determine causal factors and re-evaluate policy connecting grant funding to the status of vending machines and ship's store during RCOH.

Recommendation 69: CNIC review incentive structure to recruit and retain counselors at FFSCs in Hampton Roads, Virginia.

Recommendation 70: DOD, Department of the Navy, and CNO prioritize mental health clinician recruitment and retention to ensure adequate clinical services for all Sailors, particularly those assigned to aircraft carriers.

Recommendation 71: CNAF add additional mental health providers and behavioral health technicians to each aircraft carrier through the program objective memorandum and addition to the activity manning document.

Recommendation 72: CNIC evaluate effectiveness of referral system and barriers to program participation.

Recommendation 73: BUMED/Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) evaluate sufficiency of medical and mental health components in leadership development curriculums (all paygrades) to ensure it effectively provides training on how to mitigate reprisal and stigmas regarding medical and mental health services.

Recommendation 74: TYCOMs/Commands proactively leverage DEOCS results to support higher risk units in identifying, mitigating, and monitoring challenges. Focus on "Leadership Support—Ratings by Paygrade of Immediate Supervisor" and provide focused training to commands and departments scoring low in this category.

Recommendation 75: BUMED analyze the effects of COVID-19 on Sailor mental health. An understanding of the negative social impact should be acknowledged and understood so the Navy cannot only better prepare for the next pandemic, but also better help impacted Sailors maintain mission readiness.

Recommendation 76: BUMED collect and analyze 2017–2022 administrative separation data for behavioral health conditions to determine ongoing trends. Analysis should include specific behavioral health conditions leading to administrative separation; method of identifying specific behavior health conditions; and methods to identify these conditions earlier before individuals enter the Service and/or the Fleet.

Recommendation 77: BUMED review and identify measures of effectiveness to evaluate periodic health assessment screening process.

Recommendation 78: TYCOMs monitor number of limited duty personnel assigned on a month-to-month basis to provide indications and warnings of changes in the work environment in comparison to historical norms.

Recommendation 79: OPNAV N1 change or sponsor for change BAS policy to allow BAS for enlisted Sailors during RCOH during the period of entering of drydock to redelivery.

Recommendation 80: OPNAV N9 provide funding for crew meals, at no cost to the Sailor, during RCOH for the periods when the food service is allowable regardless of the BAS status of the crew to allow for duty section and onboard crew meals to improve quality of life in the shipyard environment.

Recommendation 81: CNO direct west coast CVNs entering RCOH to conduct an ADCON shift from COMPACFLT to COMUSFLTFORCOM and their respective TYCOMs to clarify C2 and ensure unity of command and effort.

Recommendation 82: PEO Carriers identify the current barriers to publishing timely, realistic schedule updates and analyze where the resulting risk is held.

Recommendation 83: PEO Carriers evaluate, assess, and modify current process for development and execution of integrated maintenance schedules in RCOH.

Recommendation 84: USFFC and USPACFLT comptrollers in concert with OPNAV and SECNAV Office of Budget should review the feasibility of assigning CNAL as Naval Supervising Activity Control for the Sailor quality of life portion of RCOH SCN funding.

Recommendation 85: Assign Commander, Air Force Atlantic as TYCOM for future RCOH to provide continuity across coast for CVNs and monitor RCOH execution across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

Recommendation 86: Require all RCOH stakeholders to report during every major milestone, planning event, and execution brief upfront on the title brief or slide the number of RCOH lesson-learned items identified relating to the subject and the number of lessons learned that were incorporated in the briefing, as a forcing function to drive active query of lesson learned databases.

Recommendation 87: PEO Carriers submit into NLLIS the CT1 lesson learned database on RCOH lessons learned to ensure the widest possible audience of those seeking information on common issues, to include quality of life, relating to long duration maintenance.

CHAPTER 6 Opinions

6.1 Summary List of Investigation Opinions

Opinion 1: The distributed and disjointed parking provided to ship's Sailors resulted in a perception that their increased commute and parking circumstances were not a primary concern to "Big Navy," despite the ship's leadership directing a significant outlay of their time and attention to improving parking.

Opinion 2: Sailor quality of life is negatively impacted by the parking assigned to ships at HII-NNS resulting in long-term negative effects in Sailor morale and their perceived value as Navy personnel.

Opinion 3: Absence of identified minimum manning levels by skill position or key leadership role whittles down the effectiveness of crew functions, impacting mission accomplishment.

Opinion 4: Supervisor manning shortfalls have a disproportional impact on organizations since supervisors are expected to not only oversee the daily function of the organization, but also provide the guidance and training to fill lower-level manning gaps.

Opinion 5: Manning shortfalls are a systemic Navy problem; no amount of advocacy by leadership nor TYCOM short-term fixes resulted in any long-term changes, and were inadequate.

Opinion 6: The combination of USS *George Washington* being at the lowest billet priority level for the distribution of prospective manning and being one of the only ships to source Sailors in support of deploying CVNs has transferred and consolidated CVN-wide risk into a single RCOH unit.

Opinion 7: Sea duty billet prioritization with inadequate manning supply simply shifts risk among units, creating an environment of manning winners and losers.

Opinion 8: Without appropriate balancing of supervisor and subordinate manning, manning practices add risk to mission accomplishment and negative quality of life impacts from a lack of oversight, mentorship, guidance, and other Navy leadership efforts.

Opinion 9: USS *George Washington* failed to institutionalize and prioritize CRT participation.

Opinion 10: Command climate specialist level of knowledge was insufficient to conduct program oversight.

Opinion 11: Treatment of the CMEO program as a collateral requirement sets the condition for conflicting priorities for personnel.

Opinion 12: Assignment of multiple CMEOs increases the risk of social loafing (i.e., puts in less effort because they are being judged as a group and not individually) undermining program effectiveness.

Opinion 13: Given the scale of the command, multiple CMEOs may be required; however, overall program responsibility should reside with a single, dedicated CMEO.

Opinion 14: Self-assessment is a critical command function. Effective self-assessment in accordance with OPNAVINST 5354.1 would more than likely have corrected program deficiencies if not program outcomes.

Opinion 15: The absence of critical self-assessment of the CMEO program limited program effectiveness and execution.

Opinion 16: The absence of routine ISIC assessment of the CMEO program limited program effectiveness and execution.

Opinion17: Because of the division of responsibilities between CNAL and CNAP, external inspections of the CMEO program did not occur as required.

Opinion 18: Completion of the CCA in a timely fashion demonstrates the importance of the CCA to the command.

Opinion 19: Many factors impact the ability to deliver a CCA in a timely fashion. In the case of USS *George Washington*, these included competing work force demands and the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting the ship's ability to effectively meet and collaborate.

Opinion 20: Delays in CCA delivery should be validated and approved by the TYCOM.

Opinion 21: DEOCS execution in the shipyard is limited by access to technology. Sailors may not have routine access to email and sufficient privacy to complete the DEOCS.t

Opinion 22: The convenience of survey delivery and completion greatly impacts performance.

Opinion 23: DEOCS execution during crew move aboard likely limited participation as individual access to computers was likely reduced.

Opinion 24: The removal of both the DEOCS assessment rubric and the comparative data created a critical void in command climate self-assessment.

Opinion 25: Despite challenges in data analytics, annual and situational DEOCS results show a command suffering from a chronically poor command climate.

Opinion 26: While there are benefits to the military's adoption of DEOCS 5.0, the switch likely disrupted long-term trend analysis at both the command and TYCOM level.

Opinion 27: Adopting any new system creates adjustment and adoption risks and this risk must be mitigated through robust feedback loops from users to program managers.

Opinion 28: Providing benchmarks of performance for the Navy and the specific type of command provides critical context for analyzing CCA results.

Opinion 29: The current presentation of data in the DEOCS 5.0 report format requires significantly more effort to interpret than previous formats. Misinterpretation of data regarding command climate creates risk to force and risk to mission.

Opinion 30: DEOCSs exist to provide the commander with a tool. Utilizing the term "organization" instead of "command" or "unit" may lead to misinterpretation.

Opinion 31: The hierarchical structure of the CMEO program should enable effective reach back to clarify unclear requirements. A questioning attitude is an expectation for every Sailor, regardless of grade.

Opinion 32: The governing instruction does not adequately detail what records and reports should be reviewed as part of a CCA, creating some degree of ambiguity.

Opinion 33: As the document was routed for signature across several different chains of command, it is apparent that no one asked "how" the required elements were executed.

Opinion 34: Military Equal Opportunity program oversight for RCOH should reside under a single TYCOM (CNAL).

Opinion 35: Program oversight functions are not adequately covered in CNAL/CNAP, creating risk to force.

Opinion 36: The omission of oversight responsibilities in the CNAL/CNAP instruction limited effective oversight of USS *George Washington* and created risk to force.

Opinion 37: It is unclear if CNAL or CNAP executed responsibility for the Military Equal Opportunity program oversight.

Opinion 38: In the absence of explicit transfer of oversight responsibilities, CNAP retained responsibility for the Military Equal Opportunity program.

Opinion 39: Because of confused command and control, USS George Washington command climate did not receive necessary oversight.

Opinion 40: Lack of oversight does not excuse ineffective program management and execution. Critical self-assessment is required.

Opinion 41: At the ISIC/TYCOM level, a gap exists that allowed a subordinate command to proceed without a proper Enhanced Commander Accountability debrief to the ISIC.

Opinion 42: In 2020 and 2021, routine business and administrative functions and timelines were disrupted across the world as a result of COVID-19. CCA requires a significant amount of meetings and focus groups, which could not be conducted in a shipboard/shipyard environment given limited access to virtual platforms and computers. Delays were to be expected.

Opinion 43: The connection between the USS George Washington executive summary and associated corrective action POA&Ms appeared disconnected across calendar years and chains of command. The investigation team struggled to identify linkages between problem areas identified in the executive summary and corrective actions listed in the POA&M.

Opinion 44: Given that command climate indicators remained low or worsened from 2019 to 2020, corrective or remedial actions proscribed in the POA&M were ineffective in improving command climate.

Opinion 45: Addressing issues in a CCA requires a strategic plan and follow-through to make meaningful changes. Leading strategic planning session an aircraft carrier is an executive-level function that was left to mid-level managers without sufficient training.

Opinion 46: If dedicated command climate specialists struggle to create effective POA&Ms that improve command climate, it is likely that individuals who support the CMEO program as a collateral duty may also be struggling.

Opinion 47: Training curriculum must be evaluated to ensure that POA&M development, a critical element of program execution, is adequately covered and emphasized.

Opinion 48: While the 2020 CCA POA&M may have been lost in the movement and disruption of crew move aboard or program turnover, the presentation of an identical POA&M as previously submitted represents a culture of complacency and normalization of deviation.

Opinion 49: Repetitive use of the same CCA POA&M across years irrespective of changes in the data undermines the culture of excellence that we strive for in the Navy.

Opinion 50: Increased awareness of suicidal ideations and behaviors within the organization should have triggered both concern and invasive action by the chain of command.

Opinion 51: Transparency is critical to building and maintaining trust between senior and subordinate. The process for correcting known command climate deficiencies remained opaque on USS George Washington, undermining trust in leadership at all levels.

Opinion 52: It appears likely that USS George Washington went 3 years without tracking a CCA corrective action POA&M, enabling a poor command climate and culture to continue.

Opinion 53: Execution of the CMEO complaint process did not negatively contribute to the command culture on USS George Washington.

Opinion 54: The number of equal opportunity related complaints aboard USS George Washington was not significantly different from USS John C. Stennis.

Opinion 55: Reduced anonymity may create fear of reprisal. Opinion 56: Every command requires an effective feedback mechanism that can be accessed both on and off the ship.

Opinion 57: A virtualization feedback path provides additional accountability for command leadership.

Opinion 58: Across echelons, afloat and ashore, commands would benefit from virtual commanding officer suggestion boxes.

Opinion 59: The absence of habitability guidance for ships undergoing RCOH created confusion for RCOH stakeholders involved in habitability planning and decision-making.

Opinion 60: The instructions governing "habitability" fail to specify the parties responsible for determining whether a ship is sufficiently habitable for Sailors to work and live aboard, or even that such a determination is required for a ship in RCOH.

Opinion 61: The absence of instruction fosters confusion and enables a lack of accountability among RCOH stakeholders.

Opinion 62: OPNAVINST 9640.1C, OPNAVINST 4700.7M, COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 (the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual), and COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B vaguely outline the types of spaces and facilities tied to habitability, and fail to identify specific habitability standards that should be achieved prior to moving a crew aboard a ship undergoing RCOH.

Opinion 63: The existence of habitability criteria for new construction ships but not for ships undergoing RCOH creates confusion and allows stakeholders to selectively enforce standards and requirements.

Opinion 64: The lack of a formalized requirement created a disparity between expectations for and execution of habitability inspections.

Opinion 65: EQOL and habitability programs require oversight by a single TYCOM entity that can holistically evaluate habitability.

Opinion 66: Because of the length of RCOH, EQOL programming that "finds, fixes, and trains" is of equal importance to in-service ships to ensure ship's effectively exit the yards at full habitability standards.

Opinion 67: The current informal approach to habitability determinations, involving subjective judgments and ununiformed standards, is inadequate given the magnitude of the decision and its human cost.

Opinion 68: Objective criteria enables ship's force and inspectors to hold themselves and each other accountable for a standard of performance. Self-assessment is vital to self-sufficiency.

Opinion 69: The frequency and duration of outages make normal shipboard work and life challenging in an environment devoid of alternative options.

Opinion 70: Even ideal management of habitability outages does not create the stability, predictability, and continuity we require for our Sailors who live and work aboard.

Opinion 71: Work packages that impact habitability create a potential trade-off between timely project execution and Sailor quality of life. When project execution is prioritized over Sailor quality of life, risk is transferred from the contractor to our Sailors.

Opinion 72: There are no specific criteria or standards defining the condition in which each of these spaces must be while Sailors live aboard a ship that is undergoing RCOH or any other type of maintenance availability.

Opinion 73: Execution of industrial hygiene surveys creates a foundation to inform and protect our Sailors.

Opinion 74: Execution of industrial hygiene surveys after our Sailors are living and working aboard a naval vessel creates risk to force.

Opinion 75: In the absence of an external inspection, it is incumbent upon commands to execute their own safety and operational health programs, particularly in the shipyard environment.

Opinion 76: Commanding officers with TYCOM assistance should request an interim or partial industrial hygiene survey before crew move aboard.

Opinion 77: The timing of industrial hygiene surveys must be re-evaluated to ensure we are insulating our most junior Sailors from potential health risks.

Opinion 78: No single stakeholder holistically examined the various elements of habitability and the broader implications of that decision.

Opinion 79: Stakeholders made decisions and recommendations about moving Sailors aboard the ship with incomplete information regarding the inherent risk of prematurely conducting a crew move aboard.

Opinion 80: The same formality and oversight applied to the declaration of "uninhabitability" should be applied to the declaration of habitability.

Opinion 81: Waivers and deviations from DOD minimum standards normalize inadequate provision of unaccompanied housing to our Sailors.

Opinion 82: The waivers authorized at various levels transfer risk to the Sailors who must occupy sub-standard accommodation, undermining quality of life.

Opinion 83: The continued waivers likely reflect the normalization of deviation.

Opinion 84: Current Navy policy deviates from DOD policy.

Opinion 85: Lowering accommodation standards instead of meeting the higher DoD-set standards should not be the norm within our Navy.

Opinion 86: Continued use of Huntington Hall is a normalization of deviation.

Opinion 87: The waivers authorized at various levels transfer risk to the Sailors who must occupy sub-standard accommodation, undermining quality of life.

Opinion 88: While there appears to be an increased risk of suicide based on this data, it is unclear if this simply represents expected statistical variation given the low base rate of suicide, leading to a high statistical variability.

Opinion 89: Based on the above data, there does not appear to be an increase in destructive behaviors during RCOH.

Opinion 90: Additional analysis of aircraft carrier data would be required for a more definitive reflection of the impact of RCOH on Sailor destructive behaviors.

Opinion 91: Incomplete participation in the CRT by required members creates stovepipes, preventing holistic examination of command issues.

Opinion 92: Without a holistic approach to understanding the problem, actions to improve command culture and the quality of life and quality of service of Sailors may be incomplete or ineffective.

Opinion 93: USS George Washington's leadership views indicate limited knowledge and awareness of the Culture of Excellence programs.

Opinion 94: While it is the responsibility of leaders to understand their assigned duties, it is also the duty of the Navy to effectively roll out new programs to ensure that leaders have sufficient knowledge and program exposure to execute on the command level.

Opinion 95: The CRT and CRTHFC are separate and distinct programs focusing on the command environment and individual Sailors, respectively.

Opinion 96: Effective oversight requires command level involvement. Neither the commanding officer nor the executive officer were aware of their central role in the CRTHFC and CRT, respectively. This may reflect inadequate pipeline training for command leadership.

Opinion 97: USS George Washington created its own barriers to implementation of the CRTHFC by shifting leadership responsibilities across various entities over a short period of time.

Opinion 98: The scope and scale of a CRTHFC aboard an aircraft carrier presents significant challenges. Responsible personnel aboard USS George Washington struggled to institutionalize the CRTHFC due to the magnitude of the task. Positive actions still allowed gaps and seams in the protective coverage afforded to our Sailors.

Opinion 99: While human factors councils have been a robust part of the naval aviation community for generations, implementation aboard Navy ships is relatively new, creating initial inertia and resistance consistent with any organizational change.

Opinion 100: Additional program requirements, regardless of merit and value, increase the workload on front line leaders and may lead to resistance if all other duties and responsibilities remain unchanged.

Opinion 101: In order for deckplate leaders to "buy-in," they require leadership, guidance, and training to understand the significance and importance of any program.

Opinion 102: Human factor councils are only effective if both leaders and subordinates trust in the process. Building trust requires time and persistence.

Opinion 103: Effective program implementation takes time, effort, and manpower.

Opinion 104: The Navy-wide rollout of the EOSC program and subsequent command-level implementation occurred in close proximity to the deaths by suicide aboard USS George Washington, limiting the programs ability to serve as a protective factor for Sailors.

Opinion 105: Command sponsorship is a critical program that enables connectedness for new Sailors.

Opinion 106: External program reviews of the command sponsorship are key to ensure program effectiveness.

Opinion 107: Command indoctrination is a key component in building connectedness when a new Sailor arrives aboard a ship. Delays in execution create risk to force and impede Sailor's ability to adapt to a new command.

Opinion 108: The combination of COVID-19 restrictions and inadequate space aboard USS George Washington created delays in the timely provision of indoctrination.

Opinion 109: The training environment directly impacts the effectiveness of classroom instruction. Adverse conditions undermine the value of any training. We must provide commands with adequate facilities to train the force.

Opinion 110: Ineffective administrative tracking is required in every program. Administrative manning likely created an oversight gap; however, it is the responsibility of the program manager to maintain rosters and attendance.

Opinion 111: When a Sailor is prohibited from working in their assigned rate due to an administrative backlog, quality of service for the service member degrades.

Opinion 112: Based on the self-assessment of the USS George Washington command career counselor, the program is sufficient. A more thorough assessment of the program is required.

Opinion 113: Based on the self-assessment of a USS George Washington SAPR victim advocate, the program is sufficient. A more thorough assessment of the program is required.

Opinion 114: Excessive wait times for drug and alcohol treatment creates a risk to force.

Opinion 115: The requirement to conduct Level I training aboard an undermanned ship likely undermines effective treatment. Shore-based programs should alleviate the workload and demands on forces afloat.

Opinion 116: In RCOH, aircraft carriers are not conducive to the execution of effective drug and alcohol counseling.

Opinion 117: The command financial management program requires a thorough and recurring TYCOM inspection.

Opinion 118: The financial burden placed on Sailors due to the availability and suitability of parking and housing transfers risk from the Navy to the individual Sailor to manage.

Opinion 119: Command-wide manning shortfalls at the E-5 and above levels undermines the integrity of key programs that ensure Sailors are set-up for success.

Opinion 120: The financial security of our Sailors underpins their quality of life and their quality of service. As such, trends in financial issues due to expenditures on housing and parking should have resulted in root causal analysis by USS George Washington.

Opinion 121: ISIC and TYCOM inspections provide invaluable feedback not only on command performance but also a feedback loop on issues with Navy-wide policy. Execution of inspections provides forceful backup and enables change.

Opinion 122: Integration of safeTALK and ASIST trained personnel within a unit adds an additional protective factor against destructive behaviors.

Opinion 123: Turnover of critical duties aboard a ship incurs risk as experience and knowledge of programs may be lost. TYCOMs play a critical role in providing assistance visits to ensure new program leadership is set up for success.

Opinion 124: Effective response to a death by suicide requires careful planning, detailed coordination, and rapid action. Drills provide a means to identify gaps and seams in the response plan.

Opinion 125: While community collaborations are important, it is the responsibility of the Navy to provide adequate facilities to train our force.

Opinion 126: The integration of outside support elements into a crew is challenging, yet in the case of the deployed resiliency counselor is essential.

Opinion 127: The Navy expects every individual whether active duty, reserve, civilian, or contractor to understand the roles and responsibilities within the organization.

Opinion 128: The lack of awareness of the CRT indicates insufficient integration and indoctrination of the deployed resiliency counselor by USS George Washington.

Opinion 129: The lack of awareness of the CRT indicates insufficient training of the deployed resiliency counselor on current Navy programs, potentially limiting their integration and effectiveness.

Opinion 130: Physical fitness directly supports our warfighting readiness and serves as a vital stress relief for our Sailors when both ashore and afloat.

Opinion 131: The physical fitness facilities at HII-NNS are likely indicative of broader problem with other commercial shipyards utilized by the Navy.

Opinion 132: It is the responsibility of Navy leadership to provided adequate time and facilities to execute physical fitness activities.

Opinion 133: Inspections of the command fitness program provides an opportunity to solicit feedback from Sailors on the adequacy and accessibility of physical fitness facilities.

Opinion 134: Employing active duty personnel in functions outside their professional rating (job position) must be done by exception.

Opinion 135: Quality of service is driven by the conduct of meaningful, rewarding work by our Sailors.

Opinion 136: Supporting MWR activities may be appropriate for individuals on limited duty.

Opinion 137: Extended hours for shore facilities should not be enabled by Sailors from afloat units.

Opinion 138: Reductions in funds provided to the MWR facility at Huntington Hall necessitates reductions in services provided.

Opinion 139: Based on overall demand for services, the MWR facility and associated parking at Huntington Hall may be too small to meet Sailor demand.

Opinion 140: Ships undergoing major overhaul should be afforded adequate access to resources and facilities.

Opinion 141: Reducing MWR resources transfers risk from the budget line to our Sailors.

Opinion 142: MWR activities provide valuable stress relief to our Sailors. Readily available access to events and programs is important to the well-being of our personnel.

Opinion 143: When a command is disaggregated across numerous facilities during RCOH, unity of effort across its many programs is challenged.

Opinion 144: Funding and supporting Sailor-centered programming during RCOH is of critical importance in creating a good work environment.

Opinion 145: The process for off-hour access to mental health support aboard USS George Washington is consistent with the carrier fleet standard.

Opinion 146: The effectiveness of off-hour mental health resource access is conditional on trust and the willingness of individual Sailors to access it.

Opinion 147: The overall lack of additional nonmedical counseling resources such as FFSC increased the demand for services and care placed upon USS George Washington's mental health staff.

Opinion 148: The reduction in services across Hampton Roads impacts every command across the area that depends on FFSC for specialized support.

Opinion 149: Reduction in counseling and support services ashore conveys risk to our afloat forces.

Opinion 150: Based upon maintenance of required treatment times, Sailors who received mental health treatment aboard USS George Washington received the same level of care despite the increase in demand.

Opinion 151: Matching the supply of mental health providers to support high-demand, low-density providers requires careful monitoring and appropriate response.

Opinion 152: Excessive mental health demand creates potential risk to force due to burnout and fatigue of mental health providers.

Opinion 153: Excessive loading of mental health providers aboard USS George Washington could have been identified and mitigated with appropriate real-time data collection.

Opinion 154: USS George Washington had insufficient mental health manning to meet the overwhelming demand for mental health services.

Opinion 155: Under-utilization of the SAIL program creates risk to force and may increase the likelihood that an individual does not effectively re-integrate into the unit following a suicide-related behavior.

Opinion 156: The ineffectiveness of the referral program requires further evaluation to determine root cause of communication breakdown.

Opinion 157: Countering the stigma to mental health treatment is a society-wide issue that is not necessarily unique to the Navy and USS George Washington.

Opinion 158: While senior leaders may encourage Sailors to seek medical and mental health treatment, it is deckplate leaders that must create a work environment that fosters help seeking.

Opinion 159: A mismatch between what is said at senior levels and what is done on the work center, divisional, and departmental levels erodes trust and confidence in the entire chain of command.

Opinion 160: Creating barriers to medical and mental health treatment undermines trust and confidence in the entire chain of command.

Opinion 161: It is the right of every Sailor to seek and receive medical and mental health treatment and it is the duty of every naval leader to enable access.

Opinion 162: Medical and mental health treatment directly supports our ability to retain Sailors capable of fighting and winning future wars.

Opinion 163: Reporting barriers to seeking medical and mental health treatment is fundamental to closing the say-do gap.

Opinion 164: Trust in military mental health providers is required in order for individuals to seek treatment and to engage fully in the treatment process. Without trust, the effectiveness of mental health treatment is reduced.

Opinion 165: There appears to be a force-wide increase in behavioral health-related administrative separations that warrants further investigation.

Opinion 166: While USS George Washington referred fewer Sailors for administrative separation, it is not possible to discern the root cause. Saturation of medical staff and facilities may have precluded the identification of behavioral health issues that warranted administrative separation.

Opinion 167: The impact of COVID-19 on general medical treatment likely reduced medical readiness across the east coast carrier force.

Opinion 168: Aggregation of individual medical readiness data provides a measure of command performance and process effectiveness.

Opinion 169: Effective periodic health assessment/mental health assessment screening requires critical self-assessment and transparency by the Sailor in order to ensure issues are identified and appropriate care is received.

Opinion 170: Notifying a medical provider of an issue requires Sailors to trust that the chain of command will support intervention and treatment.

Opinion 171: The increased number of aircraft carrier Sailors placed on limited duty may have resulted from broader COVID-19 issues to include access to medical treatment and mental health issues.

Opinion 172: While USS George Washington saw an increase in limited duty assignments, it did not see the same carrier force-wide increase in limited duty cases for behavioral health conditions. It is not possible to determine if this was due to effective mental health treatment or ineffective screening of personnel with mental health issues.

Opinion 173: The increased number of limited duty assignments following crew move aboard provides indication of a possible change in conditions aboard USS George Washington.

Opinion 174: Sailors may serve with a limiting medical condition for sustained periods of time before seeking care out of a sense of duty or out of concern for career opportunities.

Opinion 175: Poor quality of life and quality of service conditions on a ship may create a condition whereby individuals seek limited duty as a response.

Opinion 176: Limited duty data may serve as an indicator of changes to quality of life and quality of service conditions aboard a ship or submarine.

Opinion 177: The multiple MILPERSMAN policy on BAS is inadequate to address the unique circumstances of a CVN in RCOH in comparison to every other maintenance availability.

Opinion 178: The volume and administrative burden of the individualized nature of the pay documents within the RCOH results in errors that disadvantage Sailors in either late pay or having to repay overpayments that they weren't initially aware of.

Opinion 179: Pay issues have a disproportional impact and burden on our most junior Sailors.

Opinion 180: Having predictable pay is a quality of life issue to allow for the necessary good order of a Sailor's personal finance.

Opinion 181: Memorandum of understanding roles and responsibilities were not executed as written. CNAL executed duties implicitly designated and reserved for CNAP.

Opinion 182: Creating a hybrid ADCON relationship via a joint TYCOM instruction for CVNs is unnecessarily complex and poorly understood by those in execution.

Opinion 183: Without a clear line of responsibility of oversight, actual oversight becomes subjective among the responsible parties.

Opinion 184: The confusion on who had oversight responsibility for CVNs in RCOH would suggest that there was no clear unity of command to allow staffs to engage and provide the necessary oversight functions, or from subordinates on who to seek assistance.

Opinion 185: Pacific CVNs in RCOH at HII-NNS should conduct an ADCON shift from CNAP to CNAL, instead of operating by joint TYCOM instruction.

Opinion 186: The absence of transparency in scheduling constrains a command's ability to proactively manage quality of life and quality of service.

Opinion 187: Predictability in schedules reduces overall uncertainty for our Sailors and enables effective personal and professional planning.

Opinion 188: Integrity is the foundation of our warfighting effectiveness. Exclusion of key stakeholders in decisions that impact our mission and personnel readiness undermines command integrity.

Opinion 189: Schedule delays undermine our warfighting readiness, undermining our ability to man, train, and equip the right personnel on the right platforms at the right place and time. Delays to the schedule have consequential impacts on every key event and the ship's force requirements tied to those key events. Significant planning for upcoming training and certification requirements cannot begin in earnest until the command can be sure of the date of redelivery.

Opinion 190: Schedule delays have become the cost of doing business in our shipyards; and the acceptance that nothing can be done has become an example of normalization of deviation.

Opinion 191: Formal, transparent processes must be adhered to in order minimize the impact to our Sailors.

Opinion 192: Overly optimistic projections drove premature decisions, pressurized the crew, and unnecessarily increased risk.

Opinion 193: PMS-312 never viewed USS George Washington's request to extend housing contract to allow off-ship housing as a requirement and continued prioritizing overall project solvency of RCOH work, and believed the ship would execute crew move aboard to the planned timeline commencing at crew move aboard.

Opinion 194: PEO Carriers was not briefed on the refusal of the ship's request for continuation of the off-ship housing.

Opinion 195: Combining procurement authority for both quality of life services and maintenance activities creates the perception of potential opportunity costs between two core missions.

Opinion 196: Combining procurement authority under a single entity for both quality of life services and maintenance activities creates potential risk that overall funding shortfalls may be passed onto our Sailors in the form of reduced quality of life services.

Opinion 197: Continuing to combine habitability requirements into the funding line for RCOH is a necessary function to ensure cross-fiscal year stability and avoid the impacts of single-year funding.

Opinion 198: Naval Supervising Activity Control of RCOH quality of life SCN contracts and funding should fall under the cognizance of the TYCOM, who maintains a vested interest and oversight of quality of life of RCOH Sailors.

Opinion 199: From March 2020 to April 2021, COVID policy and restrictions had a detrimental effect on the ability of the USS George Washington to effectively provide functioning quality of life services to the crew. With finite hours in the day and COVID diminished workforce, quality of life program management, training, awareness, will logically atrophy reducing effectiveness and raising risk to mission. .

Opinion 200: While the most onerous COVID restrictions and policy have been relaxed, the impact on USS George Washington crew is still being felt today with suboptimal trained personnel on key quality of life services.

Opinion 201: Successful lessons learned have key components which include collection, and dissemination. Carrier Team 1 appears to be too biased to the collection of lessons learned while lacking an effective dissemination strategy, relying on inexperienced crew to passively search or ask for key information.

Opinion 202: Key timely knowledge was, in theory, available to USS George Washington (CVN 73) across the chain of command prior to key decision points but without an active pull from lesson learned databases was not presented to ship's leadership for incorporation into decision-making.

Opinion 203: Without RCOH continuity to guide future CVN RCOH, lessons from past RCOH will continue to be relearned as new and inexperienced RCOH leaders are presented with similar and predictable challenges

Enclosures

Enclosure 1. Appt Order - CNAL ltr 5830 Ser N01L-118 of 4 May 22

Enclosure 2. USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) 1000 Ser 00/089 letter of 23 May 22

Enclosure 3. USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Transportation Schedule 1

Enclosure 4. Summary of Field Observations, Parking, of 20 May 22–10 Jun 22

Enclosure 5. Summary of Interview with USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) E-7 and E-8 Focus Group, of 15 Jun 22

Enclosure 6. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 1 Jul 22

Enclosure 7. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 27 Jun 22, 19 Sep 22, 28 Sep 22

Enclosure 8. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 21 Jun 22

Enclosure 9. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 23 Jun 22

Enclosure 10. USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) DEOCS SURVEY, OF APR 21

Enclosure 11. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 27 Jun 22

Enclosure 12. (b)(6), email of 4 Aug 22

Enclosure 13. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 24 Jun 22

Enclosure 14. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 30 Jun 22

Enclosure 15. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 30 Jun 22

Enclosure 16. Summary of Field Observations, Transportation, 16 May 22–27 May 22

Enclosure 17. RCOH Handbook, Rev E, Mar 21

Enclosure 18. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 30 Jun 22

Enclosure 19. COMUSFLTFORCOM/COMPACFLTNOTE 1000 OF 24 MAR 22 (CANC: MAR 23)

Enclosure 20. USFF N1P143 memo of 25 Sep 19

Enclosure 21. Carrier maintenance Availability Schedule

Enclosure 22. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22

Enclosure 23. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Jun 22

Enclosure 24. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Jun 22

Enclosure 25. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Jun 22

Enclosure 26. USS *George Washington* (CVN73) letter 5354 Ser CVN73/00 of 19 May 21 (b)(6)

Enclosure 27. USS *George Washington* (CVN73) letter 5354 Ser CVN73/00 of 11 Jan 22 (b)(6)

Enclosure 28. USS *George Washington* (CVN73) letter 5354 Ser CVN73/00 of 11 Jan 22 (b)(6)

Enclosure 29. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 17 Jun 22

Enclosure 30. USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) CMEO Program Checklist, of 12 May 22

Enclosure 31. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Jun 22

Enclosure 32. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 8 Jun 22

Enclosure 33. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 8 Jun 22

Enclosure 34. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 8 Jun 22

Enclosure 35. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 8 Jun 22

Enclosure 36. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 8 Jun 22

Enclosure 37. COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3000.1

Enclosure 38. COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B

Enclosure 39. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22

Enclosure 40. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22

Enclosure 41. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22

Enclosure 42. Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22

Enclosure 43. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 21 Jun 22

Enclosure 44. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22

Enclosure 45. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Sep 22

Enclosure 46. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22

Enclosure 47. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 6 Jun 22

Enclosure 48. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22

Enclosure 49. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 14 Sep 22

Enclosure 50. SUPSHIPNN letter 4700 Ser CVN 73 RCOH 152BT/105E of 6 May 20

Enclosure 51. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 19 Sep 22

Enclosure 52. SUPSHIPNN letter 4730 Ser CVN 71 152LA/036 of 29 Mar 12

Enclosure 53. Enhanced Quality of Life Statement of Work, 1 Sep 20 to 31 Aug 21

Enclosure 54. Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 15 Sep 22

Enclosure 55. (b)(6), email of 5 Jul 22

Enclosure 56. (b)(6), email of 27 Sep 22

Enclosure 57. (b)(6) email of 7 Apr 21

Enclosure 58. (b)(6), email of 4 May 21

Enclosure 59. CNAL CMA INSPECTION—JUNE 2021

Enclosure 60. Response to RFI from (b)(6), email of 22 Sep 22

Enclosure 61. (b)(6), email of 20 Jul 21

Enclosure 62. (b)(6), email of 26 Feb 21

Enclosure 63. RCOH-020 Ship Habitability and Crew Move Aboard Strategy

Enclosure 64. USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) 4730 memo Ser 00/97 of 7 Mar 16

Enclosure 65. Response to RFI, Industrial Hygiene Officer memo of 11 Apr 22

Enclosure 66. (b)(6). A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided

Enclosure 67. RCOH-010 Key Event and Milestone Management Strategy

Enclosure 68. Key Event Closeout Form, of 16 Apr 21

Enclosure 69. (b)(6), email of 7 Sep 22

Enclosure 70. (b)(6), email of 3 Oct 22

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

1MC	general announcing system
ACFL	assistant command fitness leader
ADCO	Alcohol and Drug Control Officer
ADCON	administrative control
ADSEP	administrative separation
AIRLANT	Naval Force Atlantic
ALNAV	all Navy
AMD	activity manning document
ARSENAL	aware, rest, support, exercise, nutrition, attitude, learn
ASIST	Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training
BAH	basic allowance for housing
BAS	basic allowance for subsistence
BSO	Budget Submitting Office
BUMED	Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
C2	command and control
CAPT	captain
CCA	command climate assessment
CCMA	complete crew move aboard
CCC	command career counselor
CCS	command climate specialist
CFL	command fitness leader
CFS	command financial specialist
CIA	carrier incremental availability
CMA	crew move aboard
CMC	command master chief
CMEO	command managed equal opportunity
CNAF	Commander, Naval Air Forces
CNAL	Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic
CNAP	Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific
CNIC	Commander, Navy Installations Command
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COE	culture of excellence
COMNAVAIRLANT	Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic

COMNAVPACLANT	Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific
COMPACFLT	Commander, United States Pacific Fleet
COMUSCENTCOM	Commander, United States Central Command
COMUSEUCOM	Commander, United States European Command
COMUSFLTFORCOM	Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command
COMUSNORTHCOM	Commander, United States Northern Command
CONUS	continental United States
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CREDO	Chaplains Religious Enrichment Development Operation
CRT	command resilience team
CRTHFC	Command Resilience Human Factors Council
CT1	Carrier Team 1
CVN	nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
DCLPO	Departmental Leading Chief Petty Officer
DAPA	drug and alcohol abuse prevention assistants
DEOCS	Defense Organizational Climate Survey
DHA	Defense Health Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DON SAPRO	Department of the Navy Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment, and Suicide Prevention Response and Prevention Office
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DRC	deployed resiliency counselor
ECA	enhanced commander accountability
EMIR	Enlisted Manning Inquiry Reports
EOSC	Expanded Operational Stress Control
EQOL	enhanced quality of life
FAF	Floating Accommodation Facility
FFSC	Fleet and Family Support Center
FTE	full-time equivalent
FY	fiscal year
GCMCA	General Court Martial Convening Authority
HII	Huntington Ingalls Industries
HII-NNS	Huntington Ingalls Industries–Newport News Shipbuilding
HOD	head of department
HPCON	health protection condition

ICE	interactive customer evaluation
IG	inspector general
INDOC	indoctrination
ISIC	immediate supervisor in command
JLLIS	Joint Lessons Learned Information System
LIFAC	Light Industrial Facilities
MILPERS	military personnel
MILPERSMAN	military personnel manual
MTF	military treatment facility
MWR	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
NAVADMIN	Navy Administration
NAVENPVNMEDU	Navy environment and preventative medicine unit
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command
NAVPERS	Navy Personnel Command
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSEA 04	Naval Sea Systems Command Industrial Operations directorate
NETC	Navy Education and Training Command
NGIS	Navy Gateway Inns and Suites
NHRC	Naval Health Research Center
NLLIS	Navy Lessons Learned Information System
NNS	Newport News Shipyard
NMCP	Naval Medical Center Portsmouth
NSA	Naval Supervising Activity
OMN	Operation and Maintenance, Navy
OPCON	operational control
OPNAV	Officer of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPNAVINST	Chief of Naval Operations instruction
PACT	Professional Apprenticeship Career Track
PARM	participating acquisition resource manager
PB4T	Planning Board for Training
PCS	permanent change of station
PEO	Program Executive Office
PM	project management
PMS	program manager, ships
POA&M	Plan of Action and Milestones

POC	point of contact
POM	program objective memorandum
PSCM	Master Chief Personnel Specialist
QOL	quality of life
RDAM	Relational Administration System
RATSSEP	authorized to mess separately
RCOH	refueling and complex overhaul
ROM	restriction of movement
SACMG	sexual assault case management group
SAIL	Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life
SAPR	Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
SAPR VA	Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocate
SARP	Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Program
SCN	Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
SCOOP	Ship Consolidated Offload Outfitting Plan
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SMO	senior medical officer
SPPM	suicide prevention program manager
SUPSHIPNN	Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News
TAD	temporarily assigned duty
TEMADD	temporary additional duty
TYCOM	type commander
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USFFC	United States Fleet Forces Command
USPACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet

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[58] Carrier maintenance Availability Schedule [Encl (21)]
[59] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jul 22 [Encl (6)]
[60] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[61] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[62] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 30 Jun 22 [Encl (14)]
[63] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 24 Jun 22 [Encl (13)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[64] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]
[65] COGNOS Analytics CVN 72 Fit and Fill 2013 to 2017 of 8 Jul 22 [Ref (e5)]
[66] OPNAVINST 5354.1H
Command Resilience Team Guide [Ref (h6)]
[67] OPNAVINST 5354.1H [Ref (k2)]
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[71] OPNAVINST 5354.1H [Ref (k2)]
[72] OPNAVINST 5354.1H [Ref (k2)]; Command Resilience Team Guide [Ref (h6)]
[73] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]
[74] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) CMEO Program Checklist, of 12 May 22 [Encl (30)]
[75] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]
[76] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (24)]
[77] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]
[78] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (25)]
[79] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (24)]
[80] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 24 Jun 22 [Encl (13)]
[81] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]
[82] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (23)]
Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (31)]
[84] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]
[85] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (31)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (32)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (33)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (34)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (35)]
[86] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (32)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (33)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (34)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (36)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 8 Jun 22 [Encl (35)]
[87] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (31)]
[88] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 27 Jun 22, 19 Sep 22, 28 Sep 22 [Encl (7)]
[89] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 30 Jun 22 [Encl (14)]
[90] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 17 Jun 22 [Encl (29)]
[91] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Formal Complaints Tracker [Encl (285)]
[92] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Formal Complaints Tracker [Encl (285)]
[93] USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) FY-20 CCS Case Tracker [Encl (293)]
[94] USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) FY-21 CCS Case Tracker [Encl (294)]
[95] USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) FY-22 CCS Case Tracker [Encl (295)]
[96] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Formal Complaints Tracker [Encl (285)]
[97] USS *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) FY19-FY22 MEO Case Tracker [Encl (297)]
[98] (b)(6) email of 23 May 22 [Encl (286)]; USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Incident Tracker [Encl (287)]
[99] (b)(6) email of 18 May 22 [Encl (296)]
[100] (b)(6) email of 20 May 22 [Encl (288)]

[101] (b)(6) email of 20 May 22 [Encl (288)]
[102] OPNAVINST 9640.1C [Ref (s2)]
[103] OPNAVINST 9640.1C [Ref (s2)]
[104] COMNAVAIRPAC/COMNAVAIRLANTINST 3000.1 [Encl (37)]; COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B [Encl (38)]; OPNAVINST 4700.7M [Ref (v2)]; OPNAVINST 9640.1C [Ref (s2)]; COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 [Ref (t2)]
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[106] COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 [Ref (t2)]
[107] OPNAVINST 4700.7M [Ref (v2)]
[108] COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B [Encl (38)]
[109] COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B [Encl (38)]
[110] COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4720.1B [Encl (38)]; OPNAVINST 4700.7M [Ref (2)]
[111] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]
[112] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 27 Jun 22, 19 Sep 22, 28 Sep 22 [Encl (7)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) , of 21 Jun 22 [Encl (8)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22 [Encl (41)]
[113] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22 [Encl (42)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) , of 21 Jun 22 [Encl (43)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 27 Jun 22, 19 Sep 22, 28 Sep 22 [Encl (7)]
[114] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22 [Encl (44)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 30 Jun 22 [Encl (14)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]
[115] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22 [Encl (41)]
[116] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 6 Jun 22 [Encl (47)]
[117] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) , of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 14 Sep 22 [Encl (49)]
[118] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) , of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
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[123] COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 [Ref (t2)]
[124] SUPSHIPNN letter 4700 Ser CVN 73 RCOH 152BT/105E of 6 May 20 [Encl (50)]
[125] SUPSHIPNN letter 4700 Ser CVN 73 RCOH 152BT/105E of 6 May 20 [Encl (50)]
[126] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; SUPSHIPNN letter 4730 Ser CVN 71 152LA/036 of 29 Mar 12 [Encl (52)]
[127] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) , of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)]
[128] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[129] Enhanced Quality of Life Statement of Work, 1 Sep 20 to 31 Aug 21 [Encl (53)]
[130] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]; Enhanced Quality of Life Statement of Work, 1 Sep 20 to 31 Aug 21 [Encl (53)]
[131] Enhanced Quality of Life Statement of Work, 1 Sep 20 to 31 Aug 21 [Encl (53)]
[132] (b)(6) , email of 5 Jul 22 [Encl (55)]
[133] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)] (b)(6)
[134] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)
[135] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]

[136] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)]
[137] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]
[138] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]
[139] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]
[140] (b)(6) email of 27 Sep 22 [Encl (56)]
[141] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 14 Sep 22 [Encl (49)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]; (b)(6) emails of Jan 21 [Encl (91)]
[142] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]; emails
[143] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]; emails
[144] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 14 Sep 22 [Encl (49)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) f 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]
[145] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 14 Sep 22 [Encl (49)]
[146] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 14 Sep 22 [Encl (49)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) f 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]
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[148] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]; (b)(6) , email of 4 May 21 [Encl (58)]; CNAL CMA INSPECTION—JUNE 2021 [Encl (59)]
[149] (b)(6) , email of 7 Apr 21 [Encl (57)]
[150] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; (b)(6) email of 4 May 21 [Encl (58)]
[151] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; (b)(6) , email of 4 May 21 [Encl (58)]
[152] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[153] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) , of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[154] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]
[155] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]
[156] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]
[157] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 14 Sep 22 [Encl (49)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]
[158] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]
[159] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; CNAL CMA INSPECTION—JUNE 2021 [Encl (59)]
[160] Response to RFI from (b)(6) email of 22 Sep 22 [Encl (60)]; (b)(6) email of 20 Jul 21 [Encl (61)]
[161] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; (b)(6) email of 22 Sep 22 [Encl (60)] (b)(6) email of 20 Jul 21 [Encl (61)]; (b)(6) email of 7 Sep 22 [Encl (69)]
[162] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) , of 1 Jun 22, 16 Sep 22 [Encl (22)]
[163] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 19 Sep 22 [Encl (51)]
[164] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]
[165] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 15 Sep 22 [Encl (54)]
[166] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]

[167] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Sep 22 [Encl (45)]
[168] (b)(6), email of 26 Feb 21 [Encl (62)]
[169] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]
[170] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[171] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[172] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[173] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[174] RCOH-020 Ship Habitability and Crew Move Aboard Strategy [Encl (63)]
[175] RCOH-020 Ship Habitability and Crew Move Aboard Strategy [Encl (63)]
[176] RCOH-020 Ship Habitability and Crew Move Aboard Strategy [Encl (63)]
[177] OPNAVINST 5100.19F [Ref (y2)]
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[179] OPNAVINST 5100.19F [Ref (y2)]
[180] OPNAVINST 5100.19F [Ref (y2)]
[181] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) 4730 memo Ser 00/97 of 7 Mar 16 [Encl (64)]
[182] Response to RFI, Industrial Hygiene Officer memo of 11 Apr 22 [Encl (65)]
[183] (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]
[184] (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]
[185] RCOH-010 Key Event and Milestone Management Strategy [Encl (67)]; RCOH Handbook, Rev E, Mar 21 [Encl (17)]
[186] (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]; Key Event Closeout Form, of 16 Apr 21 [Encl (68)]
[187] (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]; Key Event Closeout Form, of 16 Apr 21 [Encl (68)]
[188] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[189] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; (b)(6) email of 22 Sep 22 [Encl (60)] (b)(6) email of 20 Jul 21 [Encl (61)]; (b)(6) email of 7 Sep 22 [Encl (69)]
[190] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; (b)(6) email of 22 Sep 22 [Encl (60)]; (b)(6) email of 20 Jul 21 [Encl (61)]; (b)(6) email of 7 Sep 22 [Encl (69)]
[191] (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]
[192] (b)(6) email of 3 Oct 22 [Encl (70)]
[193] (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]
[194] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]
[195] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22 [Encl (44)]
[196] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 27 Jun 22, 19 Sep 22, 28 Sep 22 [Encl (7)]
[197] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]
[198] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22 [Encl (44)]
[199] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 27 Jun 22, 19 Sep 22, 28 Sep 22 [Encl (7)]
[200] Commanding Officer's Weekly Agenda Slides 2020 to 2021 [Encl (71)]
[201] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (39)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[202] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[203] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jul 22 [Encl (6)]
[204] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[205] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 1 Jul 22 [Encl (6)]
[206] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22 [Encl (44)]
[207] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]
[208] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]
[209] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 24 Jun 22 [Encl (13)]
[210] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 24 Jun 22 [Encl (13)]
[211] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 24 Jun 22 [Encl (13)]
[212] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22 [Encl (44)]
[213] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (72)]
[214] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22, 21 Sep 22 [Encl (73)]
[215] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 9 Jun 22 [Encl (72)]

[216] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]; Carrier Planning Activity Schedule of 30 Sep 21 [Encl (74)]
[217] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 3 Jun 22 [Encl (75)]; (b)(6) email of 7 Sep 22 [Encl (69)]
[218] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[219] RCOH Handbook, Rev E, Mar 21 [Encl (17)]
[220] Commanding officer's Weekly Agenda Meeting of 10 Feb 21 [Encl (76)]
[221] Commanding officer's Weekly Agenda Meeting of 17 Mar 21 [Encl (77)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) of 1 Jul 22 [Encl (6)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[22] (b)(6) email of 7 Sep 22 [Encl (69)]
[223] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Quality of Life RFI, of 2 May 22 [Encl (78)]
[224] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[225] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 23 Sep 22, 29 Sep 22 [Encl (46)]
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[227] (b)(6) email of 7 Sep 22 [Encl (69)]
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[230] PEO Drumbeat of 13 Sep 21 [Encl (79)]; PEO Drumbeat of 29 Mar 22 [Encl (84)]; PEO Drumbeat slide deck of 12 Apr 22 [Encl (80)]
[231] PEO Drumbeat of 13 Sep 21 [Encl (79)]
[232] USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) Quality of Life RFI, of 2 May 22 [Encl (78)]; (b)(6) A technical understanding of how/where quality of life (QoL) services are provided [Encl (66)]
[233] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]
[234] PEO Drumbeat of 15 Feb 22 [Encl (81)]
[235] PEO Drumbeat of 9 Mar 22 [Encl (82]
[236] PEO Drumbeat of 17 Mar 22 [Encl (83)]
[237] PEO Drumbeat of 29 Mar 22 [Encl (84)]
[238] PEO Drumbeat slide of 5 Apr 22 [Encl (85)]
[239] PEO Drumbeat slide of 31 May 22 [Encl (86)]
[240] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 21 Jun 22 [Encl (43)]; Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 21 Jun 22 [Encl (8)]
[241] Summary of Interview with (b)(6), of 2 Jun 22, 15 Sep 22 [Encl (40)]; Commanding officer's Weekly Agenda Meeting of 24 Aug 22 [Encl (87)]
[242] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 22 Jun 22, 2 Sep 22, 14 Sep 22 [Encl (48)]
[243] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 23 Jun 22 [Encl (9)]
[244] (b)(6) email of 5 Jul 22 [Encl (88)]
[245] Summary of Interview with (b)(6) of 21 Jun 22 [Encl (8)]
[246] PEO Drumbeat of 12 Apr 22 [Encl (91)]
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[262] HII-NNS and SUPSHIPNN memorandum of agreement 84-27 of 31 Dec 21 [Encl (92)]
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INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHALLENGES FOR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS UNDERGOING REFUELING AND COMPLEX OVERHAUL